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Show FORWARD MARCH By II. S. Sims, Jr. iiiiiiiii tiii t i ) i i i i t i "ERRORS IN JUDGMENT" RATI IKK THAN LAXNESS TO ISLAM K I OR THE JAP SUCC ESS AT HAWAII The Roberts commission investigating investi-gating the Pearl Harbor incident, tinually emphasized alertness to sabotage and surprise submarine sub-marine attacks. I From the foregoing paragraphs it is easy to see how Kimmel and Short could have been lulled to I sleep to the possibility of an air attack. However, there is no excuse ex-cuse for the Admiral of a fleet not ! protecting his fleet against a sur-i sur-i prise attack; there is no excuse for Lt.-Gen. Short not protecting the ' Island of Oahu from the surprise attack. The success of the Japs has been placed squarely on the shoulders of these two men, and rightly so. All subordinate commanders have been excused excus-ed from all blame because they "executed their superiors' orders or-ders without question. They were not responsible for the state of readiness prescribed." Officers and enlisted men in both the navy and the army were praised by the investigation board for their part in the defense of Oahu. They were described as there "in sufficient numbers" and "in fit condition" to perform "any duty." No blame for the losses was placed on the Secretary of State. lie fulfilled his obligations obliga-tions by keeping the war and navy departments Informed as to the changes in the international interna-tional situation. The secretary of war and the secretary of the navy also fulfilled their obligations by conferring frequently with" the secretary of state, each other, and the chief of naval operations. The chief of staff of the army fulfilled his obligation by directing Lt.-Gen. Short "to undertake such reconnaisance an other measures as you deem necessary" shortly before hostilities hos-tilities broke out. The chief of naval operations assumed as-sumed his responsibilities by ordering or-dering the commander-in-chief of the Pacific fleet to consider "this dispatch" to be "a war warning." The whole story is that our commanders were amateurs in a war with professionals. They were unaware of , the strategy of modern war; that is, the strategy of doing what was least expected. We hope that the publicity that has been given to their "errors of judgment" will have a seasoning season-ing effect on other U. S. commanders. found that the Japanese attack was successful because it "was a complete com-plete surprise to the commanders, and they failed to make suitable dispositions to meet such an attack. at-tack. Each failed1 properly to evaluate evalu-ate the seriousness of the situation. These errors of judgment were the effective causes for the success suc-cess of the attack." Other reasons were given as having contributed to the Jap success, but the "errors of judgment" of the two commanders com-manders can be blamed for bur losses. Contrary to what many observers observ-ers believe, this does not mean that Admiral Kimmell and Lt.-Gen. Short are morally responsible for the disaster. In fact, these men may have very strong characters and keen senses of duty. These men should not be condemned for a failure to do their best, but should be condemned con-demned from the standpoint that they did not have the skill and the judgment to occupy oc-cupy such important positions. The whole thing comes down to this: Neither of them thought a Jap raid possible. Against all other possibilities they were prepared. Kimmel and Short were not asleep then; they were only asleep to the possibility of an air attack. This is evidenced by the fact that Kimmel had, previous to December 7th, given giv-en orders to the navy to sink any submarines near Pearl Harbor, and Short had taken ' many effective measures to guard against sabotage. There were a number of things that helped to warp the judgment of the two commanders. For one thing, within ten days of the attack at-tack Admiral Kimmel inquired of his war plane officer, Captain Mc-Morris, Mc-Morris, concerning the possibility of a Jap air attack on Oahu. According Ac-cording to Captain McMorris, the Japs would never attack. It is also true that Admiral Kimmel received a bulletin from the director of naval intelligence in-telligence on December 1st, which we quote: "... the major capital ship strength remains in home waters, as well as the greatest portion oi the carriers." Communications between Washington and the commanders did not, according accord-ing to the testimony of the commanders, lead them to believe be-lieve that the United States government expected an air raid on Hawaii, for they con- |