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Show I! DID ENGLAND DUPE GERMANY AS WAR BEGAN? ASKS VON MOLTKE ! Memoirs Say British Indicated Neutrality if French Coast Was Not Attacked, Thus De-laying De-laying Mobilization of Great Land Forces ated Press) "Did England, deliberately deliber-ately dupe Germany Into delaying mobilization mo-bilization by tentatively Indicating that she would obaeivo neutrality In the event that Germany d sis tod from a naval attack on tho north coast of I t i nee This Impression Is recorded by Lieutenant Lieu-tenant Qancral Count von Moltke, in no ut IIm critical chapter? of Ills memoirs," nuw Isum-d by In widow ihn eppenranoe ol which in.s beet) keenly awaited in view of the roh he ill. i .-d in tin- early days of mobilization mobiliza-tion and in the tierman defeat on the MUITH'. "On the day of mobilization, " says l the memoirs, "a dispatch arrived from London in which it wuu stated that England had obligated herself to assume as-sume tint defense "t th- i n in h coast against possible German naval attack. The kaiser aiik' d my opinion, whereupon where-upon I replied that 1 could hav. BO scrupples against f uaranteeing that no such atta U. was contemplated If England pledged herself to remain neutral. "It was my opinion that tho war against France would be d'-t ided on land and that we could wall dispense with naval operations If that was to be tho price of English neutrality. Obviously this dispatch represents England's first attempt to dupe us, at least to tho extent of prompting ua to delay our mobilization " AFKAID OF HOldiAND Von Moltku charges Russia with I having enkindled the war, inasmuch aa ihe well knew that t; rmany could not permit the destruction of her Aus-tro-Hungarian ally. The Qermfcn gen- , cral statf, he asserts, had long .since taken tho war on two fronts into its calculations. Plans evolved by F1 Id Marshal von Schlieffen, chief of tho general staff, provided for tho Invasion Invas-ion of Belgium, an It was commonly agreed that a decision In open battle bat-tle could not be forced without violating vio-lating Bclglun neutrality "Our Information Indicated," continues con-tinues Von Moltko, "that Franca was determined to entrench heis. it In a strong defensive position, which would force ua to conduct a long and wearisome weari-some trench and position campaign against a strong frontal defenae. Von Schlleffen even proposed to march I me ucrman ritriu ui, mi uujh airland, air-land, but rather than drive The Netherlands Neth-erlands into tho camp of our anemia, I decided to accept tho greater technical tech-nical difficulties Involved In forcing our right wing through the narrow section between Alx-la-Chftppelle and the aouthern boundary ot the province of Llmbourg. EXCUSE FOR DEFEAT "In order to accomplish this with the least possible loss of time It was necesBary to seize Lelgc Immediately " Admitting that there wan much to be said in opposition to an Invasion of Belgium, Von Moltke cites tho cany progress of the war In support of the German contention that Franco thoroby was compelled to meet the Germans Ln open battle, although ho admits that tho lnahillty of the Germans Ger-mans to conquer the French quickly wa8 solely due to English intervention, "If the attack on Llee failed. th moral mor-al setback would i. . . i n ' " r' blow, as It would have deprived tho Germans of Important railway on-.nections on-.nections at Aix-la-Chappolle ana "YJego and thonec on to Brussels. WAIt IjOKDS GEADDEM I) Von Moltke dues not spare VOP Bethmunn-Hollweg for th chancellor's chancel-lor's optimism with respect to the eventual attitude of England aj reflected re-flected In the statement m Sir lOdward Grey, then British foreign secretary, to Prince Charles Llchnowsky. tho German ambussador at Eondon, whh h not only pleased the chancellor, but tho German emperor, the minister of war and the other military lead) re, who were awaiting You Moltke at the palace on August 2. "All seemed elated over tho prospects pros-pects of a war along the eastorn front I only." says Von Moltke. " 'Now we have simply to mobilize our whole army along the eastern front,' tho kal-i kal-i set- stated, to which 1 replied that such a procedure was not quite so simple, sim-ple, It might Involve a year of preparations, prep-arations, and, onco accomplished, could not be altered. None of those present Boemod to contemplate the eventuality that France, which was U thn nlfnn.li , r , i , I , I 1 '. 