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Show If J BRYAN Hi (It lHi 1 ill Taft, in His First Speech, Issues a Defy Detroit, Sept 1S. Presldont Taft at luncheon with the Board of Commerce Com-merce here today, made the first of what may be termed the political speeches of his six weeks' tour of the country. He took up the "trusts" and clearly outlined his views concerning them. He defended with vigor tho decisions of the United States supreme su-preme court In tliQf Standard Oil and Tobacco trust casqs and thcro was a distinct campaign note In Mr Taft's challenge to his ancient political enemy, en-emy, William Jennings Bryan, to point out what particular contract or re-stralnt re-stralnt of trade he would condemn which would not be,condemncd within with-in the definition of tho statute as laid down by Mn Chief Justlco White. Mr. Taft addjd, rather significantly, thatr-persons"who9b not understands tho decisions and Teally do not understand un-derstand the law, havo had a great deal to say about them It was not fair to the court he declared, to say that it had read tho word "reasonable'' into the anti-trust statute. "I am entirely opposed to an amendment amend-ment of the anti-trust law," said the President "It is now a valuable government gov-ernment asset and Instrument Tested and brought Into beneficial use by 20 yeaTs of litigation and construction bv the highest court why should we Imperil its usefulness by experiments?" experi-ments?" 'The outcry for amendments, following follow-ing tho supreme court's decisions, the President said, had resulted In pro-posals pro-posals prepared without a real understanding under-standing of the law. and he added that while this agitation might servo the purpose of promoting 'unreasonable" 'unreason-able" and unreasoning discontent, It certainly ought not to be considered seriously. Mr. Taft referred to the fact that, immediately after the trust decisions were handed down bv tho supreme court Senator La Folletto spread on the public records a quotation from ftno of the President's messages as being be-ing at varinnce with the "rule of reason" laid down by tho court. The President assorted that his views as expressed in the message were In exact ex-act accord with the decisions. Taft's Speech. In his speech President Taft said: "My fellow citizens: I propose to take up the question which has occupied' oc-cupied' tho attention of the American people for now twenty years, that of industrial comblnatIons known as "trusts." During the last year we have had two great decisions by the supreme court of the United Stntes. Thoy are epoch-making, and the pub-licllc pub-licllc has not yet come to realize the effect that tho'so decisions are certain to hae. It Is not that tho construction construc-tion which the court has put upon the act is different from that which most mombors of the profession, and most subordinate courts, and indeed the supremo court Itself, had before Indicated Indi-cated as tho propor construction of tho statute, but Is Is that It Is now finally settled, by two fully conblder-od conblder-od decisions in respect to two of tho largest and most powerful of these combinations, what their Illegality consists in, and how they aro to be treated. In view of tho finding that they are Illegal and do violate tho provisions of the so-called anti-trust or Sherman act. "Persons who do not understand the effect of the9e decisions to say which is Intonded to load the public to the .belief that In some wav or other the supreme court has emasculated tho statute and prevented Its operation against objectionable and injurious trade combinations and conspiracies. Nothing Is further from tho truth. 'When tho statute was passed in 1800, tho expressions used in It to define de-fine its object aud what It was proposed pro-posed therein to donounce as unlawful, unlaw-ful, wore not new, but they were sufficiently suf-ficiently broad and Ijwlofiuito to require re-quire Judicial construction to so(,tlo their meaning. Congress was dealing with a. subject matter In respect to which It may bo assumed that the legislators leg-islators themselves were not clear as to tho exact limitations of tho mean-. mean-. lug of the words In the statute they were passing. Thej knew there was an evil which they hoped to restrain by tbe enactment or this law, and the-rclied the-rclied upon the courts in their construction con-struction of "the law to hedge about its operation such restriction as would (Continued ou. Page Seven,) CHALLENGES W. J. BRYAN (Continued fiom Page One.) prevent tho statute from being so wide In Its application a to involve absurdity and the Impracticable. The early decisions under the law can not be s'ahl to have oeen fortunate. Tho decision in what was known as 'The Sugar Trust case' the Knight case-was case-was really a retrograde step and one which seemed to limit much tho oper-atioiiMpf oper-atioiiMpf tho statute. It encouraged the Organization of combinations which tho same court has slnco found violate the statute. Tho case could not be effectively presented to the court because the record had not been properly made up, and tho questions urlslng'were treated In the opinion in such n way as to give the Impression that tho operation of the law would be most restricted, because of the limits of federal Jurisdiction. Indeed, some law officers of tho government did not hesitate to sav that under this decision there was little hope of reaching reach-ing the evil aimed at through federal action. It has required twenty years of litigation to make the statute dear. But now it Is clear. "I shall not attempt to give it a close, lawyer like interpretation, but I