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Show MUTUAL OR PROPRIETARY? Before entering, in detail, upon an elucidation of the characteristics that distinguish the judiciously judici-ously from the recklessly managed life insurance ' company, we propose to briefly advert, at this time, to the points raised as to the relative merits of the mutual' and the "stock" plans, as applied to the.se institutions. That the mutual plan is, in theory, the ideal, all well-informed students, presumably, agree. The idea of. permitting a set of individuals to glean a profit upon the life-insurance contracts paid for by flic many, is naturally and necessarily repugnant repug-nant to human nature. So generally is recognized and sanctioned the principle that the life-insurance business should be so conducted that no one class can profit at the expense of another, that even stock companies have, in the main, deemed it advisable advis-able and expedient to conserve the more salient mutual mu-tual features in the conduct of their 'business. To cite the ease of the Equitable (now so prominently promi-nently before the public) as illustrative of this point : a provision in the charter of this institution is designed as a prohibition against depriving its policy-holders of a sum in excess of $7,000 per annum, of the earnings or "savings" upon the business busi-ness transacted, for the benefit of the stock holders: i. e. seven per cent upon, the par value of "their stock the merest bagatelle, when compared with the great volume of its business. As, however, it has developed that the management manage-ment of the Equitable has, by "legitimate" methods, meth-ods, grossly circumvented the obvious intent of this provision of its charter, and has therefore shorn it of its intrinsic purport and value, this particular expedient stands condemned, in-as-much as it fails in adequately conserving the sacred interests of the insuring public. On the other hand, the champions of this peculiar pe-culiar system cogently maintain that there is inherent in-herent hi the purely mutual system the possibility of ruthlessly subverting its most salient feature: and that their contention, that through the instrumentality instru-mentality of voting-proxies, the management of purely mutual companies may be effectually wrested from their policy-holders, experience seems to fully coufirm. Is, therefore, the insuring public, facing "the two horns of a dilemma," absolutely at the mercy of designing spoliators of their sacred funds? Not so, let us hope. We have before us the charter provision of one very, prominent mutual company which seems, in a measure, to preclude the possibility of .the "proxy abuse" above alluded to: it limits the voting power of any one individual, and the right of the use of proxies to such as have been issued within sixty days of the time of the meeting, and absolutely prohibits the use of proxies by any of its officers, agents or trustees. As this company has one of the best management records of any like, institution in-stitution in the country, the salutary effects of this provision seems to be established. Even this last mentioned system is, however, by no means ideal. Under it the election of officers is necessarily controlled by a small per cent age of all the interested policy-holders; this objection being rendered somewhat less important, however, by the fact that .the limited number participating in each successive election is not necessarily a "fixed coterie." To summarize the points touched upon and, if possible, arrive at some pertinent and helpful de.-d de.-d net ions: The "proprietary'" system implying that under which the stock-holders have absolute control and receive all "profits" is so absolutely abnoxious as to justly condemn it in the esteem of the public. Tho "compromise" system, as typified by the Equitable, Equit-able, is essentially unsatisfactory, because of the opportunities afforded the unscrupulous for spoliation. spolia-tion. And, finally, the purely mutual plan has proven far from perfect, in its practical operations. 1 What, under the circumstances, can be done to safe-guard the interests of the army of policy holders hold-ers in these institutions? We will venture one suggestion which has occurred oc-curred to us in this connection: There is an insurance in-surance department in connection with every well-regulated well-regulated state administration. Let there be, under its supervision, an annual election, by the policy holders of the various companies in each state, of j representatives to the different meetings held for the purpose of electing the directors of such companies. com-panies. J ii this way, it would seem, could the management of these supremely important institutions institu-tions be effectually controlled by their policy-holders, thus averting a cataclysm of corruption that is so lamentably menacing to one of the most sacred interests of flu Americau public. -f Ihe San Francisco Examiner has discovered a new method for putting an end to war. Maintaining Maintain-ing that the producers of the world have their burdens bur-dens increased in exact proportion that their ! ranks are depleted by drafts for military service and by the slaughter of men of their class in sanguinary conflicts, it appeals to the laboring men of the world to render wars impossible by denying the combatants the supplies necessary for their prosecution. The most effectual means for the accomplishment ac-complishment of this purpose, the writer claims, is to refuse to handle all war supplies for transporta tion. The difficulty will be to convince the working work-ing men of tho reasonableness of the proposition that their material interests are detrimentally effected ef-fected by a reduction in the number of active producers. pro-ducers. Under existing industrial conditions the reverse would seem to be true. Were each producer required to toil in exact ratio to current demand for consumption, then would the soundness of this contention be plainly apparent. But so long as the supply of labor is almost constantly in excess of the demand, it is by no. means evident that a diminution would, or could, prove detrimental. Under our present competitive system the price of labor is manifestly regulated by the law of supply and demand, and the laboring man prospers most where tlie ratio of demand to supply is greatest. There must, obviously, be brought to bear arguments argu-ments more rational than that here considered in order to effectually enlist the influence and efforts of men against war. An appeal to narrow selfishness selfish-ness has never been, and probably never will be, efficacious in accomplishing any great reform. |