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Show S je9a PMElimg9g 5 I Steiry f ttEne . EL IFo S (Copyright, 1031, In e!l countrl by the North Amerl- J 4fjT CJ (Wtt E w em rSowppr Allittnas. World right reserved. A Including the Scamim-eftta. ttprouction In wholo fm 9a wm T W&ft T M F " J or In part prohibited.) WNU SrrWc QjJlPMilM m K I'f &MttitjJ and that work everywhere In the A. K. F. slioulj now have that end In view. A cable i sent June 21 set forth the reasons for fixing the program for the future definitely at 3.000,000 men . as a minimum, and urged upon the War department the utmost effort to meet our immediate requirements for the expansion of port facilities and railroads. A detailed study of the troop shipments and tonnage required was Included. My cable closed: "There Is nothing so dreadfully Important Im-portant as winning this war, and every possible resource should be made lm- As I was leaving he came to the door with me, and I said: "It may not look encouraging Just now, but we are certain to win In the end." He clung to my hand and In a tone that showed the utmost solicitude he replied: re-plied: "Do you really think that? 1 am glad to hear you say It." This was the first and only time that I ever sensed any misgiving in the mind of this resolute man. Notwithstanding Not-withstanding our occasional rather heated discussions on the use to be made of American troops, I admired him greatly. It always seemed to me he represented the true spirit of confidence con-fidence and courage of the French people. I then motored to General Foch's headquarters at Bombon. We consin ered my proposal to form an American Ameri-can corps near Chateau Thierry, to which he readily agreed He spoke especially of the fine work of our troops. I asked how a German drive which threatened or perhaps captured Paris would affect the armies and the people. peo-ple. His reply was almost word for word like M. Clemenceau's. They had evidently discussed the possibility of losing Paris. He, too, was certain the armies would go on with the war. Foch spoke so positively and with such evident feeling that 1 was moved to get up and shake his hand. Concentrate West of Marne. Meanwhile the Fourth and Twenty-eighth Twenty-eighth divisions, en route from the British front to the northeast of France were stopped at General Foch's request In the vicinity of Vll-lers Vll-lers Cotterets, the object being to concentrate con-centrate several of our divisions ou the west of the Marne salient, primarily pri-marily as a precaution against anoth er German offensive there, but ultimately ulti-mately for possible use on the offensive. offen-sive. The Second, Third, Twenty-sixth Twenty-sixth and Forty-second were in that area and with the Fourth and Twenty-eighth Twenty-eighth there was a force equivalent to twelve French divisions, although some of these units were without artillery. An encouraging circumstance at the moment was the success of the French in holding Von Hutier's attack on the Montdidier-Noyon front. This fourth phase of the German offensive was an effort not only to widen the vulner able Marne pocket but to secure the railway between Compeigne and Sois-sons Sois-sons and open the way to Paris. The anniversary of the arrival ol 1 which might result from further activity ac-tivity of the Germans In the great wedge they had driven toward Paris. British Displeased. The British were displeased at the transfer of our divisions from their area, claiming priority to retain them by reason of having brought them over. When General Foch Inquired of the conditions under which these troops were serving with the British, my reply made it clear that he had entire authority to direct where they should go In the emergency, as without with-out It the theory of a supreme command com-mand "would fail. The rapid succession of German offensives had seriously crippled the allies, and not only materially reduced their powers of resistance but had depressed de-pressed their morale and caused the darkest misgivings among them. They grew more and more fearful lest the enemy might still have unfold reserves ready to swell his forces. That the morale of the allies was low was shown by the conclusions of many of their soldiers returning from the front to the rest areas. Reports from the British front were no better. Their troops continuously told our men who were with them for training that we had come too late and that our entry into the battle would only postpone allied defeat. This attitude seemed so alarming that I took steps to prevent sucb a spirit from affecting our army by promptly reporting the facts to allied authorities. authori-ties. The presence of such sentiments was another important reason for opposing op-posing any form of amalgamation. Vastness of Request Unrealized. Far short had we fallen of the expectations ex-pectations of the preceding November, when Foch, General Robertson of the British, and I had joined in an urgent appeal for twenty-four trained American Ameri-can divisions by the following June. It Is small wonder that, the allies were now so insistent in urging Increased In-creased and continuous shipments of men, trained or untrained. So serious was the situation regarded re-garded that it was no longer a demand for twenty-four divisions but for one hundred. It Is probable that the vastness vast-ness of this request was not fully realized, or else the allies had greatly "exaggerated Ideas of our power of accomplishment, ac-complishment, surprising as it actually actu-ally proved to be. A brief calculation of these demands of the prime ministers showed that they were asking more than 2,500,000 mediately