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Show ' By ELMO SCOTT WATSON r NE of the last acts of the closing session of the Seventieth congress was to pass a bill providing for the erection of a national monument on the Cowpens battleground In South Carolina. When this monument Is erected, tardy recognition will be iVsv' given to a "famous victory." one CiwjRl wl,Icn ,s pcrhnps little known to niost American.-, but which was one "" ' of tlie most Important of all the Revolutionary conflicts. The story of the surrender sur-render of Cornwallis at Yorktown. the crowning event of the devolution. Is known to all. but York-town York-town might not have boon possible had it not been for two earlier victories. One n fathom look place at Kings Mountain, when the fmnth-rsmen of North Carolina, South Carolina nnd Virginia overwhelmed over-whelmed tbe British lender Ferguson, and the other was the battle of Cowpens. In connection with the action of congress providing pro-viding for the Cowpens national monument the historical section of the army war college prepared pre-pared a "historical statement." printed as a house document, which gives by far the best account of this battle that has yet been written. The Importance of that battle Is shown In the following follow-ing statement from the document: Tarleton (leader of the British nt Cowpens) In his narrative, commenting on the two disasters which the British suffered In South Carotln-i. sail lhat the fall of Ferguson at ICInps Mountain was a catastrophe which put an end to the first expedition ex-pedition Inlo North Carolina and that the battle of Cowpens overshadowed the commencement of the second expedition. ( This comment, taken tn conjunction with the apprehension of Oeorpe "Wnshlnpton that "the Southern states will look upon this victory as much more decisive In Its consequences than It really Is." briefly summarizes the result of the battle of Cowpens. The effect at the time was to hearten greatly the patriotic cause and to disiress the British army and their Tory svmprilhlzers beyond measure. It was the second link In the chain of events soon to be followed fol-lowed by others, which finally led to the surrender of Cornwallls" army at Yorlctown. To have a proper understanding of this battle and Its Importance It Is necessary to take Into account the military situation In tbe South and some of the previous events. Briefly, these were as follows: Following the capitulation of Charlestown on May 12. 1780. all of Soulh Carolina was In a condition con-dition of subjugation within a few months, and In September, British headquarters were moved to Charlotte Town, N C. Prior t this Lieutenant Colonel Ferguson had been detached with a small force of provincials to organize the mtlltla and operate on Cornwallis' flank. On the seventh of October his entire command was lost nt Kings Mountain. Following this disaster the British field army was withdrawn more than sixty miles to Wynnesborough and there remained on the defensive de-fensive while awaiting Information relative to the rehabilitation of Gate's arrr. (which had suffered a disastrous defeat at Carr.den on August 16) now commanded by Greene. Lieutenant Colonel Tarleton, the only officer remaining re-maining after Ferguson's death, used by Cornwallls Cornwal-lls for the command of roving troops, was sent Into the district north of Ninety-Six to oppose General Morgan, and somewhat later Cornwallls resumed his inarch northward. Tarleton and Morgan Mor-gan met nt Cowpens on the seventeenth of January Janu-ary and In a battle noted for the unusual tactics adopted by the Americans the British were defeated de-feated with heavy losses by a force Inferior In numbers, o considerable portion of which was militia. Cornwallls hoped to destroy or drive out of South Carolina the corps commanded by General Morgan. . . . Thero was also hope that by rapid marches the British main army would get between Greene and Virginia and by that means force the Americans to fight without receiving any reinforcements from that state or, falling In th'.s, to oblige Greene to quit North Carolina with precipitation and thereby ercourage the friends of the Crown to make good their promises of a general rising to nsslsi the British commander In re-establishing the royul government Morgan's purpose had been to harass Cornwallls' Corn-wallls' foraging and 6couting purttos f.nd being more than u hundred miles away from Greene at the time. Cornwallis believed that Tarleton could crush Morgan before Greene could come to his aid. Morgan knew that Tarleton was com Ing after him but he bad no Intention of engaging engag-ing in a battle until he could do so on ground of his own chousing. The place where General Mon an established his camp the night of the sixteenth w;m ear the Intersection In-tersection of the Mill Gap road and l lie road from the present city of Spartanburg running northeast Into North Carolina and crossin. the Broud river at Island Ford .. The position selected for the action lay on both sides of the Mill Gap road on both sides of the camp The ground Is slightly slight-ly undulating-and at ih time vas covered w.'h trees of red oak, hickory ntid plno. Being used for the grazing cf entile there was but Utile if any undcrbru.