think It Is not departing from the declaration of the court to say that they find any contract In restraint of trade, made for the purpose of excluding ex-cluding competition, controlling prices, or of maintaining a monopoly, In part or in whole, is contrarv to the statute and Is subject to injunction aud Indictment In-dictment under this statute In the federal courts where it affects inter-. state trade. Bryan Given a Task. "Now, 1 would like to ask Mr. Bryan, Bry-an, or any of the other publicists and jurists who have been denouncing this opinion as the surrender of the rights of tho people and a usurpation of judicial power, to tell the public what particular contract of restraint of Interstate trade he would condemn which -would not bo condemned within this definition tjf tho court The difficulty dif-ficulty with the literal construction of tho statute Is that it would denounce de-nounce a great many minor or incidental inci-dental restraints of trade, which made the statute ridiculous, and weakened its effect and lent support to the criticisms criti-cisms and contemptuous treatment of the statute by those who were opposed to Its passage and enforcement. "'For Instance, take the instanco cited by a federal circuit judge, in which he said that under the literal construction of the statute, which must be" enforced, if there wore two persons doing a wagon-express business busi-ness across a state line and they united lu a partnerhip, the union in tho partnership part-nership ttould bo restraint of interstate inter-state trade in violation of the statute. Such a result is really a reductio ad nbsurdum, and no one who was in favor of making the statute efectlvo for tho purposes for which it was passed, aud had any intelligent appreciation appre-ciation of what the btalulc was Intended In-tended toaccompllsh and what it meant, would contend for such a construction. con-struction. It Is true that iu one of the decisions of tho supremo court there was a statement made that tho torm 'reasonable' could not be introduced intro-duced Into the statute because congress con-gress had not -put It there, But the very same court, and the very samo Judge, when a case arose resontlng a restraint of trade that must be condemned con-demned as unlawful If a literal moaning moan-ing wore to be given to the statute, said in so many words that It must bo reasonably construed, and that It must not bo held to includo contracts that were, merely Incidental restraints of trade aTid were not made for that purpose. In one of these cases a man ownod some steamboats that did an Interstate business on the Ohio river. He wished to sell out. He did sell out, and In the sale of tho steamboats he wished to sell the good will of the lino which ho had been running. Accordingly Ac-cordingly ho stipulated that he would not himself engage In that business between those samo points for a certain cer-tain number of jears. This was Intor- state business and his contract was In restraint of trade, but the suprome court held that it was a mere Incidental Inci-dental restraint, I. o. incidental to tho sale of the good will, and so was. not within tho statute. This 'would have been the same at common law, where from time Immemorial such a restraint re-straint as this has been held to be reasonable because limited to the necessity nec-essity of preserving the good will which the vender was selling, and which but for such an agreement would be worth nothing. In other words, tho supremo court In this case, gave a reasonable construction to tho statute aud eliminated from 1Ls operation those harmless useful Incidental Inci-dental restraints growing out of lawful law-ful contracts which are made for an entirely different purpose from that of controlling prices or maintaining maintain-ing a monopoly by suppressing competition com-petition and which have always been recognized as properly enforceable by courts of both law and equity. I repeat re-peat again that, in spite of all the denunciations that wo have heard of tho decisions of the supremo court in tho Standard OU-and-the Tobacco cases, there is not one who has criticised criti-cised them that can formulate a con- tract In restraint of trade that ought to come within tho statute that does Jnot comq with it under the decision of the supreme court Court Changed Somewhat. "It Is said that tho supreme court has read something Into the statute that was not there before? that it has Inserted the word 'reasonable' before restraints of trade, when the samo court had said that this could not be properly done, because congress had evidently not Intended to Include such, a limiting word in the statuto, This is not fair to the court. It Is" true that the court. lu the early days of tho construction of the" sta'tutc, had said that It could not limit tho statute in effect by excluding from Its operation what was deemed reasonable at common com-mon law. But as other cases arose if found It necesary to make exceptions to the literal operation of tho words 'restraint of trade,' and it did so by excepting what was minor, or incidental, inci-dental, or Indirect, and Including only those cases where the chief object of the contract or combination was the restraint In doing so the court said that it must give the statute a reasonable construction con-struction and not one leading to absurd or ridiculous results. In the last two cases, the court did not change the substance of the reasoning and scope of tho previous decisions, but only treated the exceptions previously pre-viously termed 'incidental and indirect.' indi-rect.' as excluded from the operation of tho statute in the light of reason. I. e., in conformity