| Show I Kaisers Kaiser's Purpose in Verdun Verdu Battle Remains Remains' Hidden Though of the Flower of Germa Germanys Germany's ls Army Have Been Sacrificed No Important tant Gain Has Been Made Military Aspect Aspe t I Is Interesting Slaughter Not Territory Is Object By FRANK H. H SIMONDS Author of The liThe Great War C Copyright tl 1916 The Tribune The New York Evening Tribune I The German attack upon the Verdun sector of the French front has already lasted longer than the whole period of the second Napoleonic Na Na- episode the departure from Elba to the final abdication abdication tion after Waterloo Notwithstanding this fact it must it-must must be said that from the military point of view the purpose of the German attack remains hidden It has not been possible at any time since the tile first phase of the theatta atta attack k ended with the checking of the Germans on the plateau and before Le Mort Homme and Hill to find any satisfactory satisfactory satisfactory satis satis- factory military reason for its continuation Conceivably probably the German losses have been less than the re rep reports have made them out to be the reports from Paris and arid London probably the French losses have been greater than the same reports have conceded but it is a practical certainty that the German losses losse have much exceeded the French and that the proportion proportion proportion pro pro- portion has been not less than 3 to 2 that is isif if the Germans have lost men in their attacks and this is a moderate estimate the French loss is not hot less than But f for r the men th the Germans h have ve next to nothing to to show and there is nothing in the positions that they are now at attacking attacking attacking at- at tacking which explains their persistence If the Germans were able to sweep the French back across the Meuse if they were able to occupy occupy occupy oc oc- oc- oc cupy all aU the hills of the Meuse east of pf the river they would still have madeno real progress toward Paris and they would be confronted con con- fronted by a a task even ven more difficult than that which has held them for more than three months and cost them great and unprofitable losses L We We Weare are arc are then forced to believe and to this belief practically every Writer on military affairs rs in France in Britain and in the United States has come come that the Germans are are endeavoring to achieve through their attack upon the Verdun sector a military object ob which lies outside the present field of operations or else that they they- are operating for reasons that affect the political situation in ill Germany or in France Nearly two months ago on my return from Paris I 1 outlined the political al y reasons reasons ason which are based on the German belief that France is exhausted and almost ready to accept a separate se peace But the military aspect is even more mor interesting We have hav all aU assumed that some sonic time this tIus year the allies were to to break r ak out in m a aI I gerer general r l offensive 1 il concentric C power tte tr-tte t tI I o on all alf fronts simultaneously The T conferences of the allies in m r Paris ri ris' ris ha have e all been reported as discussions o of a combined military effort Such an effort must re retail recall aH to Americans the strate strategy y of Grant Giant when at last he took command of all the Northern armies Continued on page 7 lilies lies Hampered by Russia's Slow Movements Sim Movements Simonds Kaisers Kaiser's Purpose I in Verdun Battle Remains Hidden Continued from page 1 Until Grant came to the South enjoying inferior lines precisely as the central powers do had been able to move troops notably Longstreet's corps from one front to the other because the Northern attacks were never combined and there was generally a lull along the Potomac when there was activity along the Mis or the Tennessee But Grant resolved to attack all the fronts and with Sherman and Thomas he launched the general offensive under which the South first staggered and then col col- col- col lapsed Now Kow we have bave been Informed by the allied press from time to time that the next attack of ot the tho allies will wUl be on all fronts that Russia will wUl strike in the tho east France and Great and Great Britain In the west Italy In the south and that in addition there will willbe be an attack by the allied army that has been assembled at It is possible that Germany Germany Germany Ger Ger- many with her allies aUles would be able to repulse such auch a c combined attack but It Itis itis itis is equally clear that to do it she would have to assemble great armies on all fronts because she he would be unable to move troops from one front to the other But it is certain that the ce central powers now have fewer troops in the field than their opponents it is also certain that they have smaller reserves behind them It Is not necessary to accept the extreme estimates of ot German German German Ger Ger- man attrition but it is fair to accept the fact fac that superior population wealth and reserves have bave long ago given to the allies the permanent advantage advantage ad ad- vantage in numbers in the field It is I doubtful if it Austria can now put ut more troops In the field than Italy it is certain that Germany can no longer match man for man with Britain Russia Russia Rus Rus- sia sla and France combined even with Turkish aid ald which Is not considerable German Strategy Such a concentric attack as the allies al- al lies have planned would then be fr fraught with verY very Tea real danger for the central powers It might fail fall but if it it could be prevented such prevention would be pe o wise strategy Now It will be noted in iq all aU that their critics say in inthe inthe inthe the recent days that the Germans as assert assert assert as- as sert they have hav prevented this general and simultaneous offensive Not only