-h. Two very flight elevations Co. P!cAu3 topped the ridge along which the Mill Gap road runs and these were selected as lines of development develop-ment for the American troops. The main position was on the elevation Just south of the ravine in which ca np was established. To Its front for 300 yards thero Is a scarcely perceptible per-ceptible slope downwards; beyond this the slope Is greater, dropping off Into a shallow ravine 70' yards from the main position. To the rear of the main position and Just west of the camp site Is an elevation slightly higher than that of the main position. This ridge continues across the road In a south and southwest direction but at a slightly less elevation. From either side the terrain between be-tween the two was visible under and through the trees. The ground offered no cover for either the attack or the deftnse except such as was furnished by the trees. The flanks of both armies were exposed ex-posed as the terrain was favorable In all direction for the operations of mounted troops. The ravine In which Morgan camped and one on the opposite oppo-site side of the road offered but little Interference Interfer-ence with the movement of foot or mounted troops. Morgan's plan of battle was to use the Marylard Continentals and Ihe Virginia militia (of equal worth to the Continentals as many had served In previous campaigns) In his main position on the summit of the southermost rldgo and astride the Mill Gap road. Washington's dragoons to the number of SO. augmented by the 45 militia und-r McCall, were the main reserve posted In the rear of the northernmost ridge where ground. cov.r was sufficient to protect them from hostile observation ob-servation and fire and sufficiently near "as to te able to charge the enemy should they be broken." The militia were to form an Interrupted line on the flanks In front, which position was to be held only temporarily, when they were to withdraw with-draw and reform on the flanks of the main position posi-tion after reorganization had been effected ana lend what assistance they could as an additional reserve. At ti ls time Howard's Maryland and Delaware Continentals consisted of 237 men. They were placed on the loft of the line, astride the Mill Gap road To their right were Captain Beatie's and Major Trlplett's companies of Virginia militia, under un-der the command of the latter and totaling about 100 men. Captains Tate and Buchanan, with about 100 of the Augusta riflemen of Virginia, supported the right o-f the lino. In the advanced position, which was to be abandoned early In the fight, were about 308 mllltla from North Carolina, South Carolina Car-olina and Georgia, under Colonel Pickens. These troops were situated to guard the flanks. Major McDowell of the North Carolina volunteers was posted on the right flank, 150 yards In front of Howard's line. Major Cunningham of the Georgia volunteers was on the left flank at the same distance dis-tance in front of Howard's line. To the right of Major McDowell were posted the South Carolina volunteers under Colonels Brannon and Thomas. To the left of Major Cunningham was posted the re-malnder re-malnder of the South Carolina mllltla under Colonel Col-onel Hayes and Major Hammond. The latter commanded com-manded Major McCall's regiment, he being with Colonel Washington. From Pickens' lino of militia small parties of riflemen were sent 150 yards farther to the front to skirmish with the enemy. McDowell commanded command-ed those In the right sector of the skirmish line and Cunningham, those In the left sector. Patrols covered the front and flanks to give warning of Tarlcton'a approach. Tarleton , broke camp at 3 o'clock In the morn-. Ing. determined to engage the Americans before they could cross the Broad or In case they made an early march and continued their withdrawal to strike them when astride the river. When the British commander saw the disposition disposi-tion of Morgan's troops he was delighted fur he believed that he could make short work of them. He had a force of about 1,000 men and although he believed that Morgan's force totaled less than 1,920. he felt that he could Ignore the value of the 1,001) mllltla and J500 backwoodsmen In Morgan's army nnd make a quick Job of the 500 Continentals Continen-tals und 120 cavalry. Deploying his troops along the line of Morgan's front he moved to the attack at-tack at about eight o'clock. Driving In the front line skirmishes under Cunningham and McDowell, from whose fire Tarleton's Infantry had suffered but little, he advanced against I'ickens' line of militia which kept up a tire by regiments for a short time nnd then, according to their orders, retreated. The British line had still suffered but little as It approached the Continentals and Vlr-glnlaus Vlr-glnlaus under Howard. As Howard's men opened ' fire the British advance was