available. Mr. Secretary, the question Is so vital to our countrj and the necessity of winning the war Is so great that there Is no limit to which we should not go to carry out the plan I have outlined for the next ten months, and we must be prepared to carry it on still further after that at the same rate or maybe faster." CHAPTER XLVII The Thirty-second. Thirty-fifth, Forty-second and Seventy-seventh divisions were now In training under the recently organized Third corps. Especial effort was being made to hasten their preparation in both staff and line In anticipation of an early call for more serious service. serv-ice. I inspected these troops June 19-22, 1918, and my impressions were favor-. able, although a number of officers were found unfamiliar with the principles prin-ciples of tactical leadership. In such hastily trained units this was hardly surprising, especially In view of the known defects of the Instruction at home. Many were found with but slight appreciation ap-preciation of the natural defensive possibilities of a given position. Some battalion and even regimental com manders had not thought to ascertain the exact location of their front lines, and of course had failed to work out the details of preparation against a possible attack. My predilection for detailed Instruction Instruc-tion in minor tactics, growing out of my personal supervision of training In both small and large units, led me quickly to discover deficiencies. My diary notes the establishment of the military board of allied supply at this time, June 22, 1918. It was expected ex-pected to study questions of supply and adopt proper measures for the coordination co-ordination of allied' resources and utilities. Col. Charles G. Dawes, who had charge in a more limited sphere of the co-ordination of our own supply departments, was detailed as the American member of the board. Lauds Courage of Negro Troops. Cables from the War department June 22 stated that the colored people at home were being told that negro soldiers in France were always placed in the most dangerous positions, being be-ing sacrificed to save white troops, and were often left on the field to die without medical attention. It was not difficult to guess the origin of this sort CHAPTER XLIV Continued It seemed to me then that If this picture of civilization engaged In the persecution of Innocent and unarmed noncombatantH, mostly women and children, could be brought home to all peoples, reason would be forced upon rulers and governments where too often their passions and ambitions assume as-sume control. As a result of the German successes against the French something akin to u panic prevailed In Paris. Probably a million people left during the spring and there was grave apprehension among the officials lest the city be taken. Plans were made to remove the government to Bordeaux and we ourselves were prepared to remove our olllces.8 CHAPTER XLV The Second division assumed the offensive of-fensive June (1, 1918, and began a series se-ries of atlacks which culminated some three weeks later In the capture of the last German positions in the Bois de lielleau by Its marine brigade and of iVuux by its regular brigade. The fighting during most of this period pe-riod was of peculiar Intensity. The German lines were favorably located !on commanding ground and were made more formidable by the extensive use of machine guns, especially In Belleau 1 wood. In the Initial advance llarbord's marine ma-rine brigade captured Bouresches, and Lewis' regular brigade took Triangle farm and Bols de la Barctte. During the next few days our troops progressed pro-gressed piecemeal. June 15 the Seventh Sev-enth Infantry, Third division, arrived to reinforce the marine brigade engaged en-gaged In the wood. This regiment relieved re-lieved the brigade on that date and the marines were rested for a week, when they again entered the line. Against stubborn resistance, they drove the enemy from the wood June 25. Regulars Capture Vaux. Meanwhile the regular brigade continued con-tinued its attacks intermittently, and July 1, with great dash, captured Vaux and the Bols de la Roche. The operations opera-tions of the division in this vicinity were practically at an end when the new lines were stabilized on the high ground captured from the enemy. The casualties in the division were about 9,51X1. More than 1.000 prisoners were captured from the enemy. The gains by the Second division were won with little aid on either Hank by the French units, which were still In poor shape, and were made ngninst an enemy determined to crush this early American effort. The success suc-cess of this division and of the First at Cantigny and the Third on the Marne, following as they did the crisis of May 27, were loudly acclaimed by the French, and for the time being had a very stimulating effect upon French morale. With the transfer of activities to the French front northeast of Paris, our plan to build up an American corps near Amiens had become impracticable, imprac-ticable, and as I had offered General Retain the services of our divisions wherever they might be needed it now appeared possible to form at least a corps and possibly an army somewhere along the Marne salient. U. S. Divisions Relieve French. I had suggested that we should bring other divisions to join the Second Sec-ond and Third for that purpose, and accordingly the Twenty-Sixth and Forty-second were relieved from the inactive Vosges front, and five American Ameri-can divisions from the British area were designated to be sent to that quiet sector to relieve French divisions. divi-sions. The assembly of four American Ameri-can divisions in aid of the French