to the nvll sought to be reached. Xow, In what way has this injured the public weal? "What combinations or arrangements can escape under this Interpretation that any sensible man would wish to hae condemned? Did the court not con domn the Standard Oil company, the rather of all trusts, in the history of which every form of criminal illegality illegal-ity was practiced'' Did It not, on tho otlior hand, condemn the Tobacco trust, of much later origin and framed under tho advice of cunning counsel for the very purposes of evading the condemnation of tho statute and at ' the same time securing and enjoining the monopoly the framers of the stat-uio stat-uio intended to prevent and punish? Renews Invitation. "Let mo ronow again tho invitation to any of the vociferous critics or the decision of the supremo court to use their legal imaginations and state tho facts of a case not condemned within tho rulo of construction put upon the statute by the suprome court but Included within their construction con-struction of it, which reasonable men would think it wise or proper to mako criminal. "-Vow, I desire to call attention to a vecv broad distinction that many persons have failed to draw, or perceive, per-ceive, between a reasonable construction construc-tion of the statute which the supreme court has insisted upon and the Introduction In-troduction of the word 'reasonable' in tho statute so ns to lead to a result by which combinations for the purpose pur-pose of restraining trade with a view to controlling prices and maintaining a monopoly could be held to bo reasonable rea-sonable aud thus lawful. Until tho decision of the supreme court in these last two cases there was a clearly defined de-fined hojje In tho minds of many business bus-iness men who had reached tho conclusion con-clusion that It was impossible to conduct con-duct business on a free competitive oasis, and that it was necessary to secufemonopollstlc control of prices and competition in order to make business bus-iness reasonably profitable, that in some way or other the statute could be construed as to make It apply only to unreasonable monopolies and unreasonable exclusion of competition and control of prices. They had in their minds the thought that in some way or other a standard could be sot by which, if those who enjoyod tho monopoly aud the restraint of competition com-petition and tho control of prices did not abuse their power to the point of seeking from Ihe public exorbitant exorbit-ant profits, their arrangements could be hold to be only reasonablo nnd not within tho statute or punishable by law. Explains Himself. In my message of January 7th, 1910, on the Interstate commerce and antitrust anti-trust laws and federal Incorporation. I used this language: " 'Many peoplo conducting great businesses nave cherished a hope and a belief that in some way or other a lino may bo drawn iMJtween 'good trusts' and 'bad trusts' and that It Ib possible by amendment to the anti-trust law 'to' mako a distinction under which good good combinations may be permitted to orgnnlze, suppress competition, control con-trol prices, and do it all legally, If only they do not abuse the power by taking too great profit out of the business They point with force to certain notorious no-torious trusts as having grown Into power through criminal methods by the use of lllogal robates and plain cheating and by various acts utterly violative of business honesty or morality, mor-ality, and urge tho establishment of tome legal line of separation by which 'criminal trusts' of this Kind can bo punished, aud they, on tho other hand, be permitted under tho law to carry on their business Now the public, and especially the business public, ought to' rid themselves of the Idea that such a distinction Is practicable or can be Introduced into the statute. Certainly under tho present pres-ent trust law no such distinction exists. ex-ists. It has been pioposed, however, thut the word 'reasonable' should be made a nart of tho statute, and then that it bhould bo left to the court to say what is a reasonable restraint of trade, what is a reasonable suppression suppres-sion of competition, what is a reasonable reason-able monopoly. I enturo to think that this Is loput Into tho hands of the court a power ImpOBSlblo to ox-erclse ox-erclse on any consistent principle, which will Insure the uniformity of decision essential to just judgment. It Is to thrust upon tho courts a burden bur-den that they have no precedents to enable them to carry, and to give them a power approaching the arbitrary, the abuse of which might Involve our whole Judicial system In disaster." "This paragraph has been quoted and spread on the records of the senate sen-ate on Uio motion of a senator who considered this to bo at variance-With tho decision of the supremo court. Instead of being at variance, it Is In exact accord with thobe decisions. Again, from those who have given' up free competition as an economic force that ought to be encournged or enforced, and who arc utterly opposed k the spirit of-tho anti-trust law, we have frequently heard tho question. 