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Show Rod Oliver , . 1 Castro Threat, Americas t Just 90 miles off the American Ameri-can coast lies the Communist base for subversion in the Western Hemisphere. ALTHOUGH the Castro regime re-gime threatens the U.S., it poses an even greater danger to the Latin American countries. The present chaos within Santo Domingo is a direct result re-sult of Castro's Communist campaign. Plans are now being engineered to foment similar trouble in Colombia, Venezuela and Guatemala. TODAY CASTRO operates schools of subversion which indoctrinate in-doctrinate and instruct individuals individ-uals from Latin America. Following Fol-lowing these courses, the students stu-dents return to their respective countries to evcite violence and produce governmental instability, instabil-ity, thus producing an atmosphere atmos-phere vulnerable to communism. Substantiated reports by the U.S. government claim that a $ force of only 58 Communists were behind the overthrow in je the Dominican Republic. THE PRINCIPAL danger of the Cuban government is to be y faced mainly by the Latin 'j American countries. The U.S. worries chiefly when Castro collaborates with the Russians ': on missiles and other military warfare. ; I! Because of an anti-Commu- $ nist disposition, however, the :SS U.S. is committed to deter and (C prevent the Communist infiltra- tion and eventual subversion lSSi of her Latin American neigh- $ bors. ft RECENT aggression both in Panama and the Dominican Re- J01 public justifies retaliation. Cas- tro's "wars of liberation" are j, not sanctioned by any country g( in this Hemisphere. The respon- irr sibility to eliminate this "priv- jr ileged sanctuary" for commu- . nism falls on the shoulders of the Organization of American lis States. j To accomplish this each of Se the 21 members must contrib- . ute a contingent of troops for the sole purpose of containing $ communism being instigated by p Castro. of CASTRO WOULD then be is- sued an ultimatum that any 5 J further attempt to weaken or revolutionize Latin American Governments would be fatal to I'i his own regime. 2 ; At first such a force would be a deterrent force; but if SI given the signal, it would be ,( compelled by its promise to Castro to bring his downfall. E Ch THE OAS special force could do one of two things or both when Castro violated the provisions pro-visions set forth by the ulti- ' matum. ' 1 First it could establish a blockade surrounding the waters wa-ters of Cuba, thus isolating her j from Soviet military and eco- P nomic aid. An estimated $500 million of Russian aid is fun-neled fun-neled annually into Cuba. SECONDLY, THE OAS special spe-cial force could enter Cuba and by military coercion propel f the demise of Castro. Either or both of these plans is costly and would endanger thousands of lives but is com- pulsory if Castro fails to respond re-spond to the warning. THE U.S. must not bear the bulk of this mission which was to have been the case in the ;j Bay of Pigs. It is imperative 1 that it be accomplished by the f collective forces of the OAS. 'Off Presently this plan may seem remote and would demand rec- 'w onciling of the differences with- in the OAS. Latin American L governments especially must ga. realize the potential hazard to their individual security if these steps are not pursued. s |