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Show BRITAIN RULED BY FEAR V W. Stephen Iwih Tells ef Muuolini't New Gibraltar end Italy's Pivotal Policy The desperate patience of the 1 English In dealing with Benito Mussolini indicates not an excessive exces-sive courtesy, but fear more or less adroitly concealed. The apprehensions ap-prehensions of the foreign office are based on recent reliable and alarming Information, collected with care and caution at all the danger spots in the Mediterranean sea. Just now the eyes of the British Intelligence service are on the fleet of Italian U-boats which are joining with the air forces to demonstrate dem-onstrate their ability to guard and control the Mediterranean sea from Gibraltar to the Sues canal. An experiment with a amall fleet of airplaifee and aubmartnes was made in the early spring. Maneuvers Maneu-vers on a much larger scsle are set for the latter part of this month. Sixty U-boats are to be employed this time, as against 40 In March. The central and pivotal point of the Italian operations Is to be the Island of Pantelleria. situated midway mid-way between the Cape of Gran-It Gran-It ola on the southern shore of Sicily and Cape Bon on the Tunisian Tu-nisian coast. In the language of the fascist journals, this Island, but a fsw yeara ago a half-forgotten penal colony, has. "through the genius of Mussolini." been transformed trans-formed into a aecond Gibraltar. In the past year its rocky heights have been fortified and provided with artillery powerful enough to sweep the enure 40-mile stretch between Its own shores and the African aide. On Britain's Life Line A look at the map will show the extraordinary atrategic value of the island. After passing through the Straits of Gibraltar all vessela of any size en route to India hug the Algerian coast. Rounding Cape Bon they run through I ho body of water that divides Sicily from Africa. Almost Al-most In the exact center of this area rises Pantelleria. The navigator nav-igator on the way to India must pals either to the north or the south of it. No ship of more than 1000 tons ran'afford to try passing between Pantelleria and Sicily the northern north-ern aide because of the reefs and rocks that abound there nnd the numerous shoals. To seafaring men this whole section has for centuries been known as "the r Banks of Adventire" a nams 4 well justified by the many wrecks thst still occur there from time to time. On the other hand, the passage to the south toward the African ahore is entirely safe but for the heavy guna of Pantelleria. Pan-telleria. Overbalance Malta A second glance at the map will reveal how the new Italian fortress in the sea has reduced the importance of Malta and the great British naval base at Valet-ta. Valet-ta. Malta lies 120 miles southwest of Pantelleria on the route to India. In-dia. To reach Malta from the east every ship must pass under the cannons of Pantelleria. Moreover, More-over, several new aerodromes on Sicily are now in a position to harass Malta. The one harbor of Pantelleria between the point of Delia Croce and San Leonardo has been much Improved by dredging and blasting blast-ing and is now accessible to ships of medium tonnage. The island serves aa an ideal base for submarines sub-marines and waterplanes. It is an equally Ideal post of observation. observa-tion. The Island still resembles a vast beehive. Work is going on day and night The greatest precautions pre-cautions have been taken to bar strangers. Big Headquarters Installed Large headquarters for "operations "opera-tions at sea" have been established estab-lished at Tripoli with an important impor-tant branch station at Bengasi. The lines of communication via sea and air between Siracusa and Tripoli 270 miles have been perfected with a view of paralysing paralys-ing further the British position at Malta. There la now in rapid preparation a second line of cooperation co-operation between the air forces and the U-boats, with one base at Leros in the group of the Dodecanese Dode-canese islands and the other base at Tobruk on the eastern coast of Libya. This line is intended to bar the approach to Egypt and to Cyprus, another Important British base in the Mediterranean. A third line also consisting of airplanes air-planes and submarines ia in progress prog-ress further east with its bases at Massawah and Asab on the Red ea. Subs Worry British Tha British were but little Impressed Im-pressed by the tales of foreign guns placed around Ceuto to blast Gibraltar out of Its group of giant rocks, but they are seriously seri-ously concerned over Mussolini's growing flocks of submarines and bombing planes and the labors on the Island of Pantelleria. In many quarters both in and out of Great Britain the belief is prevalent that John Bull's hesitant, shifting shift-ing and contradictory foreign policy pol-icy Is in the main due to military deficiencies. England la believed to have overreached herself. Is ft feasible, people are asking, to carry out the original rearmament rearma-ment plans for spending 1900 million mil-lion pounds over a period of five years without putting too severe a strain on the country's resources, splendid as they are? Financial experts have expressed the opinion opin-ion that such a heavy expenditure expendi-ture of gold is bound to have a damaging effect on the finances of the country. Then there is the problem of manpower. The recruiting experiences ex-periences have shown up great and unexpected difficulties. At first the two dictators were obviously ob-viously overawed by the vast project proj-ect of British rearmament. They aeemed willing to alow down. But watching the progress of the rearmament, re-armament, they are now recovering recover-ing their old assurance. Behind British Overtures At present all indications point to England's anxiety to reach an understanding with Mussolini at the earliest possible moment and, if need be. at considerable sacrifice. sacri-fice. II duce is again affecting the peculiar cynical style which generally betrays that he has something up his sleeve. The rest of the program is anybody's any-body's guess except the position of Mussolini. 11 duce has a list of demands on which the recognition recog-nition of Italy's legitimate title to Ethiopia is but one item. In addition he will ask for a privileged priv-ileged position in the Mediterranean, Mediter-ranean, formally and specifically defined and agreed to by Great Britain; the cession to Italy by Spain of the Balearic islands, and a big loan either from France or England. If Benito does not get what he wants, it is certain that he will continue his unpleasant unpleas-ant and embarrassing pressure on the statesmen of France and Great Britain. (Copyright, 193T, for The Telegram.) trol; but occasions of war may be small and superficial. Yet when a break comes, a fuse is lighted that may quickly burn to the bomb. So it was In 1914. Against such contingency, a government gov-ernment is given firm support by adequate defense against aggression. aggres-sion. If hostile acts can be deterred, de-terred, or kept within bounds of arousing popular wrath, the government gov-ernment may manage to keep control. con-trol. Toward providing adequate defense de-fense our present government has acted with rare apprecaltlon for our armament's state. President Roosevelt has from the beginning been firm for sound military policy pol-icy and- is to a notable degree making good the expressed belief of every president that "a strong man armed keepeth his goods in peace." (Copyright 1937, for The Telegram.) |