'Well, sunposo you convict those largo combinations under tho statute, what are you going to do about It? You can, "perhaps, send some men to thfc penitentiary for crontlng these combinations com-binations wnlch have cheapcuoj the cost of production and given you most of your forolen trade and much of your prosperity, but what are you going to do with tho capital invested, -the. plant, and the organization? "You can confiscate it and ruin your "country "coun-try by a panic, but you can't divide such combinations into their component compon-ent parts ngain, for the lines of dl- vision have disappeared into a common com-mon ownership t "The court has5 met. tho issue and tho queries presented by the doubters and the scofrers. It has vindicated the majesty or the law. has illustrated tho wonderful elasticity anil adaptability adapta-bility of remedy by Injunction in equity, and has at the same time manifested man-ifested a due regard for the welfare of the innocent business men and the community at large, who. in ;i cataclysm caused by tho confiscatioR of such enormous capital as are involved in-volved In theso combinations and a suspension of'tiPe legitimate part of their business, would be buried with them In a common ruin. (Continued on Page Elghtl oo U'J CHALLENGES W. J. BRYAN (Continued from Page Seven.) How the Law Works, "The court has exhibited a courage in facing the necessary results In enforcing en-forcing tho statute that, Instead of prompting an attack- on it, ought to make every American proud that wo havo such a tribunal. It is now on-forcing on-forcing Its decree against the Standard Stand-ard Oil cojnpauy, and against the Tobacco company and It Is making those great combinations divide themselves them-selves Into actually compeling parts under such provisions in the decree that an Injunction shall be constantly operative to prevent by contempt proceedings pro-ceedings any assumption of the old relations of a monopoly. This was an easier matter in reference to tho Standard Oil company, because It was easy to divide tho various companies that were united by the ownership ot stock of a tho companies In a sln glo holding company. In the Tobacco To-bacco company, the decree could not be worked out so easily, and It will be necessary to separate the properties prop-erties owned by single companies and to distribute those plants into different differ-ent and differing ownerships in order to oreatc competition between them ahd maintain that competition by the power of a continuing injunction against any future union, dr any agreement to avoid future competition. competi-tion. Either This or Socialism. " Jt nocded those two great decisions de-cisions to leach the business public that, at. least not In tho supremo tribunal tri-bunal of this country, would tho claim be listened to, that In this day , and generation we have passed beyond the possibility of, free competition as consistent with prppcr business growth, or that wo have reached a time when only regulated monopoly and the fixing of prices by governmental govern-mental authority are consistent with future progress. We did get along with competition; we can get along' wlthput it; and the business men of j this country must squaro themselves to that necessity. Either that, or we must proceed to stato socialism and vest the government with power to run every business. j "The decision of tho supreme court Is In the highest, interest or tne pun-He, pun-He, and I am glad to think that business bus-iness men who have been violating the trust law are now being made to seo the necessity for putting their houses in order, changing their original orig-inal organizations, giving up tho idea that it Is necessary to control markets in order to make profits, and reverting to tho old principle of froc competition, in which all limit upon It. to prevent" its being excessive must he self-imposed by the good Bcnse of each competitor and not by any ar- j rangemont or contract between com- j potltorB or secret stipulation or wink or nod. Voluntary Breaking "Up. "The decision of the supreme court as it grows to be understood In tho near futuro will be a signal for the voluntary breaking up of all combinations com-binations in restraint of trade within the inhibition of the statute, and will, I hope, lead to a complete revulsion of feeling on the part of the businessmen business-men of this country and to a clear understanding un-derstanding by them of the limitations that must bo imposed by them upon any business combinations made b,y t,hem in the future. 'The operation procedure, and of this I have often mado complaint; but In the settlement of issues of this importance two decades aro no great length of time, and if, in that period, we shall havo stamped out an evil which would certainly have carried us to Socialism as a reaction from tho vicious control of tho few, the time spent, tho effdrt, and the litigation aro worth the coat, Thore have been times when among others, T have thought that tho enforcement of the law might havo been facilitated had tho courts visited its breach with se- verer punishment, but 'though tho mills of the gods grind slowly, yet they grind exceeding small," and without with-out the severity that some of us urged and would have been glSd to see used, a revolution in business methods where they have heretofore been violative vio-lative of tho statute will be accom pllshed, and with least disturbance to business which Is lawful. Rccallc Message. "In a special message on the subject sub-ject of trusts which I sent to congress January 7th, 1910, I said: " 'It is the duty and the purpose j of the executive to direct an invosti- gatlon by tho departmont of Justice, through the grand Jury or otherwise, into the history, organization and pur 1j pose of all tho Industrial companlea i with respect to which there is reasonable ground for suspicion that they have been organized for a purpose and are con- j ductine business on a plan which Is v In violation of the anti-trust law The j work is a heavy one, but it is not beyond the power of the department of' justice If sufficient funds are fur- j-. nlshed to carry on the Investigations jf and to pay the counsel engaged 'n the work.' " |