OCR Text |
Show General HUGH S. Johnson Uoital Fatura WNU Savin Washington, D. C. REVOLT UNDER HITLER Napoleon conquered a large part of Europe. Because he had some idea of a sort of United States of that continent, semi-sovereign states united in a loose league, he allowed the conquered countries a good deal of leeway. Perhaps his further idea of putting his own people, family or fellow soldiers, on the thrones of several of these states had something some-thing to do with his liberality. Whatever the reason, he didn't exercise ex-ercise a close enough control to keep some of them conquered. In Prussia,- Scharnhorst and Stein effectually ef-fectually evaded his disarmament decrees by using the permitted small Prussian army in a new concept, con-cept, not as a fixed regular establishment estab-lishment but as a military training school through which they rushed yearly classes of recruits as rapidly rapid-ly as possible. In this way, they forged the forces which finally sent Napoleon first to Elba and later, after Waterloo, to St. Helena. Napoleon just wasn't tough enough. We do a good deal of talking about our great liberal free union of semi-sovereign semi-sovereign states, the United States of America. But we frequently forget for-get that, so far as the States of the old Southern Confederacy are concerned, con-cerned, there was nothing free or liberal about it We forced them to remain in the Union at the points of bayonets. It is worth remembering because, after the Treaty of Versailles, the Allies, especially England and France, made exactly the same mistake that Napoleon had made and made it with exactly the same warlike people, the Germans. There was never a time, up to 1936 at least, when with the controls at their command, they couldn't have stopped Hitler, as Winston Churchill continuously urged that they should do. They didn't As Napoleon had done earlier, and as the North did not do after the Civil war, they permitted per-mitted the conquered country to build up an overwhelming military superiority, under their very noses. Now the situation is reversed. Hitler sits astride most of Europe. He has disarmed it and made its vast military booty part of his own forces. He, like Napoleon, also contemplates con-templates some kind of compulsory compul-sory United States of Europe. Some observers, reverting to the Napoleonic Napole-onic failure, say that it can't be done that his conquest will collapse through counter-revolution caused by a combination of interior strains and stresses with outside pressure. Will it? Napoleon, himself, frequently fre-quently said that all empires of conquest con-quest die of indigestion from overeating over-eating and referred to the crackups of the empires of Alexander, the Romans, Ghengis Khan, Charlemagne Charle-magne and the Caliphates of Baghdad Bagh-dad and Cordova. On all the evidence to date, Hitler is not likely to repeat the blunders of Napoleon and the Allies through any lack of toughness, efficiency or cold-blooded cruelty. Let's not kid ourselves too far from realism. COLUMN AND NOSTALGIA This column has been accused by some of its best customers of nostalgia nos-talgia or too much yearning toward World war precedents and experiences experi-ences in mobilizing American industry in-dustry and man-power for defense. Sometimes from the hostiles this criticism takes the angle that the "nostalgia" is for a government job on the defense front More frequently fre-quently it is from sincere and understanding un-derstanding personal friends, and is that too much emphasis is put on mobilization principles and experiences experi-ences 23 years old and that, like "a qail a day for 30 days," it gets too monotonous1 for the readers' relish. No, this column is not in rebuttal of any of these criticisms about nostalgia. nos-talgia. It is Just to talk some of them over. As to nostalgia for a job. That isn't good sense. Any man would like again to have some active part in a great national effort in a crisis, but that natural wish was abandoned aban-doned long ago. Quite understandably, understand-ably, this administration would not seek out a critic for any more important im-portant job than janitor in its doghouse. dog-house. It is not to be blamed for that. Any other course would be bad. It wouldn't make for harmony. On the other hand, the administration adminis-tration has shown great consideration considera-tion and restraint. This column could have been silenced any day, without justifiable criticism from any source, by simply calling Its conductor to active service as a re-serr re-serr officer a course which would also have put him in a considerable financial crimp and could have resulted re-sulted in no more Interesting employment em-ployment than counting coconuts at San Juan do Bac Bac. As to nostalgia for World war methods of mobilization, they were adopted fur manpower. For industrial indus-trial mobilization, the President Is reported to have r.i id of the war department's plan (wnieh followed our World war model) that we need a ID 10 mobilization and not a 1III8 blue print. That isn't what the Hermans Her-mans said. They are on record ns having modeled their whole industrial indus-trial effort on the war Industries board plan so far as it wis applicable. |