| Show OF KAISER t I p t IN VERDUN IS t J-t ir ff A MYSTERY t Continued from page 7 rL 1 October O October and they may be reckoned t t tp to be be-as be as ready as they promised when t i. i the plans were were made Jp nu It Is is' is clear that France particularly but but Italy also will not be as well off cF they could haVe hoped to be be- be 3 they have haye had to use reserves of men and ammunition In iw the present J Nt cv fighting But the Germans and Aus- Aus have In the same way exhausted exhaust exhaust- cd ed cd their reserves to an even greater K extent and the situation If it endures for another mont month Will not be greatly which the allies ames different from that rhad had hoped to see yta f t But It Is still sUll possible that the I l French may weary of their part of the l bargain I lIa say sap It may be possible although al- al though Ugh everything that I saw in Francel France l U contradicts any such notion It is 1 at possible that the l French rench people or ort demand t he French politicians may that shat a portion of ot the burden be shifted shift- shift pd ed to British soldiers If It this happens then there may still stin be bc a premature offensive although nothing like as weak wak an offensive as would have come f. f N had the British moved last February I possible that the attack may come comei i Von icon Oft one front before all fronts are pre- pre 4 pared j t f L On the other hand it Is equally clear t that th the time Is not far distant when WS the allies can carry out their plan as they ey had intended to carry It out So WJ 4 far tar the German and Austrian efforts to tot jS t tf Provoke an attack on one or two points t ti shave shave- h have vt failed tailed If It the French people and andI r I the politicians stand up under the attack at- at S. S V tack of ot Verdun for tor a few weeks more l i. i then the main purpose of German strategy so far as German strategy isnow is outside of n now nv v intelligible to observers 1 v g Germany will have completely failed Te Verdun Illusion I Jt It t cannot too frequently be said that Verdun Itself is an illusion The Germans Germans Germans Ger Ger- mans may get Verdun a month hence and at their present rate of progress t 1 J ear would be be bea a fairer measure and unless they destroy the French troops r before them and break through the t behind Verdun before any well re- re brought theys' theys they Will plc 44 serves 3 can be up s' s havo j achieved nothing of military value alue save only as they may have French soldiers than they t rave bave lost themselves and so far it Is Via perfectly conservative estimate that have lost more than than- the l they ith y v French fore J lore than a year ago the FrenchI French f f. f I after atter a brief success were driven south i fr fr oi of the thea Aisne east ast of S Soissons but there 4 never never was the smallest chance that the Germans could push their success V-oi V S. S further and at this point they were I t t eighty miles nearer Paris than they will will be in Verdun and there were fewer obstacles in their way You you cannot find any military reason support to the German strategy in the i Verdun VE campaign after the first attack at- at ati i tack which is not in fact political a You You may take the simple explanation that that hat the Germans believe the French I Vare almost exhausted running short of ot a are e 2 1 men men and of courage and will presently a abandon r the war if they continue to t cry p lose without regaining French terri tern tory tort You may take the less Jess simple fi but not less appealing explanation J that the Germ Germans ans have tried at Ver- Ver qun to exert so much pressure as to provoke pr yoke the allies into a premature of- of d r e. e thus destroying the chance of ofa f a combined attack later there may be some other political consideration that rib no one knows a desire to to give the German people a victory or ora a. a fear to abandon the attack having sacrificed 1 so many lives in making It it but the military advantage of a success that takes the Germans to the Meuse at Verdun takes them Into the the- city Itself Is is Just nil t To believe that the Germans are i i. wasting sUn J their men on an idle and fool- fool r I. I felt t. military venture Is absurd It is t l' l the fact that no profit worth the price H has been disclosed In the Verdun op- op ration itself that has hac puzzled not r i merely the ordinary observers but sole sol sol- l- l e 1 dieTS diers and military critics aUk alike Verdun Veri Ver- Ver Ver- Ver Verdun dun pun has nas come corae to have a value In the 7 i I fi l minds of or the world that no fortress has hasa a had for tor a a. generation but this Is a l mere Illusion for tOr Verdun Is no longer a a. fortress and has no value itself A Spring Offensive v- v Very frequently one hears In Gert Ger- Ger t- t man man quarters that the allied