Show 4 I II GERMAN STRATEGIST STR ON THE TU WAR AR I Brilliant Analysis of the Russo Japanese Campaign Russian Army Criticised BY COLONEL R GAEDKE IN THE LONDON STANDARD I d has done me the honor honorI I 1 of asking for my views concerning v the present position of the war In Inthe inthe Inthe the far east and the probable prospects of the two belligerent powers In a weak moment I pledged myself to ex express express press my views and It Is only now when I am confronted with my m task that I 1 realize that difficulties connect connected ed with wll It The task may be compared to an arithmetic problem In which the unknown quantities outnumber the equations given For apart from the material preliminary conditions which likewise cannot be exactly denned defined ev every ry belligerent action is strongly in and often dominated by pure purely purey ly Jy y personal and moral factors which baffle baffie all calculation Anyone there therefore therefore therefore fore attempting to predict the course of a campaign resembles a traveler who he is able to find his way among amon pitfalls during a a dense d nse mist Who rho could have foreseen In 1796 when Bonaparte an unknown general took tool the command of the undisciplined starving and ragged raged French army on the coast that he would be bethe bet bethe the t e master of the whole of Italy Ital in int ini 6 t i few months time And who would have ventured to assert In the spring of 1812 when the gen general oral eral and emperor led his formidable hordes across the that but a aaman small aman tattered remnant of or them out of hand and starving would retreat across that river In the winter of the same year ear Chance and unforeseen circumstances ces play pIny a great part in warfare for forthe forthe forthe the disinterested spectator and often the inner connection between events can can only be traced long after they have taken place Was it anything an thing else eIe el than chance that caused the Petro with Admiral Makaroff and his lIs whole staff on board to De Oe wrecked by a floating mine thus sealing the fate of the Russian fleet It is la true that the course of or the first year of the campaign seems to reveal some BOme essential facts which might have hoe led to such chances being foreseen But our judgment might easily be led astray should we attempt to apply the knowledge gained from the past course of events without any further consid consideration consideration oration to the future Even the criticisms criticisms of experts vary considerably just according to their own individual tactical and experiences Japanese Strategy at Fault I am personally for instance no ar ardent ardent ardent dent admirer of ot Japanese strategy strate which I consider to have hae been at fault in more than one particular The Jap Japanese JapaneSe Japanese anese generals failed to exploit their favorable position at the beginning of the war to the extent which they might have done and which would have haye in insured Insured Insured far more decisive successes The capitulation of Port Arthur which has hus jit nt last taken place does not shake my opInion on this point The dogged pertinacity of the Japanese in striving to subdue Port Arthur was within a hairs breadth of or costing them the loss of the battle of Liao Yang On the theother theother theother other hand the long resistance of the fortress has been of Incalculable value to the Russian generals and has been the only factor which has enabled them t to maintain their supremacy at Muk Mukden len ion and with it the possession of the largest part of fertile ferUle South Man Manchuria Manchuria an churia The Russian government and an military authorities had to reckon from the very outset that toward the end of or the year ear earthe the fortress would succumb to the des desperate desperate desperate attacks of the Japanese and to my m own knowledge they actually In Included eluded this eventuality in tin n their deliberations deliberations deliberations It was likewise an open se secret secret secret cret that General Kuropatkin was not going to take a step toward the relief of the fortress after his unsuccessful offensive movements during the first half of October but preferred to await anait the full concentration of his three armies In my opinion the capitula capitulation tion of or Port Arthur is IB not of such de and material importance import nce as the general public assume it to be The war will be decided as has always alwa s been the case ease on those battlefields where great generals struggle for victory by bythe bythe bythe the overthrow of a living force and not by the capture of a pile of ruins has been infinitely more costly to the Japanese e than to the Russians Even the tho occupation of Moscow pw in 1812 1813 by Napoleon did not result in the victory and peace anticipated and Port Arthur cannot Be compared in importance with Moscow Should even the moral Impression of this fresh success of the Japanese be beo beso so 00 o great on the people and government of Russia that at the present time an e felt to conclude a a disadvantageous disadvantageous disadvantageous peace It must be classified as one of those Incalculable chances which defy prediction From a purely military point of or view Yiew I do not con HIder eider the situation