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Show SPK SYSTEM LEO EMPEROH INTO SEipfl Precise Information Sent From Petrograd, Paris and London Through the Diplomats. GERMANS UNABLE TO GRASP THE IMPORT Greatest Mistake of All ! Was the Belief That England Was Com mitted to Peace. By DR. E. J. DILLON, (Famous war correspondent of t'.ie Inle-national Inle-national News .Service and London Daily Telegraph.) LONDON, Crept. 'J7. Ii Germany be indeed in-deed set apart by Providence as a people chosen to rule Europe and sway the world, the outcome of the present conflict con-flict should be to sanction this inscrutable inscrut-able decree of fate. Certainly the hour has struck for which she has been waiting wait-ing and keeping her powder dry during the past forty years. It is now or never. A worse case with which to zo before the world than that of Germany in the present struggle it would be hard to imagine. She is engaged tin a naked might struggle, in which brute force is pitted against the most sacred rights that lie at tiie very roots of all organized so ciety and she calls on God to help her effect her purpose. " The attempt to obtain without a war a return for the outlay on her army and navy by calling for coveted territory as a propitiatory sacrifice was energetically made, but failed. Every precautionary measure that prudence prompted or circumstance cir-cumstance suggested was adopted betimes, some secret, others public. The methods that characterized these preparations foremost was to increase the German army and to levy a nun-recurring war tax. No Attention Given. To these moves Europe paid little heed. Now had Russia had recourse to a measure meas-ure or this kind all the great pow ers j "would have clamored for explanations. "Germany was allowed to have her way " unquestioned and yet the German chancellor chancel-lor dropped a hint of his rtdl purpose which ought to have been sufficient to put Europe un guard. He spoke of the coming conflict between be-tween Teutons and Slavs, and in truth that was the keynote of the situation. In Russia it was heard and understood. Whether it was alsn taken to heart and adequately acted upon is another matter. mat-ter. In the British island most people listened, smiled and went ilipjr way unheeding- Yet this was the first step toward to-ward tackling the entente powers one by one, which constituted the Alpha and Omesa of the kaiser's potii v. German banking 'maneuvers began later. lat-er. Enormous sums ot gold were cornered cor-nered in by German financial institutions through their influential agents in Kns-iand. Kns-iand. Even, since the war bcaan targe batchps of checks and bills, indorsed to London bankers, by financial house- in Sweden, Denmark, Holland. Portugal h nd Italy have been forwarded to london for discount and collection, for in tNs re-snect, re-snect, too. the Britis.i are trusting pn-ple. pn-ple. Secret Mobilization. Mobilization began secretly some weKs before wyr was actually declared. Anion? papers found on a captured German general gen-eral was a service letter disciplining him f"i- not immediately answering an order for mobilization dated Julv This date enables us to gauge the sincerity sin-cerity of the kaiser's efforts to moderate mod-erate Austria's impetuosity It is hardly an exaggera tion to say Russ'a had no secrets whatever fr"m agents, diplomatic and military, of the German government- Every intrigue t'v-it v. as woven, evcrv scheme that was laid bpfr.-P the various slate departments at Petrograd. every casual remark dropped by the czar in Intimacy and in private ?s to the real nr s-ipposd uekness in the imperial defenses was carefully reported i v iih all local anecdotic embroidery and ; duly taken cocniv.anct of in Berlin. ; German represenia lives were made ' aware of advb-e tendered to the czar by his majeMy's trusted advisers in various ; critical emergencies arid they duly an-i an-i nouneed It to their chiefs, t lie czar's ' present enemies. j Documents Purloined. j I can affirm that certain f tatn docu- j mejits were t ,i is very yea r conveyed to the future eneinv. and one of thern, to-fXft'.f- with all the facts and figures ad-, ad-, dined t herein, contributed materia 11 y to I Genua ny s decision to present its ultt- ; malum to rtnsia and in-nr the sr-m- ! inelv unlikely risk of war against that I empire if It should venture to take up - tie challenge. I make this st; te inept with first-hand knowledge. I could prove it If needs were. Thus Russian ingeniusneis and candor j played their part, probably a derisive onf, in t.rirming down the fnchtf-d ' calamity on tiiat nation. German di plomacy never cmtenteo itself with single J track; all its lines were many tracked. In I.'icijii. Prince fjrhnowsky. like his ' colleague. f'O'int Poo rta !e. In FJerro- prnd. shrank, during the period of crisis ', pre e,; jut: t he wa r. to a mere fimirel.ead of the embassy. Pa ron vn Kuhlmann was e:nliqssarl'ir then. It was his tnfor-; tnfor-; ma thm that wan treated as decisive; ti was be who was aked to seid ;, report to Wilheluistra se as to the likeh'bood of civil war breaking out in !re-rid. Its p-oi.aole duiatloti and the geneial effe.-t ; i would Pave upon the country and the Ptitlsh governnient. Impressed the Kaiser. !; ;i : 1 rr.; nn's report . wiil'-h wa:-: cherkrd )v letounf and a pprwin t ions in lierlin before h number m" spl-s and German jonrnalistK who b;td b-.;n dispatched tn-I'.eendntly tn-I'.eendntly to p.clfaHt. and other parts ,, ' -, ni,ide a pmfmmd i rnpre -sKUi on i - kaiser and his (.ffl'-tal adviser:-. Krorri ti.e' g-Kt of it they derived 'be comforting com-forting roiivi'-tion, will h was still stroiiK ilurhtg the week en-led Auk'nut I. that I'.nkfland'b iieutiaiily was a foregone con- i lu.-iion. t ii. w this. and. further, I know ti.e t- t eii-o . f, usf: vvhl'-h was made of Die as-, j-uint'tlon. I K uiilma no's report was emphatic, ij- j t;..WI and cogent. He had no mi. livings. - Arrordlng to liifn, the die wa:-; air-ady. east and the effect of t he throw could not be altered. The British cabinet was bound hand and foot bv the results of its home rule policy. But even had ,it been otherwise, it w as ir rev oca bly com-mi com-mi tied to peace. The As-iuith cabinet 1 was firmly resolved not to be drawn into a continental war, whatever its origin or its issues. That was the motive whirh had restrained fc-ir Edward i Irey from contracting any binding obligations toward to-ward France. Paradoxical though it may sound, tiie German government suffered from a plethora of information. It was too well informed of what was goinc on in Russia, Rus-sia, France and Britain and too little qualified to contemplate .in a correct perspective per-spective tiie things revealed in the end. |