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Show a 1 1 il ,,, it", iV uimiltt'in Washington, I). C. ARMY VS. NAVY The Selective Service system isn't ldvirti.'ing It, but there lias been letne tierce' rowing behind tne scenes over the inductim utaiidiii'.tx af the mny find navy. Thi.uch the army has liberalized Its physical and mental reipnre-merits reipnre-merits to increase the number uf draft ehuibles and likewise keep the induction of married men at a minimum, mini-mum, the navy still clinRS to the higher standards In elTeet while it was taking only enlisted men. Virtually all physical requirements require-ments are higher for the navy, but the biggest difference is In the mentality men-tality tests for the two services. Navy induction doctors won't pass mnn unless he bus fulr I Q., whereas army doctors are required lo approve lower standards. Result is that thousands of inductees induc-tees who express a preference for the navy are turned down and find themselves them-selves in an army uniform instead. The fact mat the army has to take these navy "castofls" is bitter medicine medi-cine to war department highups; and Brig. Gen. Lewis B. Hershey, selective selec-tive service director, made a strong protest about it behind closed doors recently to the War Manpower commission's com-mission's management-labor policy committee. The standards for' both services should be uniform, Hershey declared, de-clared, adding that If the navy's standards were brought down to conform con-form with those of the army, it would help offset the need of inducting induct-ing married men, especially those with children. The navy has been turning down a large number of single men for physical or mental reasons, Hershey pointed out. 1 "How has the difference In standards stand-ards affected the army?" the draft director was asked. "It's affected us plenty," exploded explod-ed ' Hershey-- - "The navy selects whom It wants and the army gets all the lower element" The committee agreed with Hershey, Her-shey, promised to recommend to WMC Boss Paul McNutt that he endeavor en-deavor to have the navy's standards lowered. ' " FRANK NAVY TALK Vice Admiral Fred Horne, assistant assist-ant chief of naval operations, has been holding some quiet blackboard talks with the house and senate naval affairs committees, and these talks have been a real step toward, congressional-executive co-operation. Horne, by his frankness and willingness willing-ness to admit navy mistakes, made a better impression than any other navy man appearing before con-cress. Home was high in his praise of our naval officers and men, but frankly admitted that the navy was caught off guard in the Savo Island battle of August 9, just after the marines landed at Guadalcanal. He said there was no. excuse for this defeat; that a board of inquiry was now investigating; and there probably would be heavy penalties for the guilty; -v.- Horne said that apparently the captains of the cruisers sunk had not ordered their men to battle stations. sta-tions. . He also revealed that an Australian Aus-tralian admiral that night was in command of the "screening force" of cruisers and destroyers supposed sup-posed to be protecting the main task force. Horne admitted that the Australian Austra-lian officer and Admiral Kelly Turner, Turn-er, chief of the Allied task force, knew a Jap scouting fleet was in the vicinity, but didn't figure it would risk an attack. The commanders calculated that the earliest possible time the Japs could reach Savo island is-land was after daybreak next morning.'" morn-ing.'" " ' A'' " ' Therefore, the Australian admiral left his flagship, the Canberra, and spent the night on Admiral Turner's flagship 25 miles from the scene of battle. No orders were given meanwhile mean-while to Australian and' American "officers under, Turner and the Aus-trallanj Aus-trallanj and they were caught completely com-pletely off base when the Japs struck at about 1:50 a. m. Japs Cornered in Aleutians." 7 On the more optimistic side, Ad-, , miral. Horne reported the United States had sunk a great many Jap cruisers, and that despite the defeat at Savo island we had been definitely superior in operational-strategy. In' the 'Aleutians the Japs are so completely bottled .up, Horne re' ported, that we probably could wipe them out at any time. Our submarine sub-marine patrol has been especially effective in these waters, with the result re-sult that "the Japs are desperately hard up for food, aviation gasoline and other supplies. Horne also made ho attempt to minimize the seriousness of the submarine sub-marine menace. "" e e e CAPITAL CHAFF C Interesting question: Why is it that army air crashes during training train-ing and operations right here in the U. S. A. are military secrets? Could it be that some persons are trying - raftlMirCT-!R " ' ' C. One of the roads running through the woods around Et- Berining, Ga., is labelled "Burma Road," anothei "Chungking Approach." But most popular among soldiers is ."the Road to Singapore," because at the end they hope to find Dorqthysniour.' A: A' ,A: :;7 '" ": '.' |