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Show Supreme Court Renders Decision in Hardy Case IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH MAMMOTH . CANAL 4 IRRIGATION IRRIGA-TION CO., Et al., Plaintiffs, vs. Honorable THOMAS H. BURTON, as Judge of the District Court of Beaver County, Defendant. WOOLEY,' District Judge. This is an original proceedings for a writ of prohibition directed to the Honorable Thomas H. Burton as Judge of the District Court of Beaver County, Utah, to restrain that court proceedings, under the provisions of Laws Utah 1919, Ch. 67, with a gen eral determination of the rights to the use of the waters in what is called call-ed the Beaver River system under an order made and entered in an action pending in that court entitled William Will-iam L. Hardy, et al., plaintiffs, v. Delta Land & Water company ami Beaver County Irrigation company, defendants, which will hereinafter be referred to as the Hardy action. The Beaver river has its source in the Tushar range of mountains along the eastern border of Beaver counts, Lrtah, and flows thence in a westerly direction through Beaver valley to a point a short distance above the town of Minersville, where 'it makes a turn and thence flows in a general westerly west-erly course. Where the river leaves the Beaver valley a dam known as the Rocky Ford dam has been constructed across the channel of the stream forming a reservoir used for the impounding im-pounding and storage of water to be used in the irrigation of lands lying below. The Beaver river with its tributaries constitutes what is called the Beaver River system, and that system embraces the waters of the state in.volvel in this proceeding. The plaintiffs in this action are all water users on the upper part of the stream, diverting and using the water p.bove the dam and reservoir mentioned. mention-ed. There has been considerable litigation lit-igation in the past involving water right in the Beaver River system. It commenced in territorial days. It is vet unfinished. But the water rights of these plaintiffs, and all of the rights above the Rocky Ford dam, as well as the rights below the dam which are used by the town of Minersville, Min-ersville, have been established and determined as among the plaintiffs and as among the parties to the action act-ion in which such decrees were made, by judgments and decrees, made and ntered in the district court, in various vari-ous actions therein pending, before the commencement of the Hardy action. The Hardy action was commenced in the year 1916 in the District Court of Beaver County, Utah. It was brought to determine and quiet the rights to the use of the waters of the Beaver river at and below the dam. The subject-matter of the litigation was the storage rights in the reservoir reser-voir and the rights of the appropria- tors on the lower part of the stream. The issues in that action presented questions in dispute as to the use of the waters diverted from aid river below the dam only, and did not in any way involve any of the rights to I the use of the -waters of the system belonging to the plaintiffs in this action, or any of them; and none of these plaintiffs were, prior to the date of the order herein complained of, parties litigant in that case. A decree was entered in the Hardy action act-ion in 1918. Thereafter the case was appealed to this court, where the trial court was reversed, the findings of fact and conclusions of law set aside and the cause remanded for a new trial. The case is reported in 65 Utah 28; 234 Pac. 524. Remittitur was filed on April 22, 1925. On December 28, 1925, after the remittitur had been filed n the district court, that court, through Judge Burton the defendant def-endant herein, made and entered in said action an order directing the clerk of the court to notify the state engineer of the pendency of the action and directing the state engineer to proceed in accordance with the provisions pro-visions of the law aforesaid which, in the meantime, luul come in effect, and thereby determined to proceed in said c:;se as in said law provided to make a general determination of all f the rights to the use of the waters of the Beaver River system. That order and determination were made and based upon a motion which was made by the defendants in that action act-ion requeting the same, to which motion mo-tion the plaintiffs therein objected. Tb:1 plaintiffs in this action, however, noi being parties to the case at that time, took no part in such proceedings. proceed-ings. These -plaintiffs object to being brought into that case as they have been or will be as a result of the aforesaid action on the part of the district court. They have no desire to litigate their own rights nor the rights of anyone else in the stream. So they applied by various petitions and motions to the district court for relief, asking the court, upon a reconsideration re-consideration of the matter, to set aside its order of December 28, 1925, and protesting that the court had no jurisdiction to make said order or to proceed to a general determination. But the court, after hearing the plaintiffs, plain-tiffs, stood upon its previous determination deter-mination and denied their motions ami overruled their objections. At the plaintiffs have no adequate remedy at law if the trial court is without jurisdiction in the matter, they have brought their grievances to this court in a petition for a writ of prohibition which they filed here on May 13. 