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Show Bji iH SMessi! IPassMnag5g i I tny fi tlm Ao Mo W, f JJ (Copyright, 1931, In all coun tries by the North Amcrl- GSlCfSE ww can New))fr Alliunce. World rights reserved, if w' including the Scandinavian. Sieproduction in whole Tr t-m n W Pimi -7 w-m Jj or in pan prohibited.) -W.NU Ser.ico W0JJS,. A Vr&iliSltJ Q the Brst contingent, their rntlior un-military un-military appearance in ill-fitting uniforms uni-forms and their apparent lack of formal for-mal discipline created the impression in the minds of the French officials that they were too kind-hearted to be come aggressive Sghting troops. At the conclusion of my inspection of various places Chaumout was selected se-lected as the best site for our general headquarters. It was on our line of communications to the front and centrally cen-trally placed as to probable sectors of our operations. The tine stone regimental regi-mental barracks became our headquarters headquar-ters and we were able to obtain ample billeting accommodations In houses for all except the enlisted men, who were provided with temporary barracks. CHAPTER XI In the organization of our armies for the World war it was evident that if any considerable numbers were to be sent abroad an additional force would be needed over and above the regular army and the National Guard. The War department therefore established estab-lished what was called the national army, to be composed principally of men who were to come into service through the draft. Most of the divisions di-visions of the national army were organized or-ganized in August and September, 1917. As the time approached to begin the training of the smaller units it was found that after equipping the special troops urgently needed in France there was little equipment left even for the additional men required to fill up the National Guard. Unfortunately, this made It necessary neces-sary to delay calling out men for the units of the national army. However, considerable numbers were called into service and proceeded with preliminary prelimi-nary instruction, but the lack of equipment equip-ment 'seriously delayed their progress. Visiting Billeting Areas. My diary notes the following: Paris, Tuesday,- August 21, 1917. Visited billeting areas of Forty-seventh Forty-seventh French and our First division di-vision with General Petain on Snndav. of tonnage. The other members of the conference were of the opinion that if new adjustments could be made there might be shipping for nine or ten of our divisions before spring. So for the moment there did not seem to be the slightest chance of transporting a million men to France by the following follow-ing June. After canvassing the whole situation, situa-tion, the conference expressed the unanimous opinion that a defensive role should be adopted on all secondary second-ary fronts. The British and French representatives hoped that the surplus sur-plus troops resulting from this course might be available to strengthen their armies In France and General Cador-na, Cador-na, of course, thought the Italian armies should have their share. CHAPTER X About this time (.luly, 1917) disturbing disturb-ing reports were submitted to me confidentially con-fidentially by one of our naval officers sent by Admiral Sims from London. Calculations based upon tonnage losses for May, June and July seemed to confirm the conclusions of a month previous that there would soon be In-sullicient In-sullicient allied shipping left to bring over an American army of required strength, and that the allies would find it dillicult to keep up their food supply sup-ply from overseas. The data presented by the naval officer proved that if this rate of destruction de-struction could not be reduced the war would be lost before we could fire a shot. This report was certainly most pessimistic, pes-simistic, but It did not dispel my confidence con-fidence in the success of the plan that had been tested and was about to be inaugurated of sending ships over in convoys under the protection of naval i vessels. Additional destroyers requested re-quested by Admiral Sims had by this One message Intercepted by the French, sent from some wirtless station sta-tion in Spain to the German general staff, announced the arrival of several American vessels at Nantes and of 10,(X)0 American soldiers at St. Na-zaire, Na-zaire, and also gave the routes taken by our transports. Another, evidently intended for submarines, sub-marines, reported the departure of a convoy of transports from New York. These and similar facts were cabled at once to Admiral Sims and to Washington. Wash-ington. Leadership Big Problem. Probably the most important factor in building up an aggressive army is the selection of leaders. Without sufficient suf-ficient leadership the finest of troops may suffer defeat by inferior forces skillfully led. The following was my recommenda tlon to Secretary of War Baker: "My observation of Brifish and French armies and most exacting arduous ardu-ous service conditions at the front fully convince me that only officers In full mental and physical vigor should be sent here. Contrary course means certain inefficiency in our service and possible later humiliation of officers concerned. General officers must undergo un-dergo extreme effort in personal supervision super-vision of operations In trenches. Very few British or French division commanders com-manders over forty-five or brigadiers over forty. "We have too much at stake to risk inefficiency through mental or physical defects. Strongly recommend conditions condi-tions be fully considered in making high appointments and suggest that no officer of whatever rank be sent here for active service who ts not strong and robust in every particular. Officers selected for appointment general gen-eral officer of line should be those with experience in actively command- CHAPTER IX Continued. Referring to their lack of artillery In the beginning, General Ilirch said there was reason to believe that they had finally attained a superiority over the Germans. Real Teamwork Lacking. Sir Douglas told me some of the de talis of Nlvelle's unsuccessful attack In the spring, how It was known far and wide, beforehand and spoke particularly par-ticularly of the consequent serious disaffection dis-affection among the French troops. Although Al-though he had placed himself under Nlvelle's