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Show flilT ITALY By Arthur E. P. Welgall i The neutrality of Italy In the present pres-ent war camo as a surprlso to most k people, and it was gonorally attrlb-k attrlb-k uted to the traditional hatred of tho I Italians for tholr Austrian neighbors, f Certainly this was ono of tho contributory contri-butory causes for their nttltudo; bif 1 should like to ask tho question who-ther who-ther it was not duo in the main to their obligations to Kngland contracted contract-ed during tho Turco Italian war. It Is not generally realized that it was England who mado tho successful invasion in-vasion of Tripoli posslblo for Italy, and that, without her help, tho occupation oc-cupation of that territory could never nev-er havo been sustained, notwithstanding notwithstand-ing tho wonderful bravery and dash of tho Italian troops. Tripoli may bo said to havo been England's peace to show; and tho refusal of tho Italian Ital-ian government to take arms against England looks Tory much as though It wera a practical application of the maxim that ono good turn deserves another. I do not wish to suggest that there wag anything more than, an unwritten agreement between England, and Italy, or that this alone would hav decided the course which our southern friends hare adopted; but I think that It is legitimate to ask whether a declaration of neutrality, though so beneficial to the Italians, was aot largely Impelled by some kind of deepy friendly understanding wUh England which was a direct outcome out-come of the war in Tripoli. Tho fact Is not generally npprocl-ntcd npprocl-ntcd that Egypt, which is noxt door neighbor to Tripoli docs not belong to Engldnd, but is still n Turkish pro vlnco, merely and controlled by England on behalf of the Sultan and I his vassal, the Khedlvo. In 1882 the English entered Egypt to nuoll an insurrection which had Jeopardized tho Khedlval throne; and tho British army ot occupation has remained on tho banks of tho NIlo Blmply for tho purpose ot preventing further risings and upholding tho authority of tho Khedive as being conducive to the ! maintenance of law and order. Egypt pays a large tribute to Turkey yearly; year-ly; and the Sultan has not raised any serious objection to Eng'lsh rule in this province of his, because the Brit-' Brit-' Ish presence there Insures tno most punctilious pnyisient of this trlbuto nnd maintains a stato of profound peace In nn otherwlso rather ttubu-lent ttubu-lent portion of his omplro. So groat a chnngo for tho better has been wrought In tho condition of Egypt by tho occupation, howovor, that It Is felt by tho British government that an ovncuatlon of tho country would bo littlo short of n crime against hu inanity. Not only does Urltlsh control con-trol of Egyptian affairs prevent tho oppression of tho pcasunts by tho upper classes, not only does It Insure all tho comforts of peace and Justice both for the native and tho European I population, but it also procures that 1 renso of general security which cn-Ej cn-Ej ables tho commorco of tho country 1 to expand and prosper. Hundreds B of first rate Englishmen aro employ-1 employ-1 ed In the senrlco of tho Egyptian 1 government side by side with Egyp-I Egyp-I tlans; and although all governors ot I provinces, all heads of tho ministries I nnd the majority of Inspectors, are I native Egyptians, the English officii offic-ii inls are able to oxert a guiding con H trol ot the administration. Thean M EngllBh officials aro in no way con-M con-M nocted with tho Urltlsh government fi lot It bo understood. They bocomo H for tho period of tholr sorvlco, Egyp-fi Egyp-fi tlans they havo to wear tho Egyp m tlans tartoush, or foz, during offico hours; they havo to work on Sundays, M Frldnja being tho Mohnmmodan ssb-1 bath and day of rest; thoy recelvo M tholr appointment and tholr dlsm.s- sal from tho Khedive's govornmonv, Jj which acts in tho numo of tho Sul-H Sul-H tan, und in ovory way they aro M servants, not ot tho British govorn- ment, but ot tho Khodlvo and his i master, tho Sultan. Tho British con-k& con-k& trol la exerted through tho medium ML ot tho British Consul Gonoral, who tm is supposed moroly to direct from tho outside tho gonoral wolfaro of tho Wt country. Of courso, tho British Con ft sul General actuully governs Egypt, ft nnd regulates its administration; but Is under tho abBoluto control ot tho W. Khedive and tho Sultan. Egypt pays NU a trlbuto of nearly 700,d00 per ante an-te num to Turkoy; tho colnago of tho W country la issued In tho namo of tho H Sultan; ull taxes nro levied In Ms W imo; Turkish Is spoken: tho wholo m Egyptian army, with its EngllBh or filiiatlvo officers, Is at tho absolute dls-fllposal dls-fllposal of tho Sultan in time, of w-ir, jlnnd Egyptian torrttory may bo occu MPled by Turkish troops at any mo ment. In actual fact, many of those Turkish rights aro now dlwregardcd; but nevertheless, they wore recognized recogniz-ed as lata ns 1892 In an official firman, fir-man, or decreo, and they havo nover been repudiated by England. It cannot can-not bo too emphatically stated thnt it Is actually an Integral part of tho Turkish empire. When, therefore, Italy deo'ared war on tho Porto, and Bolzed the neighboring province of Tripoli, the Turkish government had an absolute right to march Its armies across Egypt to fight the Ital'itns in tho next province; it was entitled to order the Egyptian army to assist In tho de-fenso de-fenso of tho cmplro; and It had every written authority for demanding tho Khedlvo'o assistance in monoy, innte rials and men. Egypt was tho natural nat-ural baso for Turkish operations j Tripoli; for tho sea, being hold hy tho Italians tho Turkish armies could