Show X genakh MN dafft ml ph 1 sit a 0 X story ory oi the A A A E ire x copyright 2931 in 11 II 11 conuto by the north A amerl AI I by sall general M 0 can n N Nw piper alliance Al llano world rights right re CT X including in part the S di dai I in service whole jolin els W 9 persisting Per S sniff X 0 CHAPTER IX continued referring to their lack ot of artillery tn in tile the beginning general birch said there was ren reason soil to believe that they liadel had finally 1 a lly attained a superiority over the G germans e amans real teamwork lacking sir do douglas duglas uglas told me some of 0 the details of Ni Mv elles velles unsuccessful attack attach in the spring how it was waa known far bud and falde ide beforehand and spoke par W of the consequent serious disaffection among the preach french troops al though be had placed himself under tinder IN Jelles command for these opera tlona cons he had he said little confidence con in the outcome from tile the start ile he also commented on the failure fallu of the french to operate cooperate co fully on various occasions ills his remarks entirely con firmed the belief that I 1 had long since held that real teamwork between the two armies was almost totally absent scarcely anything more strikingly in impressed upon me our unprepared ness than what I 1 saw during a few hours spent with general trenchard at the british using flying field where we witnessed flyers doing every imaging able stunt and saw planes of all classes clashes bombing pursuit and ob observe serva tion motors of different types tin and the thoroughly equipped repair shops the outstanding thing fin however wever which it was gratifying to note later on in our own aviation personnel was wa the incomparable spirit and alertness of the young officers and the enlisted personnel every man mail seemed to be disappointed when a flight of planes departed for the front without him this visit to british headquarters was most instructive as every was given us to study intimately the details of their wartime organ bation after similar studies of the french system we selected celec ted from each those features best suited salted to perfect a well balanced staff tor for our own army the cordial relations and good ut ui ferstanding standing der established between sir douglas halg and myself find and between the corresponding members of out oui staffs and with a number of tile the lead ing british officers with whom we wen later to have official dealings proved very advantageous tn in london long ions after the armistice sir douglas in so on after dinner speech spes cli referred to this visit which happened during a of depres depression slon and said that our timely Appe artince nt at ills his headquarters had tia I 1 aroused in them a strong feeling or hopefulness for tile the future meets other leaders my diary at this time notes the following pi paris 11 als thursday tuly july 1 M 6 1917 had breakfast yesterday at the cryllon crillon with bilth toy george ile he Is alert und and energetic and has a clear conception of allied lems took lunch with mr ilal hal four who thinks we have reason to feel easier regarding submarines representatives of tile the va rious allies met for conference on general situation in the evening M albot tile the prime minister gave a state dinner to officials attending conference today attended luncheon to at al lied fled representatives given ghen by bv the president and mine Poi at the elespe palace in conference this afternoon with Pe cadorna Cido riia robertson and roch foch tit nt lat litters dis cussed military plans talked about tonnage possibilities and shortage of personnel all pessi pasal and reserved tames james stillman just returned from a tour of 0 france conf confirms irnis reports of 0 serious situation not hopeful the meeting of the allied military leaders july 2 20 which wits was my first brought out little that eliat was hopeful the political relations of the allies were touched upon lu in it a general way but only so fur far as they might affect the military situation tile hie most sig sl recent event of course liaos liat been tile the crisis in Itus llusala sla with reference tu to american am alcan assist nce I 1 gave tu in deball the situation as to our man power immediate and prospect especially in the light of the tha latest plans of the department and laid particular emphasis on the ne cassity of additional shipping A cablegram lied just been received tu in response to ruble mine or of july a 0 in which I 1 biad requested that at least a meillon roll llon men inen reach france 1 ranee by the following spring this message indicating that the war department foresaw small cnance chance of securing the necessary tonna tonnage ge was read to the conference in part as fol 01 ol lows by using all shipping which Is now in sight for the purpose and which will be available after month of no vember ember the plan proposes to transport to france by june 15 1018 twenty one divisions comprising about men inen together with auxiliary troops and replacement troops line of win cont troops and others amount ing to 1170 men making a total of men more mora tonnage needed although snort of my recommends recommend a tlona lions eden eyen this schedule could bs be car mad fillad out baly ay by a yer ver