spring 1 X drive has been prevented by the Verdun Verr Ver- Ver r dun attack There never was any intention intention in- in ten tion on the part of the allies ames to ata attack at- at a 3 Mack tack In the spring for the simple rear reason rea- rea r son that Russia could not be 1 Cloned A year a ago o Germany attacked Russia In in inthe the spring Nand land Russian lack of munitions munitions' partly contributed to the great Russian defeat Nowhere In Europe did I hear a suggestion that before the allied attack would come July and it was of often postponed evento even evento to next year ear We Ve have lately seen tho the Serbian army now reorganized moved to Sa- Sa There have been signs of activity activity activity ac ac- along this front and the forecast has bas led the thai of an allied attack here Germans and Bulgarians to seize Greek forts with the alleged purpose of forestalling forestalling forestalling fore fore- stalling an attack There has been beena a slight resumption of activity at points on the Russian front but nothing nothing nothing noth noth- ing of ot an any real moment As for the tho British thay have been ben practically quiescent d during the whole winter and spring Only in recent days days' have there been printed rather crude hints that the British are ready rady to attack when Joffre gives the word But It is well to remember that the British have been willing if not wholly ready to attack at any moment they were asked by the French to attack ever ever since the Verdun attack began They have supplied a new army to occupy occupy occupy oc oc- oc- oc cupy the Arras sector there are many hints afloat that they will presently take over the Roye sector and thus hold the line from the Olse Oise to tho the All talk about British unwillingness unwillingness unwillingness to share in the conflict or bear their share of the loss Is moonshine Much of it is malicious gossip intended ito to influence French opinion and thus help the German game which is to provoke a premature offensive It is entirely likely that there will willbe willbe be no attack until August it is more than conceivable that the attack will no be made until September although this would shorten very materially the period in which a successful offensive could be pushed home but it Is also plain that within a month now the allies will be able to move more as they I planned unless In this ine ne the Germans Germans Germans Ger Ger- mans finally break the French nerve or drive the French politicians into I demanding British action in advance of the agreed time German Failure Unless there is some explanation so far successfully hidden from all ob observers observers observers ob- ob servers this German attack upon France must now be reckoned as a failure allure wholly analogous to that at the and Ypres It has gained no ground of ot any value or any considerable considerable considerable consider consider- able extent It has not inflicted losses on the French at all equal to those borne some by the Germans and it has neither broken French nerve erve nor provoked provoked provoked pro pro- a premature allied attack Its sole result to date has been the purchase purchase purchase pur- pur chase of or a few square miles of French territory the capture of or some French prisoners perhaps wounded and unwounded and a number of guns The I total French loss may be it It is not more more and and the German is not less I than On this basis Fr France nce can afford to sell the Germans Germans' more square ml miles es of French territory for another month or two until the great attack comes When this attack does come if It comes the British will wilt have to to bear to-bear bear beara a share of the cost based upon upon the French sacrifices now They will have nave to o do more than planned before the Verdun operation less' less will willbe willbe be asked of the French But British reserves In men are far far- greater than French and while France has seen her reserves red reduced ced with the German there has hag been no reduction In iiI British and Russian reserves and the balance is against the Gen Germans ans The only explanation I can find forthe for the persistence of the Germans in the Verdun affair is their conviction that the Fren h are about done that the 11 allies are still far from ready for a I general attack and that they can still precipitate one under conditions most favorable to themselves s. s I do not believe believe believe be be- lieve even the fear of the effect at home of a failure would lead the German Ger Ger- German man high command to continue its terrible terrible terrible ter ter- sacrifices The German high command command command com com- mand has made mistakes but hut It has never made such a blunder as this would be and It has has' frequently shown a skill and quickness to change its strategy when It had been bee check checked d. d |