temporarily checked. At this moment. Tarleton sent the two troops of dragoons, which he had posted on each end of his line to guard his flanks. Into action. Lie now had about 7."0 infantry In line, supported by two guns (three-pounders) and was opposed by less than 430 Infantry In Howard's line. The militia which had withdrawn to the Hanks of Howard's line had not yet reformed and It was doubtful at the moment whether they would be of any use. Tarleton's dragoons charged upon them and were cutting them down when Washington counter- j charged with his cavalry on the left of noward'a line and relieved the pressure there somewhat. It became evident to Howard lhat when Tarleton Tarle-ton should bring his reserves into action his exposed ex-posed right flank might be thrown into confusion nnd he ordered the flank company to change front to the right. His orders were misunderstood nnd this company began to retreat. The officers along Howard's line, seeing this, and supposing that orders or-ders had been given for a retreat, faced their men about and began to retire. Morgan, who was engaged en-gaged In reforming the militia, was surprised to see his Continentals, who had fought so valiantly at Camden, In apparent retreat. He quickly rode over to Howard. "What are you retreating for?" he shouted. "Simply a change of position to protect pro-tect my rteht flank," replied Howard. "Are you beaten?" asked Morgan. Pointing to his men. Howard said, "Men who are retreating In that order are not bent en." Morgan then ordered Howard to continue his retiring movement until he reached the rising ground In the rear and then rode back to select the position where they were to make their stand. The British, seeing this movement nnd believing victory within their grasp, pressed forward with fixed bayonets. Tarleton's cavalry was ordered to charge. By this time not more than thirty yards separated the "retreating" Americans and the victory-flushed redcoats. Suddenly Howard gave a sharp order. His men wheeled right-about face and from their guns poured a sheet of flame which stopped the British In their tracks and threw them Into great confusion. Howard then gave the order "Charge bayonets!" Back over the ground which they had Just crossed swept Howard's Marylanders. Like n thunderbolt Washington's Wash-ington's cavalry dashed down upon them. The panic which caught the British Infantry spread to Tarleton's dragoons and a general flight followed. fol-lowed. Tarleton tried In vain to rally his men but It was useless. Within twenty minutes after the. battle began It was over and the British were completely defeated. Tarleton had suffered a loss of 110 killed, 200 wounded, nnd 531 taken prisoner. The American loss was slight 12 killed and 00 wounded. The spoils of their victory nmounted to 2 standards, 2 cannon, S00 stands of arms, 100 dragoon horses and 35 wagons. "It appeared to the British when Howard's line fell back," writes the army war college historian, "that victory was at hand and so It would have been had the line been composed of men less Inured to battle than were the Continentals of Maryland nnd Delaware, There was no delay or hesitation when the order to halt, face the enemy and tire, was given, and there then occurred In a moment a scene of dumbfounded surprise, confusion con-fusion nnd panic seldom witnessed In baMIe. The outcome resulted In one of the most gloriously unexpected victories of the Revolutionary war. As a result of this brilliant victory, M rgnn nnd his mo were given the thanks of the United States rTor their fortitude nnd good conduct displayed dis-played t the action at Cowpens" under a resolution resolu-tion of Congress, March 9, 17S1. The resolutions further provided that a gold medal be presented to General Morgan; silver medals to Colonels Washington and Howard and a sword to Colonel I'ickens. Tnrleton, In his report to Cornwallls. attributed his defeat "to the bravery or good conduct of the Americans; to the loose manner of forming which had always been practiced by the King's troops In America; or to some unforsoen event, which may throw terror Into the most disciplined soldiers sol-diers or counteract the best-concerted designs." Whatever the reason, however, It was n crippling blow to Cornwallls. for the victory of Cowpens had deprived him of his most effective light Infantry In-fantry and, as later events proved, it led eventually even-tually to his downfall. On January 19 Cornwallls started In pursuit of Morgan to i-ut him off from Joining Givene and. If possible, tr recapture Morgan's Mor-gan's prisoners. By a superb march Morgan eluded him and Joined Greene in North Caro Una. Then followed the masterly series of ina neuvers by the "Rhode Ihind blncksiulth" (Greene) which ended In the b.-.ttle of Guilford Court House nnd finally forced t'ornwitliis in retreat re-treat Into Virginia. He took h!s position nt York-town, York-town, Washington completely deci-Ived the British In the North as to his future plans. niiireher South, swooped down upon rival!is--nnd thf rest is hls'icryl |