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Show A SUBMARINE-AEBOPLANE-WIRELESS SYSTEM OFiSEACGAST DEFENSES Tho European war has turned the thoughts of tho American public toward to-ward tho question of national do fenso moro sharply than at any time Inco the early dayB of the republic. Our tremendous coast lines on the two oceans offer almost countless opportunities for attack from tho sea. While tho moro Important strategic points nnd tho entrances to tho harbors har-bors of tho great seaboard cities are guarded by coast dofenso batteries, yet there nro still many places at which an enemy could land troops, nnd thoro Is always tho chance as has been demonstrated in every ro cent war, of a successful naval attack at-tack oven against such great guns n-; those which guard tho harbors ot Hoston, Now York, Philadelphia, Hal-tlmore, Hal-tlmore, and San Frnnclsco. Tho submnrlno has demonstrated Its paramount valuo as a naval weapon wea-pon of offenso nnd dofenso; tho aeroplane aero-plane hns proved Its worth as a means of detecting the approach of an enemy whether by land or sea; the wireless has developed Into a ready and invaluablo means of com munlcatlon. A navy adequate to guard our 3,000 miles of coast line against any possible attack, would have to be of such proportions as almost al-most to bankrupt the nation to pay for It. Any navy the United States can afford to maintain would have to be to scattered aa to Its unltu, it the effort were made to protect the entire coast, that the Inevitable result re-sult would be to furnish adequate protection nowhere. Why not, then, rely moro upon tho submarine, tho aoroplano, and tho wireless, and less on the battleship? It would bo teas Ible from every engineering and military mili-tary viewpoint, and practical nt a flnnnclal cost certainly not much moro thnn half the sum which has already been Bpent on tho navy and const defenses to protect overy mllo of coast on both oceans against any posslblo attack ftora tho sea. Let tho Atlantic and Pacific coast bo divided Into 10 mile sections, measuring along tho main contour and disregarding the minor bays, headlands and Inlets. At each Id mile point let there be erected a wireless tower of a height and capacity capac-ity sufficient to enablo It to communicate commun-icate a minimum distance of. say COO miles. Let this wlroless tower, or rothor tho spot at which It Is locntoa, servo as tho voe a-ul harbor for ono submnrlno and two scouting, bomb-dropping bomb-dropping areoplanes; tho aeroplanes and submarines all to bo equipped with means of wireless communication. communica-tion. On tho towers searchlights might also bo mounted, nnd thoy could likewise bo utilized ns light TioUr"8 or ln"'lmarl8 tor mariners, ns wolls sUon8 tor tho C0!l8t liatr0' and life saving :orvlco Witn 300 such w!roi.."s submaiiuo aoroplano coast defense statiC.ns ln constant communication with catu other, no hostllo licet could approach our shore from any direction without with-out being discovered nnd Its cxnr.t pobltlon noted nnd reported back by tho aeroplano scouts. Evon It thoy found no opportunity to drop bombs on tho advancing warships, they could guldo tho submarines to tho attack. Long beforo the enemy's smoke were vlslblo, 50 miles out nt sea, the submarines sub-marines from 20 stations would 6 converging toward the hostile ships. Tho air would be filled- with aero planes whoso pilots could direct the movement of tho submerged crntt with unerring accuracy. Ileforo the watchers on shore could got a gllmpso of tho hulls of tho Invaders, only a a rare combination of chnnceB could prevent tho entlro fleet from being sunk. Should all or most of tho units of tho attacking fleet succeed In ovnd ing tho submarine attack, fields of mines, placed by mlno patrols working work-ing from each 10 mllo baso and sown so thickly as to form a continuous cordon nlong tho shore, would servo ns a further and final dofenso. These might bo contact mines, or olectrlcnl ly connected to tho shoro stations. Dy tho tlmo such a scheme of dofenso do-fenso could bo put Into operation, howovor, there Is Uttlo doubt that means of controlling and exploding mines nnd torpedoes by wireless Impulses Im-pulses will havo boon perfected. In leod, If tho results nlroady known tr havo been nchloved In Europo by Top res y Quovedo, nnd In this country by John Hays Hammond, Jr., in couponing cou-poning vessels by wireless impulses from a dlstnnco, nro taken Into con slderntlon, It Is not n wild dream to predict that tho submarines Involved In this project could bo operated with-out with-out crows, being steered nnd thol-torpedoes thol-torpedoes discharged by tho opcrat- ors In tho wlroless towers, acting un u"er tho direction of tho oxpot ofTic- Icrs ln tho noroplanos. There Is reason rea-son to bollovo that our war depart ment, under whoso patronage and dS eutlon Mr. Hammond has boon working, already possesses tho seexot of this means ot wlroless control. ' What would It all cost? All tho necessary construction and equipment equip-ment for tho wlroless towers could bo dono for $10,00 nploco or less soy $3,000,000 ln all. Throo hundred sub marlnos would cost, at tho rnto paid for tho latest submerslblo modols built for our navy, $150,000,000 or $500,000 aplcco. It Is entlroly prob-ablo, prob-ablo, how over, that this cost could bo very grcat'y reduced, porhaps as much as ono third, were tholr construction con-struction to bo undertaken on such a wholo salo scalo. Navy flying bonti of tho most modern typo aro worth-$12,000 worth-$12,000 ench. Six hundred ot them would cost $7,200,000 at this rato. Estimating tho averngo cost of tho necessary buildings, hangars, harb ors for tho submarines ,etc, nt each station at $100,00 hero Is another $300,000,000. An investment of $200,-000,000 $200,-000,000 at tho outside would protect our coasts. That Is $ for evory man woman, and child In the United States surely oheap protection at price. Suppose the cost of maintenance, mainten-ance, for men, supplies, renewals and repairs, were as much each year as the original coat what of It? One fifth or less of our annual national raveaua Is not too high a price to pay tor proteoUon. The army an navy appropriations ln 1914 were $251,515,629.11. Tho naval vessels now ln commission represent a total Investment of more than $400,000,000. If oven double that Bum would ln sure our national safety, who would begrudge It? Popular Mechanics. |