7 1 i I L' WOllhl flf tlirlt I us on the west a possibility with which we were bound to reckon, lot, despite her alleged good will, how could England have prevented France from undertaking ueh an attack? HI8 VUBW6 PRE V. ME "The feeling among those present constantly became more agitated, and 1 seemed to stand wholly alone ln my views i finally succeeded In persuading persuad-ing his majesty as to the Imperative need of carrying out our original plan of mobilization, which provided for the advance of strong forces against France- and tho dispatching of a weak defensive army against Jtunsla. And-Other And-Other procedure at that moment would produce disastrous contusion In our military dispositions. "I declared that if the moblhz-itlon plans which had then been drafted, were subjected to alteration. I would be forced to decline to assume further responsibility. Thereupon a reply to Grey's message was drafted, In Which It was stated that technical reasons made it impossible to halt the German operations along the French frontier, but that no attack on France would be undertaken provided France also remained re-mained Inactive under directions inun England." I FARED DISASTER Von Moltke does not oonceal his disgust dis-gust with the English proposal and declares that h v. a convinced long before the outbronk of the war that France would never remain neutral ln the event of hostilities between Germany Ger-many find Russia and that tho mo-nv mo-nv "t war between Gerinnny and Russia, Rus-sia, broke out It was Imperative thai Germany, so soon as thc French at-itltudo at-itltudo becamo suspicious Immediately to declare war on Fram e ' L now d mandi'd of the kaiser and his immediate advisors as a guarantee of French good will, temporary possession pos-session of the fortrsses of Verdun and iToul," continues thc general. This proposal was rejected on the ground that It indicated lack of confidence in England. Tho outcome of i heso pour-aarlers pour-aarlers plunged me In utmost despair, for 1 fully realized that tins, diplomatic diplo-matic actions were working serious Interference In-terference with our military plans and that they were likely to result In the gravest disaster to us nationally " Recording his feelings when ordered to recall the army corps which was to occupy Euxembourg, an Invasion which was to bo avoided, according to Von Bethmann-Hollweg, as representing repre-senting an attack on France and which might vitiate the English guarantee. guar-antee. Von Moltke says: ADV UffOB MKDI RED "I cannot possibly describe tho sentiments sen-timents that moved me when I arrived ar-rived home; I broke down completely and wept tears of despair When an adjutant brought ln the dispatch ordering or-dering the Sixteenth division back from the Euxembourg frontier, I ! threw down my pen and declared that 1 1 would not sign the order, as such recall would Impress my subordinates as an Indication of Insecurity Urood-lng Urood-lng and a spirit of profound dejection, dejec-tion, I remained at my desk until 11 o'clock at night, when the kaiser summoned sum-moned me to the palat e. He had already al-ready gone to bed but got up and slipped on a dressing gown. He handed hand-ed me u dispatch from the king of England, in which the latter declared that nothing was known to him about an alleged guarantee by England which would prevent France from declaring de-claring war and that Liehnowuky's dls- I'lii' ii iimiol liau I'een I'tia'ii '.'il 11 " error or misunderstanding. "Thc kaiser was highly agitated, and turning to mo, said. 'Now you may do as you like.' 1 returned homo Immediately Im-mediately and instructed the Sixteenth division to march into Luxembourg " Von Moltke concludes tho chapter with n few dramatic Hues' "This was my first expc rleneo In tho war I have the conviction that tho kaiser would never have signed tho mobilization order If the Elchnowsky dlspatob had arrived a half an hour earlier. I could never get over the ImpreMlons created by this day's cx-perlem cx-perlem ; u was as though something within me had been destroyed, which never again could bl revived, confidence confi-dence and hope had become shaken." oo |