large increase of tonnage the other members of the conference were of the opinion that it if new adjustments could be made there might be shipping for nine or ten tea of our divisions before spring so for the moment there did not seem to be the slightest chance of transporting a million men to france by the following june after canvassing the whole situation the conference expressed the unanimous opinion that a defensive role should be adopted on all secondary fronts the british and french representatives hoped that the surplus troops resulting from this course might he available to strengthen their armies in n france and general cador na of course thought the italian armies should have their share CHAPTER X about this time july 1917 disturbing reports were submitted to me confidentially fidentia lly by one of our naval officers sent by admiral sims from london calculations based upon tonnage losses lisses for may alay june and july to confirm the conclusions of a month previous that there would soon be in suil lelent allied shipping left to bring over an Amer american lenn army of required strength and that the allies would find it difficult to keep up their tood food supply from overseas tile the data presented by the naval officer proved that if this rate of d destruction t st could not ile be reduced the war would be lost before we could ore fire a shot this report was certainly most pes stalls tle but it did not dispel my confidence in the success of the itie plan that had been tested and was about to he be inaugurated of sending ships over in convoys under the protection of naval vessels additional destroyers requested by admiral sims lind by this z N I 1 I 1 i I 1 ja A AM 1 4 r IL A div am J aek e I 1 JK agg 1 9 val des Ec Eco liers near chaumont domicile of the american commander in france time largely increased such craft tit in nui waters and as it result tile activities or of lud bad been somewhat Bome what diminished for july as compared with april need of speed evident yet for the time being ship construction la in british yards continued below losses losse sand and our shipping board at home had scarcely sto stopped pled wrangling over materials and types all these facts caused everybody everi body to realize the extreme urgency of speed and that in turn fine ve some hope that tile pros pacts might soon become brighter it was my belief even in the face of the heavy losses tint that with alth coin co operation cooperation under expert man mail aget tient mid and distribution the shipping would be ample fur for all purposes tills this would require of course that it bi be placed under some central authority hut but tile the governments especially the 1 that controlled most of it while apparently de alious of helping did not seem inclined to think they could make any they hat entered into arrangements to assist each other oilier with shipping for foodstuffs but there was ft as no such thlin thing as po altia of allied tonnage tor for general purposes flo however weer the alie reports on the situation did make atch tilt an lin lilt pres siou on the alie military leaders that they suggested the possibility of pool ing all available avallon le shipping gand and accord angly recommended tied it a commission to consider the question with especial reference to the transportation of the american army spies get sailing dates the success cess of submarine warfare had been largely deloen dependent deat upon advance knowledge movements ot of vessels As there was no doubt that the palling dates of much of our shipping reached germany through spies one way to reduce tilt jhb datig danger ger would be ba to close such sources of information in the beginning the practice by our war department of transmitting secret information was extremely loose tile the data regarding sailing was of course sent to my headquarters but bill at the name time or often before it was also osame given to both french and british mill tary and naval attaches und missions minions in washington they immediately transmitted tile the information by cable to their respective governments govern with alth the result that it usually became almost common knowledge 1 but there were other sources of ta in format for matlou ioa possessed by the enemy oue otie message intercepted by the french sent from some wireless wl relesa station stai tn in spain to tile the german general genera staff announced the arrival of several american vessels at nantes and of american soldiers at st na dalre and also gave the routes taken by our transports An another othir evidently intended for submarines mai rines reported the departure of a convoy of transports from new york these and similar facts were cabled at once to admiral sims and to washington leadership big problem probably the most important factor in building up an aggressive army I 1 Is 8 the select selection lon of leaders without suf frelent leadership the finest of troops may suffer defeat by inferior forces skillfully skill fully led the following was my recommend a tion to secretary of war baker my aly observation of british and F rench french armies and most exacting arduous service conditions at the front fully convince me that only officers in full mental menial and phyl physical vigor should be sent here contrary course