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Show lOTniiiinniiiMniiiiiiiiiiiiw 1 (J3eliind the JJeactiined I Miiffliiiimiiiuiiiniiiiiiiniiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiin lieved that if we do, the Soviets will be forced into making even greater, more lasting concessions than Krushchev appears willing to make at present. Critics of the Dulles foreign policy argue that Krushchev's calls for an easing of the Cold War offer a golden opportunity for the West. They would take advantage of Krushchev's offers of-fers to negotiate the outstanding Cold War differences. Dulles and President Eisenhower Eisen-hower believe that the Soviets have made these offers out of weakness. When critics stress the Soviet military and space gains, the administration argues that Moscow is over stressing its admitted ad-mitted gains to "blackmail" the west into making concessions. The Administration seees the Reds' sometimes frantic appeals for more East-West trade, his sending of Mikoyan, a Red trade expert, to the United States as proof that Krushchev needs the trade more than the U. S. does. The question then, is Krushchev Krush-chev really in economic trouble? The administration believes I that Krushchev is caught in be-Itween be-Itween these economic pressures: Krushchev's own lavish promises prom-ises to save his political neck that the Soviet people will soon be better off economically with a higher standard of living than the U. S., and the Russian people's peo-ple's demand for fewer promises and more consumer goods. Rising demands of the East European satellite peoples for better living standards, too. Rising demands of the underdeveloped, under-developed, Afro-Asian nations for more Communist economic aid. Whether Secretary of State Dulles returns to his desk after his latest, and most serious hospitalization, hos-pitalization, few in Washington expect him to serve out the full 23 months remaining before the Eisenhower administration ends in January, 1961. He is expected to make every effort, however, to be back on the job to direct the crucial East-; West negotiations on Berlin this spring, and then, in the opinion of many observers, both Republicans Repub-licans and Democrats, is expected expect-ed to step down as Secretary of State just before, or following the expected Eisenhower-Krushchev summit talks later in the year. Everyone would be most surprised sur-prised if Dulles, barring an unexpected un-expected more critical turn for , the worst, should resign. His closest friends say he has absolutely abso-lutely no intention of stepping down unless forced to do so. In the meantime, the country has been given an opportunity to evaluate Dulles' much criticized criti-cized foreign policy strategy as a result of his illness. No one in the Eisenhower administration ad-ministration has come in for such j widespread attack as Dulles, as I his views have been called "war I like," "unrealistic" and "out of step with the times." Yet, the biggest mystery in Washington has always been just what Dulles' Dul-les' and America's foreign policies poli-cies really are. It can be stated categorically that Dulles believes there is only one foreign policy issue affecting affect-ing the Western Alliance insofar as the Cold War is concerned. This is whether Krushchev's repeated pretensions for more "peaceful economic competition" should be accepted at face value giving the Soviets an opportunity to win a breathing spell in the Cold War while they step up their economic expansion home, or whether the West continues to maintain pressure on the Soviet Union. Dulles has be- Undersecretary Christian Her-ter, Her-ter, now Acting Secretary, has never attended a major conference confer-ence with the Russians, has no broad diplomatic experience and no economic background. U N Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge is criticized by conservative Republicans Re-publicans as "too much of a deep end one Worlder." The name of former Governor Thomas E. Dewey of New York is being heard more often if only because he is felt to have the political prestige at home to carry on Dulles' highly unpopular unpopu-lar policies abroad. Soviet efforts to increase Moscow's Mos-cow's economic penetration into such areas as Latin America and Asia. The continuing arms race, and Mounting Red Chinese demand for Soviet economic aid. Secretary Dulles has believed, although it has been unpopular to admit it, that Western policy should be to tighten, not ease, pressures on the Soviet Union. He would deny them trade until the Soviets either retreat or make more basic, essential concessions con-cessions to get it. Dulles believes Krushchev's apparent willingness willing-ness to negotiate Berlin and the German problem now is the first real sign that these pressures are paying off. Whether Dulles returns to his desk as Secretary of State or not, President' Eisenhower also believes completely in his policy of refusing to ease pressures on the Communist world. No successor is likely who would tend to reverse these policies. poli-cies. Washington gossip since Dulles' illness that a successor more inclined to compromise some of the Cold War's issues would be chosen is sheer poppycock. poppy-cock. Dulles may be criticized at home and abroad because he is too unbending and inflexible. But this is exactly what he believes be-lieves U. S. policy must be. The State Department has a whole stable of experts qualified quali-fied to succeed Dulles. However, How-ever, many who have been mentioned men-tioned are expert in a limited 1 area. Assistant Secretary Walter Robertson, a close Dulles friend, is an expert on Asia, for example. ex-ample. Propaganda chief George Allen has had little experience in international economic warfare. war-fare. Undersecretary C. Douglas Dillon, while an economic expert has had virtually no political experience, ex-perience, except during a brief stint as Ambassador to France. |