of the Russian army essentially more unfavorable than it 1 was ws before b for the fortress surrendered For its numerical superiority is s and re remains remains mains assured despite the reinforce reinforcements reInforcements ments meats of ot about men of the thc Port Arthur besieging force which will strengthen the Japanese field army The object of the Japanese at the out outset outset set et of the war was not limited to the recapture of the sea fortress although It has tas been a u thorn in their side but butto butto butto to the comprehensive purpose of driving g ing n the Russians out of Manchuria And I 1 find that as yet they are remote J from their goal The Russian army arm up to the present has not sustained any an decisive defeat but on the contrary directly confronts the Japanese le lesions legions glens gions to the south of or the capital Muk Mukden Mukden Mukden den and ami is superior in numbers and undaunted courage An attempt will have JULve to be made by bJ the Japanese gen generals generals generals to conquer their opponents there I i should hesitate to assert however that their chances chalices of doing so 50 are very great fIe t Russian Counter Move Practicable On the other hand liand 01 I consider even after the fall of Port Arthur and in invIe vIe of the strategic position and dif different dIfferent different ferent strengths a Russian counter countermove rove move as quite practicable The con eon connection connection of ot the Japanese army anny with Korea Is a very er loose one and can easily be threatened and a a retreat in inthe inthe inthe the peninsula on Port Ar Arthur Arthur thur would leave that very er occupied territory completely at the mercy of ot the thc Russians The possession of Korea would amply compensate for forthe forthe forthe the loss of port Arthur even If It were assumed as certain that the Japanese supremacy were also assured in inthe inthe inthe the future Certain doubts which I harbor at the same name time as as to whether the Russians will she beable able to turn the fortune of war warIn warin warin In their own favor do lie Ue in this direction n Although I L cannot perceive that the course co of the war up to the present is due d to the superior strategy of the Japanese I must admit that the skill and the energy of the movements of their Infantry In fan to in the field and its n discipline and training have shown themselves superior r to that ot of the Russian infantry The prospects of a L successful continuation of the campaign by the Japanese are based Olk these moral factors and not on the simple proportions of the numbers of or troops Composition of Army But whilst I am inclined to throw these chances into the scales les in favor faor of the Japanese doubts makes them themselves themselves selves solves felt relt again In my mind For the Russian troops who opposed the Jap nose last las r were hardly equal in and trainIng to the other troops of the Russian army arm Of the Siberian rifle battalions forty were Wore newly formed from quite different corps at the beginning and after the out outbreak outbreak outbreak break of the war and the remaining I had to contribute to the new formations and included there therefore therefore therefore fore among their ranks an overwhelm overwhelming ing number of reserve troops and officers who were strange to each other These battalions of which only sixty joined field army anny formed however his pIs most efficient troops Next to them came the battalions of the Fourth Siberian re reserve reserve reserve serve corps which it Is true although only formed at the beginning Inning of the war from very weak peace skeleton corps comprised a splendid l id set of men inspired by a certain national en enthusiasm enthusIasm enthusiasm who had had some fi me weeks time to become accustomed to their new formations and duties The troops troop which came from Eur viz the Tenth and Seventeenth army corps and the Fifth and serve corps did not at first fulfill the great expectations with which tH lr r arrival in Manchuria was expected expect The com corn companies companIes of the first two cops cOis cO ps mentioned above consisted of SO men of their heIr peace footing and reservists the two reserve corps ha had been newly n lY formed from weak weal res re naturally included a stil smaller num number number number ber of actual soldiers The rhe great aver aversion aver aversion aversion sion shown by b the Russian nation O Othe t the war was evident in the depressed de spirits of the reserve troops many m ny of whom had left leCt their families behind in poverty and distress Frequently led l d straight straI dit from the railway on to the battlefield after a journey of four to tosh six sh weeks situated in a very ery difficult position from the very outset march marchIng marching Ing and fighting in unknown regions taken away from front their original regi regiments regiments ments meats and joined together anyhow it itis itis itis is not surprising that symptoms of panic pan ic repeatedly manifested themselves among the Russian sOldiery especial especially ly h In consequence of their insufficient knowledge of warfare they the were con continually exposed to attacks on the part of the experienced Japanese infantry The Russian troops showed themselves