Show s. s SAND AYD BRITAIN UNDERRATED I CAUSE OF GERMAN DOWNFALL O ALL I B l fin HITCH IK v l Service Correspondent DON April Germanys Germany's 26 Germanys Germany's two great mistakes es in the the war were werf r und underrating n creating of or tho Englishman as ason fighter r on land and her stupidity In the the capacity of or r underestimating tones rIca o build ships and transport across the thc Atlantic c course ur e c we wo know this but It t l to not to g get t confirmation of or fact tact em e an sources N-JW N V It H to the t h ft feria 1 mi of or i r frank ner written by a German arm army of 1 r to a German prisoner of or war In Inland agland land a i. letter which was duly dulyn notel I the prison camp censor and is now U leased teased ased for publication T The c letter was was' written some time in January last and IH Is an extremely fianU I p position ot i of or some hitherto unknown r diS Hs What the writer has to sa say about ip 9 mistakes mt made madu u on the score of ot ability lity to participate In Eu- Eu pos po's axon aJon agony runs 1 like 0 this c Submarine Nen ow f Now ow came the second great mistake 7 lic c first t was at the tho outbreak of ot war warthe the complete underrating of the lishman as a 1 land fighter the underrating un un- i rr of or America both in her can ca- ca t n city elt to build ships nn and to raise raSso an anim im We got Kol ot ft false e information from flom ill fir navy nan which hall had been heen thoroughly 11 oUt gilt b by the great treal fuss made over It G cr cry one from front thu tho l kaiser al cI dow n- n Ards Our ambitions had been raised y an unhealthy pitch and the war ward fid d not fulfill those thane c ambitious hopes judiciously injudiciously IY distributed distinctions z In in tho the arm army made mad the submarine submarino t report a much larger largel num- num num-I num rr r of oC ships sunk than y was ls as really tho the sc use sc Thus the great L army anny ann general I 1 c 1 f a ICA 1 rc b a sl's I aff UL sor UI on U a u. u lf they hall hail guessed that the ne ne war was ryas after till Vill not going so soch sol ch l a as the admiralty gave out they rould euld have realized reali that we could not nots ope pc In our ur lochs docks with the thc competition s i i t f the whole world 1 i know too LOO for forI I certainty that great mistakes were I nado nilda in the shipbuilding pro program ram i through rough the foolish h distribution of tho the i ork ork etc Our navy y was riot not in any I Ia fray ay a able able to lo disturb the transport of or I Ii i troops trot and in fact only had hadI I to Lo cut off England's lions Uon Thus In January T Jar n 1918 1315 therein therea there a 31 in the field a much larger larer Amerl- Amerl I in n army r than our general Jeneral staff starr was are ire of or When hen more details were as- as usI I it was then necessary ar to tal laKo laKoMe o Me e e offensive with all speed speed earlier earlier I plan an n ha had been planned and before the 1 had been sufficiently trained f r for rr r I 4 Minn S Song on The swan son song of or the thc German army a sung sun by this unnamed officer is a a. agic epic of or what Wright might have c been instance in Api April il 1918 1015 when we wc weh h 7 America were trembling upon the telly ily II bulletins ns of or the Germans' Germans groat rca I toward Amiens and Paris beK be- be K ml ud when the was bolO bom- bolOin in g Paris and to all appearances je e boasted break through h was about obe o be was really at al tho the end I this t his r resources and was riskIng all alln allon allone on n one throw In plain terms this was recently charged charge against t him by prime primo minister of the tho German republic Hear Bear what hat this German German German Ger Ger- man officer has to sa say about it On the of or April there were really really real real- ly h not enough b troops available a and sO ao I tho the break through via miens Amiens to the coast could not be made mado The Tho often offen offensive I sive had oven then on tho the gre tt scale failed railed The Than aim mentioned to in Luden- Luden I dorff's order order at changing In the trench scar Mar into Inlo a n war movement was not alI at attained at- at I t tamed and at this point peace terms ou ought ht to 10 have boon proposed The following fol fol- fol- fol lowing leaving offensive at Soissons and Kem- Kem mcI inel and later at were only miserable n attempts Besides this th the Austrian offensive In Ital Italy had hud been beon unsuccessful but then th thay y yil il have O l never been able to attack b by themselves you could never depend ou On th them m. m Defect ct and Revolution Resolution From the the time of oC the of t th the first offensive e at Amiens J lt ft seems to have Jo lost t his nerve ncr he lie tad had ad risked rifled ed all on this throw and now tI the o whole thing was only a fight of or de de- de The moment for Cor proposing peace with great reat concessions after the first offensive had now slipped sUpped b b perhaps too too the entente would not lot nt have ha accepted It they thc they were too s sure sura re of or success and there never nOVer was aB any iny lack of stubbornness s there each opponent stood tood the tho threatening ghost of or revolution I There has been great speculation amon among publicists and anil military expert of or the allies as to the relation between r en the German Heat u ud irid i th the revolution resolution which already alread had t Le un before th the armistice armistice ar ar- ar ml Uce was signed nfl last Jast ember imber Which stood In in the relation of cause Use an and effect she ha se e i fr f the tho German armies or the be beginning of oC revolt 7 Sa this Teutonic observer and participant In both hoth t ev events Ant I Th The r revolution wa was not the cause but hut tho result of or defeat With ith us IS it came camo when all ail confidence In tn general headquarters was lost and especially when the American leaflets undermined undermined undermined under under- mined this confidence more moe and and the tho tanks lanks as a a. new weapon broke It p n altogether c Now too the real cause taus came out Gut of what had always alwa's influenced the attitude of of 01 the government government govern govern- ment even before the the war the r of or revolution rc which could anly be prevented pro pro- vented b by war Mutterings H in no A powerful government g acting according according ac ac- ac cording to Ideas should have stifled 1 the he hee e very bc beginnings of or this feeling early In the nineties but as asIt asIt asit It grew worse from Crom year ear to year rear this f fal oar ar influenced more and more both the internal 1 d external policy of Ger Ger- many A zi zigzag g course a policy polley of I world dominion etc were v the r result Above o all alJ things order was entire entirely y I lacking aching In me Ise finances s of the tho empire FO EO o that there was no money moncy to spare r fi-r lr efficient nt lr preparation for tor the world- world war for arm army navy foreign office oHire etc etc The subject is so bl big there is s ono no no room loom here to on it and we have o discussed it often oLn enough nough together ale al- al r e ady dy Only a successful war could have ha given th the e 30 time and breathing breath breath- in Lug ing space to tD carry arr out far reaching r re forms The Thc war being lost los the whole structure was as bound lound to give way At the vetry ery r mordent when th the leaders leaders lead cad ers of the r revolutionary movement were able with the tho help of or Russian capital to organize the disgusted is masses mass mass- es cs the crash came Liebknecht had al already already al- al r ready ad been it at work In 1 1914 15 H |