11127. i Since the aforesaid order was entered en-tered the state engineer ha proceeded with his surveys and investigations and has spent in and about that business busi-ness a sum in excess of $4,000.00. This court, upon the filing of the the petition, issued an alternative : writ directed to trial court restraining restrain-ing further proceedings in the Hardy ' action under the law of 1919 and di-(Continued di-(Continued on page 4) Supreme Court Renders Decision in Hardy Case -( Continued from page 1)- recting the defendant Judge to appear ap-pear and show cause why he should not be absolutely restrained and pro-hibited pro-hibited from further proceedings in the matter. The defendant has filed a demurrer to the petition upon the ground that it does not state facts sufficient to justify the relief prayed for, and also an answer under oath with a prayer that the alternative writ be dismissed. At no material issue of fact is raised upon which ;t will be necessary to have a verdict or a finding we shall proceed to dispose dis-pose of the case upon the merits upon the basis of the facts about which there is no dispute. It is ulso made to appear from the petition and answer that some time after the plaintiffs hud been accorded at least two hearings in the district court in regard to their objections they were permitted to appear again and showed the court that there had been a serie of transactions take place among some of the original parties to the Hardy action wiiich changed their relationship in respect to their water rights. The record is not clear as to just when it was that these transactions occured but it was perhaps some time in the early part of the present year. The facts are that the Duluth Land company, a corporation, cor-poration, became possessed of the Beaver Bottom rights claimed by the original plaintiffs in the action; the Beaver Kiver Irrigation company, one of the defendants, succeeded to the rights of the Delta Land & Water company, another defendant; and the Eocky Ford Irrigation company succeeded suc-ceeded to a large part, if not all, of tho rights of the Beaver County Irrigation Ir-rigation company. So that the Rocky Ford Irrigation company now represents repres-ents the rights claimed by the original origin-al defendants in the action and the Duluth Land company owns those formerly held by the plaintiffs. These corporations are separate and distinct and do not have common stockholders, stockhold-ers, but the Duluth Land company is a stockholder, .possibly a controlling stockholder, in the Eicky Ford Irrigation Irriga-tion company. Those sections of Chapter 67, Laws of Utah, 1919, which relate to the subject under inquiry, as is pointed out by Mr. Chief Justice Thurman in the case of Smith v. District Court, not yet officially reported but found in 256 Pa. 539, present a comprehensive comprehen-sive plan for the determination of water rights in river systems and other sources in this state. "The form of action," he says, "was- evidently evi-dently intended to apply where many persons claim rights to the use of water wa-ter from such source of supply. One of the purposes of the statute was to -prevent piecemeal Jitigation in the determination of water rights and determine de-termine them all in one action. Such is the only effectual method of determining de-termining them in order to prevent a multiplicity of actions in which the samearty is oftentimes compelled to try his rights over and over again until un-til all persons claiming rights are made parties to the action. Another purpose of the statute evidently was to make a permanent record of such rights by decree of court instead of permitting the eveidence thereof to resort in parole. For these purposes the statute is in the highest sense remedial and will no doubt prove to be of great benefit to those persons who are owers of water rights in the systems to which the form of action implies." This court must construe and apply that statute so as to carry out the purpose and intention of the legislature in passing it. It will be observed by reference to sections 22 to 37, both inclusive, ,that the scope of the inquiry necessary to . be made in the Hardy action as a result of the action of the trial court in the premises has been greatly extended, ex-tended, far beyond anything required by the issues raised in the pleadings in that case. New parties have been or will be brought in, including the plantiffs in the case and all others claiming rights in the system, and all of them will be required to set up their claims in the manner provided by the statute under penalty of a forfeiture of their rights if they fail. A general outline of the form of action act-ion that the Hardy case has now become be-come is given in the Smith case above cited. In short, from the usual suit in equity involving disputes as to water wa-ter rights in which only appropria-tors appropria-tors on the lower part of the river were concerned it has been converted into a statutory proceeding for the determination de-termination of all of the rights to the list of th waters of the Beaver River , sytem. It should be remembered that the familiar rules of practice and procedure pro-cedure by which the courts are guided in ordinary law suit do not apply in such cases where the legislature has lai ddown other and different rules relative to a particular subject. If this principle is kept in mind the legal conscience will tolerate some things that would otherwise upon first blush appear to be contrary to our accepted ideas as to how a law suit ought to be conducted and carried on. It is provided in the statute that such a proceeding may be initiated in the following cases: (1) By the state engineer; (2) Whe.ii five or more water wa-ter users upon the system or source of supply file with him a verified petition requesting a determination of the relative rights of the various claimants, and he, upon investigation, finds that the facts and conditions are such as to justify it. (b) When twenty-five or more, or a majority of the water