means certain inefficiency in our service an and d possible later humiliation of officers 6 concerned general officers must undergo extreme elgort in personal supervision of operations I 1 in trenches very few british or F rench french division commanders over forty live five or brig brigadiers adlers over forty we have too much at stake to risk inefficiency through mental or physical defects strongly recommend conditions be fully considered in making high appointments and suggest no officer of whatever rank be sent here tor for fictive active service who Is not strong and robust in every particular Off officers leers selected for appointment general allicer of line should be those with experience in actively command ing troops Off officers leers not fulfilling above conditions can be usefully employed at home training troops little effort at selection these recommendations were not at al together followed tit at home in fact very ery little effort seems to liae have been made at selection so thit that some officers without or initiative whose inefficiency should have been well known an and d others whose age and physical condition were suh as to dis quality qualify them for strenuous service were given important assignments most of thorn them were known to me ano and not a few fe who under the alie rule of seniority were commanders command is of re 1 ments and departments had lacked inched the energy even to train their cont coni mands ur or themselves in batile exer alses where favorable opportunity had been of oneri ferd d the policy of the war department from beginning to end seemed to be to appoint officers to the higher grode grade to seniority with the bitell litun tion of weeding ve eding out the luellet lent hil later on tills appears to tit li ive ve hern the department part ment s idea of and the result was practically no nn selection select loo nl all after the of su bucci ell officers it was as a slow to nale them in the training area the first division wa now well settled in its training area an ii in it tile the re glon gion of south of liar le due duc tile the troops of the liv liviston islon tind had already established friendly relations ioni with the french peasantry and hod had quickly adapted themselves to their new thode luode of life As the natural consequence ol of tile the financial condition of the frugal french provincial he was BBS wont to profit by the presence presena c of the british and ourselves ourse hei and tile the openhanded open handed v hahlos of the americans served to give some encouragement to this inclination As a result sunie some coolness ool nesa grew up later between our nien men and their early friends lenda fr in all al history I 1 do not believe there hns has ever eer been an all army on foreign soil so considerate and observant of tile the rights and interests of the people the peasant class made a strong appeal to every man in thy the army their still slin city their love loe of the soil and tile long hours of work in the tuelda by the old men and women and young boyf and girls remained the constant admiration of our soldiers I 1 am inclined to think however that the excellent behavior of the men in the first contingent their rather father un nn military appearance in ii III uniforms and their apparent lack bufor of or uial mal discipline created the impression in tile the minds of the french officials that they were too kind kindhearted hearted to be come aggressive fighting ting troops at the conclusion of my inspection of various places chaumont Chan mont was se lecter as the best site for or our general headquarters it was on our line of communications to the front and centrally placed as to probable sectors ot of our operations tile the one fine stone regimental barracks became our headquarters and we were able to obtain ample billeting accommodations in houses bouses for or all except the enlisted men who were provided with temporary tempo i barracks CHAPTER XI in the organization of our armies tor for the world wal war etwas it was evident that it if any considerable numbers were to be sent abroad an additional force would aou id be needed over and above the regular army and the national guard the war department therefore established what was called the national army to be composed principally of men who were to come into service through the draft most blost of the divisions of the national army were organized in august and september 1917 As the time approached to begin the training of the smaller units it was found that after lafter equipping the special troops urgently needed in france there was little equip equipment meni left even tor for the additional men required to all up the national guard unfortunately this made it necessary to delay deftly calling out men for the he t units of the national army however considerable numbers were called into service and proceeded with preliminary instruction hut but the lack of equipment seriously delayed their progress visiting billeting areas bly diary notes the following paris tuesday august 21 1017 visited billeting areas of forty seventh french and our first division with general retain on sunday inspected st dialer regulating station n and witnessed attack near verdun yesterday visited french hospital at bouilly souilly Sou llly |