especially nervous of attacks threat threatening threatening threatening ening their flanks and cases have haye oc occurred occUlTed occurred where they simply evacuated the positions to them without and without awaiting orders I 1 may repeat here that I consider the disadvantageous organization and for formation mation matlon of the troops responsible for these deplorable events The rhe policy of the Russian government which by underestimating Its opponent believed it possible to carry arr on a war In re remote remote remote mote territories and simultaneously to maintain a threatening attitude e on its European western frontier his has met with its deserts In any case one on fact has been made evident by b this cam campaign campaign viz that there is a limit ven 4 vento to power Kuropatkin Criticised An army arm improvised In this manner could only be strengthened welded w to together together together gether and inspired with confidence by victory Itself But that was lacking Kuropatkin however cannot be pro pronounced pronounced pronounced free of all blame In spite of the various manifestations of incapacity inca pac ity on the part of o those occupying high commands and in 11 spite of the fatal interferences by the viceroy in his plan of campaign The passive defense continually maintained long after it was necessary the termination of every ery encounter before a decision had been arrived at and the interminable re retreats retreats retreats treats caused thereby could not but damp the enthusiasm of the army Probably all the other armies of the thc would would have suffered still sUll more from this influence than the Russian army did The weak point in Kuro Euro conduct for which In other good military reasons can be assigned must be sought in his at attaching taching too little weight to moral con considerations and in disregarding the le ye e action which the slow but constant ad advance adVanCe advance vance of the Japanese produced among his troops and followers Finally FinaU the of the imponderables of im immeasurable Immeasurable Immeasurable measurable psychical influences avenged itself on the chief himself b by drawing him down into the whirlpool of the shak shah shaken shahen en confidence At the decisive mo moments moments ments merits on the battlefields of Liao Llao Yang and Y his com corn composure composure deserted him and when only requiring to stretch out his hand to gain the laurels he yielded them to his opponent Thus the Japanese tri triumphs triumphs tn were augmented by a fresh un unexpected unexpected unexpected expected success the influence of which hicl has been felt up to the l on of Port Arthur and which will vill still be felt It was only during the time nine days da s battle between Mukden and Liao Lino Yang Vang that General Kuropatkin regained his lost confidence and it was only due to his unyielding resistance daring that period that the Russian army was enabled to maintain its Us positions and even to gain fresh footing This suc sue success success cess was instrumental In the gradual recovery of the martial spirit in the Russian army arm from whose midst the Incapable officers of all an ranks were w rc slowly but unrelentingly being weed weeded d ded ed out by the energetic measures 5 of the I am there ther therefore therefore fore of the opinion that at the pre pres present pr prent ent moment the th Russian troops are arc better than they the were v ere at the outbreak of the war the more so as the military authorities have avoided their former mistakes when dispatching reinforce reinforcements rein orce ments meats The First European corps al already already already ready creates a good impression and the regiments belonging to it have fought all encounters victoriously ViC in iii which they the have as yet taken part As far as my own observations go aid ad ahdas adas as far as I have bave been informed the thc corps formed more recently and those drawn from the western frontier pro provinces provinces I inces of the empire as well as the 1 European rifle brigades have hav been I massed together under the tIme same favor faor favorable able conditions I I Prospects of the Belligerents I must frankly admit here that th t I am unable to form a definite judgment as asto asto to tf the prospects of the belligerent pow powers powers i ers for the second year of the e war I and that as far as I am concerned this question remains rem veiled in the he t greatest uncertainty I should only like to repeat my statement the I future chances of the Russians are far better than they have been hitherto and that I i do not consider a 3 decisive victory for General Kuropatkin as be beIng belag lag Ing beyond the range of or possibilities j jA A superior number of or troops alone will most certainly speak In ill favor of the Russians and the longer the war con continues continues the greater will this superiority become for the number of or reinforce reinforcements ments that the Russians can dispatch b to Manchuria is unlimited I am of opinion that t the commander In chief hie will have at least battalions at his disposal d osal toward the end of January against which the Japanese will not be beable b bable able to oppose more than battal battalions battalions battalions ions after having drawn upon all their |