users on a stream, if there be fewer than twenty-five, so petition him. In either of the foregoing fore-going events it is made the duty of the state engineer to bring such proceeding pro-ceeding in the district court (Sees. 20 and 21.) (2) By the District court: (a) Whenever any civil action is commenced com-menced therein involving the use of water from a river system or other source and a general determination has not already been had. (Sec. 38.) (b) In the case of a waste of water, upon a petition of any person or user of water from the river system or source, made to the-state engineer or to the court, or upon a report thereof to the court by 'the state engineer. In this case the court may make a general gen-eral determination, if one has not already been made, or may make a re-determination in whole or in part. (Sec. 39.) It is also provided in sec. 40 that a re-determination may be had in other circumstances under certain cer-tain conditions. Section 38, which is the particular one relied upon by the defendant to justify his positions in the matter reads as follows: "Whenever any civil action is connected in the district court involving the use of water from any river system or water source, the court, in its discretion, may, if a general determination of the rights to the use of water from said river system or water ' source has not already been made, proceed, as in this Act provided, to make such a general gener-al determination. In any action -for the determination, of water right the ."State of Utah shall be joined as. a necessary party." . . Manifestly that section is a legislative legis-lative grant of discretionary power to the district courts to do exactly what has been done in the Hardy action. It is a grant of power to the court to decide in any cae of the nature therein, there-in, mentioned, whether or not a general gener-al determination of the water rights in the system or source involved is necessary or advisable and to proceed with such determination if the necessary nec-essary or adivability therefor exist. It is a broad grant. The only limitations limita-tions upon it are that the. case in which such power is exercied must be a civil case; it must be commenced in the district court; it must involve the use of water in a river system op other source; and that a general determination de-termination of the rights in said system sys-tem or source has not already been made. .Nothing is said., in that section, sec-tion, or elsewhere in the law, as to how the court's power may. be invoked, invok-ed, or as to who may invoke it, in an action within-the purview of Sec. 3S, or as to hov" the court is to be advised, whether by the . pleadings in . the case, or otherwise, in regard to the necessity or advisability for setting set-ting ia motion the machinery to bring about a general determination. - We think it is sufficient, therefore, . to bring about an exercise of the judicial power under this section, if some one interested in the case, or in the waters wa-ters of the system or water source in-vplved, in-vplved, or perhaps the state acting through the state acting through the state engineer, brings the matter to the attention of the court . in some orderly manner and requests or moves the court to act thereon. Hence we see no reason why it may not be done either by direct allegations in the pleadings or by motion. It was done by motion in the Hardy- action. The Hardy action would seem to be precisely the sort of case that is con-, templated in Section 38. It involves the rights to the use of the waters of a part of the river system. There are many rights upon the stream. both below anil above the dam; there are storage rights of winter waters , and of the run-off in the non-irrigation seasons. There are rights in that system that date back to early territorial days and rights, which counsel assure us in the briefs, have but recently been initiated by filings in the office of the state engineer. It is a civil action; it was commenced in the district court; and, as .will be 'shown, there has been no generalde-termination, generalde-termination, within the proper meaning mean-ing of that expression, of the waters of that river system. Why then should we not apply the law of that section j to this case and hold that the district court acted in all respects within the jurisdiction thereby conferred and dismiss these proceedings? Plaintiffs Plain-tiffs say that we should not because the waters of that river ystem have already been determined by decree of the district court and hence the waters of that system do not come within the terms of Section 38. They base their conclusion upon the decrees which have been mentioned in the statement above which determine the rights of the users above the dam and of one of the lower appropriators. But this point is not well taken. The terms "general determination," as used in this section and elsewhere in the statute, as we understand them, without attempting an exact definition, defini-tion, connote a determination of all rights within the system or other source existing at the time that the court is called upon to act or when the decree is made, and which is based upon the surveys and investigations made by the state engineer that are provided for in the statute, and made in an action conducted under and substantially in conformity with the law. There has been nothing like that done with respect to the waters of this river system. This law was not even in effect when the decrees were made and centered upon which reliance reli-ance is placed in this connection. The cases in which those decrees were entered en-tered were not prosecuted under this law, but according to" the former practice in this state. None of them nor all of them together