command for these opera Hons, he had, he said, little confidence In the outcome from the start. lie ul.so commented on the failure of the French to co-operate fully on various occasions. His remarks entirely confirmed con-firmed the belief that I had long since held that real teamwork between the two armies was almost totally absent. Scarcely anything more strikingly impressed upon me our unprepared-ness unprepared-ness than what I saw during a few hours spent with General Trent-hard at the British flying field, where we witnessed flyers doing every Imaginable Imagin-able stunt, and saw planes of all classes, bombing, pursuit and observation, observa-tion, motors of different types and (he thoroughly equipped repair shops. The outstanding thing, however, which it was gratifying to note later on In our own aviation personnel, was the incomparable spirit and alertness of the young officers and the enlisted personnel. Every man seemed to be disappointed when a flight of planes departed for the front without him. Tills visit to British headquarters was most Instructive, as every opportunity oppor-tunity was given us to study intimately intimate-ly the details of their wartime organization. organi-zation. After similar studies of the French system we selected from each those features best suited to perfect a well-balanced staff for our own army. The cordial relations and good un derstanding established between Sir" Douglas Uaig and myself and between the corresponding members of out staffs and with a number of the lead lng British officers with whom we were Inter to have official dealings proved very advantageous. In London, long after the armistice, Sir Douglas, In an after-dinner speech, referred to this visit, which happened during a period of depression, and said that our timely appearance at his headquarters had aroused in them a strong feeling of hopefulness for the future. Meets Other Leaders. My diary at this time notes the following : Inspected St. Dizier regulating station and witnessed attack near Verdun yesterday. Visited French hospital at Souilly. Returned this morning with M. Painleve, minister of war, ou his train. As I had accepted General Petaln's invitation to see the French offensive " that was to take place August 20. I motored to French general headquarters headquar-ters on the 18th, accompanied by Colonel Col-onel Palmer and Captain Boyd, and after dinner left with General Petain and two or three members of his staff on his train for an Inspection of French and American troops the following fol-lowing day. We reached Gondrecourt the next morning and began the day with a review of the French Forty-seventh infantry division, which was paraded pa-raded on a prominent plateau near Houdelaincourt. This division had been in every serious seri-ous engagement of the war and its losses had been very heavy, as could be easily surmised from the youthful appearance of the officers, most of whom had risen from the ranks to replace re-place casualties among their seniors. General Petain told them that because of its fine record the division had been given the special honor of assisting assist-ing in the instruction of the American First division. I ?I S3 11 H 3S ?5r r?- Tv7. , . , , - -A Val des Ecoliers, near Chaumont, Domicile of the American Commander in France. Paris, Thursday, July 26, 1017. Had breakfast yesterday at the Crillon with Lloyd George. He Is alert and energetic and has a clear conception of allied problems. prob-lems. Took lunch with Mr. Balfour, Bal-four, who thinks we have reason to feel easier regarding submarines. subma-rines. Representatives of the various va-rious allies met for conference on general situation. In the evening M. Ribot, the prime minister, gave a state dinner to officials attending attend-ing conference. Today attended luncheon to al-iJed al-iJed representatives given by the President and lime. Poincare at the Elysee palace. In conference this afternoon with Petain, Cadorna, Robertson and Foch at latter's office. Discussed Dis-cussed military plans, talked about tonnage possibilities and shortage of personnel. All pessimistic pessi-mistic and reserved. James Stillnuin, just returned from a tour of France, confirms reports of serious depression. Situation Not Hopeful. The meeting of the allied military leaders July 20, which was my first, brought out little that was hopeful. The political relations of the allies were touched upou in a general way, but only so far as they might affect the military situation. The most significant sig-nificant recent event, of course, had been the crisis In Russia. With reference to American assistance, assist-ance, I gave in detail the situation as to our man power, Immediate and prospect, especially in the light of the latest plans of the department, and laid particular emphasis on the ne cessity of additional shipping. A cablegram had just been received In response to mine of July G in which 1 had requested that at least a million men reach France by the following spring. This message, Indicating that the War department foresaw small chance of securing the necessary tonnage, was rend to the conference in part as follows fol-lows : "By using all shipping which is now In sight for the purpose and which will he available after month of November, No-vember, the plan proposes to transport to France by June 1", 191S, twenty-one divisions, comprising about 420,000 men, together with auxiliary troops and replacement troops, line of communication com-munication troops, and others, amounting amount-ing to 214,970 men, making a total of 634,973 men." More Tonnage Needed. Although short of my recommendations, recommenda-tions, even this schedule could he carried car-ried out only by a very large Increase time largely increased such craft in European waters, and as a result the activities of submarines- had been somewhat diminished for July as compared com-pared with April. Need of Speed Evident. Yet for the time being ship construction construc-tion in British yards continued below losses aud our shipping board at home had scarcely stopped wrangling over materials aud types. All these facts caused everybody to realize the extreme ex-treme urgency of speed, and that in turn gave some hope that the pros pects might soon become brighter. It was my belief, even in the face of the heavy losses, that with complete com-plete co-operation under expert management