on that front would more than offset their recent losses. General I'etain, in his letter accepting accept-ing my offer, said in part: "I must express my deep gratitude for She prompt and very important aid you are bringing in the present crisis. The American troops already engaged in the battle are the unanimous unani-mous admiration of the whole French army. The power of the effort which your country is at present showing, as well as the resolute and generous spirit with which you enter the struggle, is for the allies and above all for France a comfort in the grave times through which we are passing, and a pledge of hope for the future." What if Paris Should Fall? Leaving the suggestion with General Petain, without further discussion, 1 returned to Paris, arriving June 8. The next morning I called on Premier Clemenceau, and on that morning the fourth phase of the great German offensive of-fensive started between Montdidier and the Oise. Reports indicated that it was meeting considerable success Mentioning this to M. Clemenceau I askea htm what he thought would be the result if Paris should fall. M. Clemenceau replied that he ami Mr. Lloyd George bad ?onsldered that possibility, and had reached the conclusion con-clusion they would do everything In their power to save Paris, but If li should be lost they would go on fighting. fight-ing. "Above Paris is France," he added, "umd above France is civilization." ENcagX LOCATION AMERICAN DIVISIONS r-p- )soJy JULY 18.1918 LLJ )'flr ?tr'" International bdy E?f '" Bruxelles Numerals indicate Divisions i WittXlL Si lisi Vi.ifLl circled numerals those not in line 3-? VLIlie v p 50 . 'OP MILES afaZBSSas o '' ' ' SO ' 100 150 KILOMETERS 0 Cherbourg SedQ c-sp SaiiQTiI eimsiss.)S GERMANY rY zeiS-t JMetz Brest PaflSC e-UuclV. A (NeufdhateatAv f:) r ? ru Lo7inal lCblmkr ChaumorVt (g) A V ' SWifzERLP our advance contingent in France was the occasion of many congratulations on the part of the French. CHAPTER XLVl The demands for American divisions divi-sions were pressing. The First, second sec-ond and Third had already become actively ac-tively engaged, the Firs', being slated to go to the reserve near the Chateau Thierry salient when relieved from Cantigny. The Second was still in line at Belleau wood, and the Third south of the Marne. General Foch had asked for five of the divisions recently arrived that were training with the British. . Of these the Fourth and Twenty-eighth, while en route to the quiet Vosges sector sec-tor to relieve French divisions, had been diverted to the reserve near the western face of the Marne salient. The Thirty-fifth moved to the vicinity vicin-ity of Epinal aud the Seventy-seventh was about to enter the trenches in the Baccarat sector to replace the Forty second, which was to reinforce Gou raud'sarmy east of Itheims. The Eighty-second Eighty-second had started for the Toul sector sec-tor to relieve the Twenty-sixth, which in turn was soon to relieve the Second Thus there were three American di visions In quiet sectors and seven either In the battle line or held In readiness to meet any eventuality combatant troops by the following spring, which, augmented by those required re-quired for the services of supply, conservatively con-servatively calculated for a well-balanced force situated in 1 foreign country coun-try under the circumstances that surrounded sur-rounded us, would amount at least to 4.000.000 men. The American combatant force would thus have equaled 'J00 divisions of the allies, and their apprehension may be imagined when ..e realize that this was greater by one-fourth than the combined allied armies of 1G2 divisions di-visions then on the western front. Saw 3,000,000 as Limit. Although no such number as this could have been considered feasible, as It Is unlikely that ii could have been either transported, equipped or supplied, It was necessary, in view of ' the situation, to lay plans for bringing over all we could. After giving the question careful study, it seemed to me that 3.000.000 men would be the limit we could hope to reach by the spring of 1919. This, roughly, would provide at leasi sixty-six or possibly over seventy com batant divisions, the rest being necessary neces-sary for the noncomhatnnt service. As we had hitherto made estimates based upon a total force of 2,000,000 men, li was quite imperative that calcul.i t i::i -should be made on the Increased lu.- of propaganda. As a matter of fact, none of these troops had been in line except in quiet sectors. Those I had recently seen were in fine spirits aud seemed keen for active service. The only colored combat troops In France were those of the Ninety-second division, then in a quiet sector In the Vosges, and the four infantry regiments regi-ments of the Ninety-third, each attached at-tached to a French division. Several individuals serving with the French had already received tne croix de guerre for conduct in raids. Clemenceau at Chaumont. Prime Minister Clemenceau, General Foch and M. Andre Tardieu, with Generals Gen-erals Weygand and itordacq, came to Chaumont June 23, 1918, for a conference confer-ence on the increase of American man power. M. Clemenceau's popularity In France was probably at its height. As this was his first visit to Chaumont the people turned out en masse, crowded crowd-ed into the plaza and gave him a rousing rous-ing welcome, llis reception within the hotel de ville by the officials, civil and military, was marked by eloquent speeches. In his remarks M. Clemenceau Clemen-ceau gave the people every encouragement, encourage-ment, making special reference to the increasing forces the Americans were sending over. . (TO BB CONTiNUBO) |