settle the rights of all of the water users in the system. We hold, therefore, that there has been no general determination determina-tion of the rights to the use of the waters of the Beaver River system, so as to take the Hardy action outside out-side of the provisions of Section 38. The plaintiffs also contend that since their rights have all been heretofore here-tofore established by court decrees, the only way under the law in which they can be again inquired into an action of the kind in question, is under un-der Section 39, in case of an alleged waste of water or a failure to use the same in accordance with the rights so established; and inasmuch as there has been no waste alleged as against these plaintiffs in the Hardy action, or any abuse of their decreed rights, or any traspass by any of them as against any of the parties to that action, and no proceedings have been taken therein under Section 39, therefore the court was and is without with-out jurisdiction in the promises. They say the construction of the law in the case of Eden Irrigation Co., et al. v. District Court, et al., 61 Utah 103, 211 Pac. 957, and certain language emanating from this court in that case, supported their position. This position, however, cannot be sustained for two reasons, namely: (1) Because there has not been, as we have already al-ready pointed out, a general determination deter-mination of the right in the system involved. (2) Because the law is not susceptible to the construction which the plaintiffs would have us place upon up-on it if this contention were sustained. sustain-ed. Section 39 reads as follows: "Whenever any person or water wa-ter user from any river system or water source believes that there is a waste of water from said river system or water source, said person or user of water may report the matter to the State Engineer or may petition the district court for the investigation investi-gation of such alleged waste; whereupon the State Engineer may make an investigation and report his findings to said court of such alleged waste or said court may order or make such an investigation, and if such investigation investiga-tion warrants, may proceed to make a determination, if such has not yet been had, or a redetermination, redeter-mination, in whole or in part, of the rights to the use of the water from said river system or water source." This section cannot be said to be intended as a limitation upon the power pow-er conferred upon the district courts by Section 38. But such would be the efect of our construction of it if we were to hold with the plaintiffs upon the point now under consideration. Instead, it is a jrant of additional j power, both to the state engineer and I to the court, which may be used in the special circumstances therein mentioned; and it also providse a means whereby any person or water wa-ter user upon the system may cause to be brought an investigation, and, if need be, a determination, of a supposed sup-posed waste of water. The two sections sec-tions are in no way antagonistic; they supplement each other. It is true that there has been no charge of a waste of water made against these plaintiffs or any of them in the Hardy action; and that the plaintiffs, having rights which have been established es-tablished by decrees of the courts, cannot be required again to litigate their rights unless and until such a charge is made. But that is no reason why the court was without jurisdiction jurisdic-tion in that case. All that it shows is that the action of the court cannot be supported under Section 39. But as the power of the court is drawn from Section 38 it is no cause for challenge to show" that it cannot be found in Section 39. We do not wish to be understood as intimating by anything that is said in this connection, connec-tion, or by the holding in this case, that the matter of a upposed waste of water cannot be inquired into in an action initiated under Section 38. oFr we think it can be. It would be according ac-cording to the spirit and purpose of the statute for waste to be made a subject of inquiry in every general adjudication. To do this would injure in-jure no person in his rights, for no one can have a right to waste water, and it would aid in bringing about the largest possible beneficial use of the waters of the state. But of course, there would have to be some pleading or allegation made by some one, of which an appropriator suspected sus-pected of waste would be entitled to notice, before a water user could be required to come into court and de-fent de-fent hs rights against such a charge. This fs true whether his rights are established by decree or not. That matter, is all provided for, however, in the statute. The procedure upon a general determination, after it has been initiated, is the same whether the action be commenced under the one section or the other. In either case the state engineer makes his surveys, investigations and reports and proposed determination; he distributes dis-tributes the waters until the final decree de-cree in the same manner, paying due regard to the rights which have been established by decrees. All persons claiming rights in the system, whether wheth-er the same be decreed or not, are required re-quired to come in and file statement of their claims. The statement stand in the place of pleadings and issues may be joined theron. We see no reaon why under such procedure, the matter of waste of water, even though the right therto be claimed under some decree of court, may not be drawn in queseion in a general determination de-termination which has been set in motion mo-tion under Section 38; for it might be discovered and reported to the court by the state engineer,' or it might be alleged in the original pleadings filed