only reach tho seat of hostilities ty way of tho high road through Asm Minor, Syria and Egypt. Thus thero can bo no shadow of doubt that Italy had first to ascertain England' 3 attl-tudo attl-tudo on the f'J j beforo tho project of tho Invasion of Tripoli cou'.d en ter the fluid of practical affairs. If England had stated its intention of acting according to tho letter of tho firman of 1892, and of allowing Turkish Turk-ish troops to Pass through Egypt, let alono tho question of allowing Egyptian Egyp-tian soldiers to fight tor the defense of tho sovereign, IUly would never I have risked an invasion of Tripoli. I That invasion could only have ben mado practical by England'a definite assurance that Egypt would remain neutral, and would prevent the pass E of the Turkish armies through its territory. Moreover, before the Uo-laratlon Uo-laratlon of war Italy had to be satisfied sat-isfied that the Brltuh control of Egypt was sufficiently powerful to prevent a revolution In that country which, if successful, would havo glv en Turkey tho opportunity ot marching march-ing a largo force through tho Dolta to Tripoli. In vlow of those facts it Is surely significant that I-ord Kjchencr, the only mnn whoso Influence could keep Egypt passlvo at such a critical time, was sent to Cairo a few days beforo Italy declared war, and that tho declaration de-claration of hostilities was announced announc-ed on the next day after tho news ad reached Rome that ho was installed in-stalled at tho British headquarters In Egypt; and It i; equally significant that Lord Kitchener at once took the most drastic measures to provent any Turkish soldiers from passing thru to Tripoli. When the Egyptian troops demanded tho right to go to tho relief of tho Turks In tho west. Lord Kltchonor Is Bald to havo told them that It thoy were to do hy would fill their placo i Egypt with British regiments maintained at the expense of tho Egyptian nation. 11 proposition which effectually chocked chock-ed tholr enthusiasm. When tho Bedouin Be-douin tribes askod permission to sorvo w'i.h tho Turks, ho ropllcd that If thoy did not remain pnsslvo ho would treat their wnrllko tcndoncles as an Indication thnt thoy woro fit to bo conscrlbed for tho Egyptian army serving In tho far away Sudan theso Bedouin havJtg boon always exempt from conscription; when the Egyptian Nationalists desired to raise funds for tho Turkish cause ho arranged, ar-ranged, I believe, that most of tho monoy should bo given to tho Red Crescent hospitals; and when a tow Turkish officers managed to croop through Egypt In disguise on their way to the seat of host titles, ho caused the strictest watch to bo kept on the frontiers by detachments of hn 21st Lancers. In a word, Eng land, and England alone, mado the conquest of Tripoli by Italy a possibility. possi-bility. At that time, It must bo remembered, remember-ed, a European war was Imminent; and It was genorally understood that Italy was about to Join with Austria and Germany in tho coming attack upon tho TrJlo Entente. Is It thoro-foro thoro-foro concolvablo that England should havo allowed Italy to occupy tho tor-rltory tor-rltory on tho Immediate west of Egypt and should hnvo risked giving tho gravost offenso to Turkoy by holplng tho Italians to do this, 11 England had supposid that, In n tav months tlmo they would bo fighting against Eng'and and menacing England's Eng-land's position on tho Nllo? To ray" u i d thero wns, at tho tlmo, only ono explanation ot England's nttltudo; nttl-tudo; sho helped Italy to fulfill hor old dream ot occupying Cyrcnnlca on tho understanding that, in tho event of a European wnr, Bho would not fight ngalnBt England. At that tlmo I wns of tho opinion that tho neutrality neutral-ity of Italy would mako such a war Impossible, for Germany would fool horsolf outnumbered without tlu a. Blstnnco of her southern ally; and 1 pm still of tho oplnim that It Gor-many Gor-many had ronllzed thut Italy was undo;' un-do;' so friendly nn obligation to England Eng-land sho would hnvo refrained from taking up tho sword. Moro than two years ago I pub lished an article in which I recorded theso fncts, nnd it may bo of Interest Inter-est to quolo n few lines from It. "No public stntcment," I wroto, "has been ' mado wh) h would Indicate that tho British government mudo any agreement agree-ment with Italy, but thero can bo very littlo doubt that such an agreement agree-ment was mado. England appears to have undertaken to keep Egypt nu-solutoly nu-solutoly neutral and to allow tho Porto no asslstanco from Its vassa. England's nttltudo to Italy was as THREE THE ATTITUDE WO ;wA follows: 'Slnco, it appears to bo inevitable, inev-itable, said England, "that somo Eu ropcan power will pounco upon Tripoli, Trip-oli, wo in Egypt much prefer you as our neighbors to, say, tho Go:mans; and though wo do not w'4 h to dofond Turkey by actively taking your part, wo will show our friendliness to you by holding Egypt neutral. It Is England Eng-land who has given Italy tho opportunity oppor-tunity of seizing her covotcd portion ot North Africa, and less a prize than tho peaco of Europo. Now wo need fear no war, for wo havo hemmed Germany and Austria around in B'tch a manner that thoy could fight only a campaign of defense England on tho north, Franco on tho west, very pos' 4 ly Russia on tho cast, and now Italy on tho south, aro leagued around tho Teuton race, not to mennco, but to pacify; not to mako war, but to make war ImpoBslble." Alas! my wordg bava proved un true in regard to the prevention of war, but with reference to tho supposed sup-posed compact with Italy, based on thorough friendship, events do not Indicate that any error hat been made. Ban Francisco Town Talk. - |