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Show DEWEY WOULD HAVE A NAVY !j Washington, Jan. 29. Admiral Dewey, who was oxpected to appear i before the house committee on naval affairs in behalf of four battleships I yesterday, was unable to be present, j ' and . Admiral Vrecland appeared in : I 1 his place. STho great admiral of the American navy has prepared a striking interview, inter-view, which expresses his views upon up-on tills question views which have tm not been expressed before. The m- I terviow will appear In tho forthcom- !ing issue of the Navy Magazine. Through the courtesy of tho Navy League of tho United States 1 am enabled to give this interview oxclu-u oxclu-u sivoly to tho International News Serv ice. - Dewey's Statement. Admiral Dewey says: A careful study of our naval establishment, estab-lishment, as it exists today, leads unerringly to the conclusion that it . grows from a need that the people feel instinctively, but know not how ? to meet. The mnsses of the people J live inland, rarely seo a battleship, have no opportunity for gaining knowledge of the navy. They believe - In an adequate navy, but are not 5 sufficiently informed to urge their representatives as to its upbuilding. J The result has been that tho growth of the navy has been haphazard; has been feverishly pushed at times when ) there was imminent national danger, - and nllowed to almost go by the fj board when there seemed no occa-3 occa-3 slon for alarm to the untrained observer. ob-server. "The general board carefully studied stud-ied the nation's commercial aspira-tions aspira-tions and the strength of the coun-$ coun-$ tries with whom commercial rivalry '3 was likely to bring us in contact. It studied the well-established national 1 policies like the Monroe doctrine and i the restriction of Oriental immlgra- - tion. It looked into possible com- 1 plications over defending the Pana- a ma canal and maintaining its neu- I"' trnlity. It became thoroughly con-1 con-1 vlnced that these policies could not bo sustained without an adequate navy, that America must have such a navy or surrender the place that it should justly hold among the nations of the world. - "Added to this, the general board i studied the naval policies of other strong nations, familiarized Itself 3 with their degree of preparedness, gained the facts of their probable j strength at a date twenty years ahead. It found that some of these i nations had outlined for themselves ! definite programs that were to lead j to a given strength at a given time. If tho United States oxpected to be able to occupy a position of influence influ-ence besides those nations at tho time, it must adopt a program that 1; would give It a comparable fleet at tho future date. : "So three years after Its organiza- l . tion, the general board, in 1913, was iJjU ready with its recommendations of a ' i- building program to last through the H years and result in a well balanced j and effective fleet in the year 1910. I It was convinced of the advisability I of substituting this continuing, con- I sistent building program for the hap- hazard methods of annual appropriation. appropria-tion. "Since 1903 the general board has i each year given the same advice with relation to a building policy. Its recommendations rec-ommendations liave each year been i unanimously concurred in by the" ex- i; perts who have made up the board. The public has usually been acquainted acquaint-ed with the number of ships that the general board has asked for, but the reasons for those requests have accumulated accu-mulated dust in the archives of the navy department and the public does not "understand the patriotic reasons that lie back of tho recommendations This year the secretary of the navy has transmitted the advice of the general board to congress for the first time and it has been mado public. "The general board is most anxious that the public should become familiar famili-ar with the building policy that It proposes. pro-poses. It -believes that the public, undertanding, will instruct its repre sentatives to provide an adequate fleet. If it does not, the responsibility responsi-bility will then rest with the pcopl6 and not the naval experts. "And this building program. What does it provide? "In the first placo It was suggested that the nation adopt a definite cumulative cu-mulative building program. It was shown that if provision wcro made for two battleships a year, with a third ship the third year, tho result in 1920 would be a fleet of forty-eight capital ships. The auxiliary ships to maintain a well balanced navy should, of course, be provided with each increase in capital ships. This would not appear to be an over-ambitious building program. The general gen-eral board later came to recommend as many as four battleships a year The impression wont abroad tlint tho general board stood for a continuous program of four ships a year. This was wrong The board recommended recommend-ed this number of ships for given years, because the ships provided In previous years had been too few and the possibility of reaching the goal of forty-oight ships in 1920 depended on providing the greater number at the time asked. "It is not generally realized that the United States is " lamentably behind be-hind in its construction of battleships and that the navy has already been placed in a position of inferiority during dur-ing the past two years. "The general board now realizes that its policy of forty-eight battleships battle-ships in 1920 will not be realized. It believes that a building program that will secure that result at the earliest earli-est possible date should, however, be definitely adopted. It recognizes that full understanding and complete support from the people and from congress cannot be obtained immediately, immedi-ately, nor in a few weeks nor months. "It believes, however, that it can evontually be 'obtained, however, and that tho best and surest method of doing tills Is for the department, whicb bas knowledge and understanding understand-ing of the questions involved, to adopt and maintain consistency from year to year a fixed governmental policy, ta.klng the congress and the people fully into its confidence and disseminating dissemi-nating generally throughout the prese, through patriotic societies and organizations and through any other available agencies, Its reasons and arguments in support of its policy." |