in the case, or it might be made an issue by some claimant upon the statements which are filed. If the issue is-sue of waste is raised the plaintiffs might properly be required again to litigate their rights in the Hardy action; act-ion; but if it is not raised they will not be required to do more than to filetheir statements as required by the law so that their rights may be duly registered along- with all others in the system, and be thereby finally set at rest, at least so far as it is possible pos-sible for water rights to be. in peace. Such is the purport of Mr. Justice Frick's discussion of this matter in the Eden case, supra; and there is nothing in that case which even bears upon the question of jurisdiction jurisdic-tion which we have to decide in this proceeding. We therefore conclude that the district dis-trict court was not without jurisdiction jurisdic-tion in the Hardy action because of the fact that it did not proceed under Section 39 and that no waste had been charged as against these plaintiffs, all of whose rights have been established estab-lished by court decrees, a shown by this record. The next point relied upon by the plaintiffs is stated in the brief in the following language: 'The trial court has no arbitrary power under the provisions of Section 38 of said Chapter 67, or under the . provisions of any act of the legisla-v tu're of this State, to provide for a ' general adjudication of the use of waters wa-ters of any river or river system." In the reply brief the matter is referred re-ferred to again in this language; "We did not mean to charge the trial court with any wilful arbitrary j action in this matter, but we do submit sub-mit that order for general adjudication adjudica-tion is, under the law and the facts in this case, an arbitrary action." If counsel mean to say by. this, and - j we suppose they do, that the court j acted arbitrarily in the premises and j hence beyond the limits of its lawful I powers, usinpr the word arbitrarily in ! the sense of capriciously or without consideration of the matter, then, the fact exhibited in this record do not bear out the asertion. It has already been pointed out that the court first heard and considered a motion made by he defendants in the Hardy ac-. tion for the order herein complained of, to which motion the plaintiff in that action objected. After the court had entered the order of Dec. 2S, 1925, these plaintiffs were permitted per-mitted to come in twice with motions and objections calculated to stay the proceedings as to them; and they do not complain that they were not accorded ac-corded every opportunity which they aesired to make known to the court and to present the grounds and reasons rea-sons for their opposition. So it appears ap-pears that the trial judge gave consideration con-sideration at least three times to the matter of whether or not there ought to be a general determination, and so far as we know upon each occasion heard everything anybody had to say upon the subject. Assuredly this record does not exhibit an exercise of arbitrary power, nor the erercise of a lawful power in an arbitrary or capricious manner. It .shows the exercise of a discretionary power after af-ter much consideration. To be sure the court may have erred in its judgment in the matter. But that is something which we cannot inquire into in this proceeding. Joseph Nelson Nel-son Plumbing & Heating Supply Corp. v. McCrea, District Judge, et al., 64 Utah 484, 231 Pac. 825; Board of Home -Missons, etc., v. Maughan, Judge, 35 Utah 516, 101 Pac. 584. The fourth point is that the Hardy action is a moot action only; it represents rep-resents no issues to be tried and is therefore not such an actic as is contemplated con-templated by Section 38. But it was not moot when the order of December Decem-ber 2S, 1925, was entered, whatever may be said as to its status in this respect at the present 1 time. The transactions which it is claimed render ren-der the case moot occured long after the order had been entered and after much of the work had been done by the state engineer upon the surveys and investigations required by the law in such cases. So this argument can have no application to the power of the court to make the order. Moreover, More-over, since the nature of the proceeding proceed-ing has been entirely changed from its original form and the case has become be-come a statutory action involving all water rights in the river system,- the original rights are still before the court and will be determined, adjudicated adjudi-cated and registered,- even though many if not all of the issues raised in the pleadings in the first instance may have been compromised or become be-come moot by reason of some action taken by the parties. ' If the court had the lawful power in the first instance in-stance to inaugurate the proceedings for a general determination, it would in our judgment be unreasonable to hold that the power to continue the ! undertaking to its completion has been taken away by reason of the facts that some of the- original parties to the action have old or conveyed con-veyed their rights to others and that issues formerly raised in the pleadings plead-ings may not have to betried out. The jurisdiction or power of the court in these statutory proceedings for the determination and registration registra-tion of water rights doe not rest upon such considerations. Hence we conclude con-clude that the plaintiffs' fourth point is not valid. The final proposition is that the Hardy action was demitted to the trial court with directions to that court to proceed in hearing proot upon a limited limit-ed issue only raised by the pleadings in the action, namely, the use of winter water on the Beaver Bottom Lands so that said court was limited-in