man-agement and distiibution, the shipping would be ample for all purposes. This would require, of course, that it be placed under some central authority, but the governments, especially the British, that controlled most of it, while apparently desirous of helping, did not seem inclined to think they could make any concessions. They had entered into arrangements to assist each other with shipping for foodstuffs, but there was no such thing as pooling of allied tonnage for general purposes. However, the discouraging reports on the situation did make such an Impression Im-pression on the military leaders that they suggested the possibility of pooling pool-ing all available shipping and accordingly accord-ingly recommended a commission to consider the question, with especial reference to the transportation of the American army. Spies Get Sailing Dates. The success of submarine warfare had been largely dependent upon advance ad-vance knowledge concerning movements move-ments of vessels. As there was no doubt that the sailing dates of much of our shipping reached Germany through spies, one way to reduce the danger would be to close such sources of Information. In the beginning the practice by our War department of transmitting secret information was extremely loose. The data regarding sailing was. of course, sent to my headquarters, but at the same time, or often before, it was also given to both French and British military mili-tary and naval attaches and missions in Washington. They Immediately transmitted the information by cable to their respective governments, with the result that It usually became almost al-most common knowledge. But there were other sources of Information In-formation possessed by the enemy. ing troops. Officers not fulfilling above conditions can he usefully employed at home training troops." Little Effort at Selection. These recommendations were not altogether al-together followed at home. In fact very little effort seems to have been made at selection, so that some officers without ambition or initiative, whose inefficiency should have been well known, and others whose age aud physical condition were such as to disqualify dis-qualify them for strenuous service, were given important assignments. Most of them were known to me ami not a few who, under the rule of seniority, were commanders of regiments regi-ments and departments, had lacked the energy even to train their commands com-mands or themselves in battle exercises, exer-cises, where favorable opportunity bad been offered. The policy of the War department from beginning to end seemed to be to appoint officers to the higher grade, according to seniority, with the intention inten-tion of weeding out the inefficient later ou. This appears to have been the department's de-partment's idea of selection and the result was practically no selection al all. After the appointment . of such oilicers it was a slow process to eliminate elimi-nate them. " In the Training Area. The First division was now well settled in its training area in the region re-gion of Gondrecourt, south of Har-le-Due. The troops of the division had already established friendly relations with the French peasantry and had quickly adapted themselves to their new mode of life. As the natural consequence of the financial condition of the frugal French provincial, he was wont to' profit by the presence of the British and ourselves, and the open-handed paydav habits of the Americans served to give some encouragement to this inclination. As a result some coolness grew up later between our men and their early friends. In all history I do not believe there has ever been an army on foreign soil so considerate and observant of the rights and interests of the people. The peasant class made a strong appeal to every man in the army. Their simplicity, sim-plicity, their love of the soil and the long hours of work In the fields by the old men and women and young boys and girls remained the constant admiration admi-ration of our soiuiors. I am inclined to think, however, that the ei'.ellent behavior of the men In Visit Our Troops In Training. Accompaned by Brigadier General Bundy, Colonel Cruikshank and others, I took General Petain to see some of our troops being trained in throwing grenades and in the use of the French automatic rifle. An amusing story was told us in connection with grenade instruction. One of the men insisted on throwing his grenade immediately after setting the fuse instead of waiting wait-ing till he slowly counted seven, which was necessary so the explosion would occur as the grenade reached its destination. After being cautioned several times by his officer the man said : "Captain, I just can't hold these grenades any longer because I can feel them swelling swell-ing in my hand." We visiled several villages occupied by French and American troops. As we passed through our billets and inspected in-spected the kitchens, Petain particularly particu-larly inquired about the components of our ration and tiie manner of cooking cook-ing and serving meals. The French soldiers were furnished wine In place of coffee provided for our men and the allowances differed In other respects, ours containing a larger meat component. com-ponent. But when it came to cooking the French were ahead of us, although our men preferred our own food to either the French or British ration. Wounded Nurse Decorated. Motoring to Souilly, the headquarters headquar-ters of the French Second army, we met Major General Fayolle, commanding command-ing the group of armies of the center, and Major General Guillaumat, commander com-mander of the Second army, whose chief of stalT explained in detail the plan of the battle that was to take place next day. We had luncheon with General Fayolle, whom later I came to regard as one of the ablest of the French generals. In appearance lie "was rather frail, no longer youug, but active and alert. On our visit to the military hospital at Souili.v General Petain decorated I Mdlle. de Baye, a nurse, with the croix de guerre, as she lay on a cot suffering from a severe wound Inflicted by a piece of shell two days before. When he t!d her who 1 was she said : "1 am glad you are here, general, to see how a French woman can suffer foi her country." She was so happy, however, how-ever, that I am sure that for the moment mo-ment she had entirely forgotten ne palu. (TO BE CONTINUED.) |