this but they assert that they have prevented it by their Verdun operation This assertion the allies meet with a general denial A But it is clear that the real purpose pose of German strategy If the signs have been correctly read Is to prevent the general attack not by so great a 1 blow of their own own like like last lat years year's attack on Russia Russia Russia-as as to to make an attack Impossible impossible impossible sible for tor they have atte no such blow but rather by exerting such great pressure on one section one section n of the front as to provoke the allies alUes at other points Into a premature attack which shall not be general but local and can be pe defeated In detail For example suppose that the consequence consequence con con- sequence of the first and yer very successful successful successful success success- ful drive of the Germans in the Verdun sector bad had resulted In a demonstration a a. counter offensive by the British in Artois and and I such an at attack attack attack at- at tack would have used up much of the tile accumulation of ammunition It would have resulted in great casualties and it would very probably have haye removed I Britain from the line for tor tho the rest of ot the year year that that is is for offensive pur pur- I Ithe poses Apparently moreover this is EXactly exactly ex exactly EX ex- what th the Germans expected to do do because we have the very very complete statement made by British observers that at the moment when the Verdun attack began the Germans Germans' had concentrated concentrated concentrated concen concen- huge reserves opposite the British Brit ish lines reserves out of all relation i to the situation as it existed if it no al allied allied allied al- al J lied attack was to tobe be expected Th The The- Germans were ready for a British o offensive of- of when they attacked Verdun but the they began their attack on oil Verdun at precisely the time when Russia Ua could not move because Archangel was closed the supply of ot munitions t the e alli al- al 3 li s were t. t to te send ir In i ithe the spring had not come and there was no chance that r Russia would be a serious menace If It by attacking the French the BritIsh British British Brit Brit- ish could be drawn into an offensive while the- the Russians were out of ot th the i 1 game Germany had bad the maximum chance of repulsing the British and aM breaking up the whole allied plan and she could temporarily transfer from the Russian to the western front many divisions of troops France Declines So far tar we are on fairly safe sate ground t because it is a fact fast that when the German German Ger- Ger j. j man attack on Verdun began the British Brit Brit- t tish r rish ish did offer to counter attack if the French desired Instead Joffre asked Haig Halg to take over over the Arras sector of the French front thus releasing a a whole French army which could b be put in reserve behind Verdun This th the 1 British of course promptly did Meantime Meantime Meantime Mean- Mean time the French took Petain's arm army which was sas in reserve and put it in the Verdun sector The German attack upon Verdun was brought to a dead halt in the early days das of ot March there was a gradual dying dy- dy r ring ing Jag down of the activity over a considerable considerable considerable con- con period Then came caine a new and still more violent phase In the early early eary ear ear- ly y days das of April This was waa without any profit whatever and ent entailed some loss although nothing like the loss 0 of the last days of ot the previous fighting in the Vaux district Still there was no sign of of British activity As for tor forthe forthe the Russians they were still without ammunition for tor Archangel was not yet open also the weather conditions made operations in the east almost almos Im im- possible Since that time time we have had two more violent phases That in May was without any real feat value but in th the recent days there has be been n what the French describe as the most violent of ot all the attacks and there has teen been art immaterial but noticeable re recession on the part of the French lines west st of the Meuse followed by new assaults in inthe inthe the Vaux district 4 Meantime there has haa broken out a B. a. a very severe Austrian attack upon the the i Italians which closely resembles the attack upon Verdun has haa resulted in even more considerable gains to the assailant assailantS and does not seem to have been brought to a permanent halt hatt aa as S yet So far tar as one can Judge exactly the same purpose underlies this attack Italy is to be subjected to pressure conceivably lY with the hope of ot dealing her a decisive blow but more likely to drive her to appeal to ta her allies for tor aid and thus induce a partial and premature premature premature pre pre- mature attack on the western front Despite the fact that Russia has now been able to use the port of Archangel Archangel Arch Arch- ang angel 1 for some weeks it is a certainty that she has not yet been able to re receive re re- and bring up to the front most of the munitions which she he needs and which her allies aUles have sent her The Political Maneuver But France Prance has be been n compelled to endure a very rough attack It Italy ly is enduring another which has threatened threatened threat- threat ened to carry the war into the Ven Venetian Vene- Vene tian Uan plain and at one point has actually actual- actual ly passed the Italian frontier We are re rethen then approaching a crisis In German strategy Within a month at the tho outside outside outside out out- side it is fair to assume that R Russia will be able to make some sort of an effort approximating what was wag ex expected expected ex- ex of her when the plans for tor a general offensive were made In Paris 1 last winter As for tor the British they have had no serious fl fighting since last |