limited-in receiving proof upon that issue, and therefore it is not such an action as comes within the purview of Sec. 38. The argument in this connection, we think, is based upon a misconception misconcep-tion as to the result or effect of the holding in the Hardy action. It is quite clear, at -least to the writer's! mind, from a reading of the opinion i filed in that case, that the findings of fact, the conclusions of law and the decree made and entered by the trial court were set aside and that ; the case was remanded for a new j trial. True it is that the court was directed to hear additional evidence j upon the limited issue mentioned in the opinion. But after hearing such! evidence the court would then be un-1 der the necessity of making new find-1 ings and new conclusions and a new j decree, upon the basis of the evidence introduced at the first trial supplemented supple-mented by such additional evidence, I and of the law as declared by this j . court. The case was pending when the order for a general determination I was made, in the sense that it had nut been, decided or disposed of; there I was t:i! some evidence to be heard and the findings of fact, conclusions' of law and decree were to be made and entered. We think the case notwithstanding not-withstanding this situation still came within the puyiew of Section 38. There is one other matter which we mention and that with some reluctance, reluc-tance, because it docs not seem to have any bearing whatever upon the merits of the jurisdictional question which mu.-t be decided in this case only because it received a good deal of attention in the oral argument and occupies a large amount of space in the briefs. It is in relation to what Was said by this court in the Hardy action about the law of 1919, as it might be applied to that case. This court in remanding the case took occasion to suggest to the parties thereto that a disinterested hydro-graphic hydro-graphic survey of the respondents lands and irrigation systems, made by the state engineer, along the lines provided for in the statute, would eliminate many of the uncertainties which were inherent in the record then before the court, and partly on account of which the case wasrevers-ed, wasrevers-ed, and would furnish a scientific guide for the trial court in determining deter-mining both the extent of respondents' respon-dents' several requirements and the . improvements which it would be necessary nec-essary for them to make in their irrigation ir-rigation systems in order to apply" the water in a reasonably efficient manner. But this court did not direct that such survey should be made; the matter was expressly put out only by way of suggestion to the parties Much less did the court direct or even suggest that a general determination . be made of all of the water rights in the river system involved. So if the trial court made the order in question because the judse thought he had been directed to do so by this court, or if he was influenced thereto in large measure by a misapprehension of what is said by this court upon the subject in the opinion irr the Hardy action, and not by reason of other matters- which he might properly consider when called upon to exercise the discretionary power which the law has vested in the court, then we would not hesitate to say that he committed a grevious error. But this is something which could not be corrected cor-rected by this court in this proceeding, proceed-ing, because we cannot review his actions, but can only look into the question of his jurisdiction. We have thus disposed of every point made by the plaintiffs in this case against the jurisdiction of the district court. Inasmuch as they have pointed out no substantial reason rea-son why the court was not strictly within the limits of its lawful powers in the premises, and we dicover none ourselves, we hold that the district court when it made and entered the order of December 28, 1925, providing provid-ing for a general determination of the rights to the use of waters from the Beaver River system, acted within the limits of the powers vested in that court by the provisions of Sec. 38, Chapter 67, Session Laws of Utah, 1919; and that nothing which has occured oc-cured since that time in the Hardy action, so far as the record shows, has deprived the court of its jurisdiction jurisdic-tion to proceed with such general determination de-termination in the manner provided by the statute. It follows that the alternative writ of prohibition heretofore issued and served in this case should be, and the same is quashed and the proceedings dismissed. Plaintiffs to "pay the costs. It is so ordered. The Supreme Court now having held that the District Court had jurisdiction to order a general adjudication, adjudi-cation, and that the State Engineer has jurisdiction under an order of the District Court to proceed under the general water act to adjudicate the waters of the entire Beaver River system, it follows that very shortly the State Engineer fill, prepare and file his proposed determination of the waters of the Beaver River. If any objections are filed by water claimants claim-ants to the proposed determination, . the District Court will hear the objections ob-jections and determine the rights of all parties claiming water in the river. Thus the long and expensive and vexatious suits involving the right to the use of water in the Beaver Beav-er River will be finally closed and settled from one end of the river to the other. Messrs. Wilson and Barnes and Abe Murdock represented the Mammoth Canal Co., et al., and the firm of Cheney, Jensen, Martin-eau Martin-eau and Stephens, and Sam Cline represented rep-resented Judge Burton, who was upheld up-held by the Supreme Court in this proceeding. |