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Show 1 Qeneral FersKmg's Siorij of the A. E. F. I y y (Copyrtht, 1931, In 11 countrlci br th 4 North American Newspaper Alliance. World TO.. .,1 : J a rlthta rcved. includinl the Scandinavian. U4 H"2116' f I Reproduction in whole or in part prohibited.) - - I -wnu Servic. John J. Pershing of tronps by giving them confidence In their own personal prowess. Through the kindness of Sir Douglas Haig we were fortunate early In our experience to have assigned to us Lieut. Gen. II. II. K. Butler and other officers of the British army to assist In this individual training. Later on several French and British Brit-ish officers also came to lecture at a number of our schools. We found difficulty, however, In using these allied Instructors In that the French and, to a large extent, the British had practically settled down to the conviction that developments since 1914 had changed the principles of warfare. Both held that new conditions condi-tions imposed by trench fighting had rendered previous conceptions of training train-ing more or less obsolete and that preparation for open warfare no longer long-er was necessary. French publications and manuals were generally In accord with this theory. If the French doctrine had prevailed our instruction would have been limited limit-ed to a brief period of training for trench fighting. A new army brought up entirely on such principles would have been seriously handicapped without with-out the protection of the trenches. It would probably have lacked the aggressiveness ag-gressiveness to break through the enemy's ene-my's lines and the knowledge of how to carry on thereafter. It was evident that the victory could not be won by the costly process of attrition, at-trition, but that we should have to drive the enemy out Into the open and which we placed greater dependence for our success. It was apparent that we could not depend on the Krerch without great risk of failure at a critical moment and It w'as evident that if we expected Hie maximum efficiency in this service we must provide our own personnel as well as additional locomotives and cars, all to be as far as practicable under American management. With this plan in view commendable progress had been made toward both procurement and organization by Colonel Col-onel Taylor, and complete estimates for rolling stock and construction "at ports, terminals and yards, including an accurate survey of building and equipment requirements, had been made under his direction by Maj. W. J Wilgus, formerly vice president of the New York Central, afterward a colonel, who had been a memler of the Parsons Par-sons board. These estimates without change served as a permanent guide for railway construction plans and material. Creation of Transportation Corps. As co-ordinate with the procurement and maintenance of material and equipment we were confronted with the vital question of organization for operation and management, but we had no officers in the regular service of suflicient experience in railway management man-agement to insure success. Therefore the evidont course to pursue, to which the precedent of both British and French pointed the way, was to create a transportation corps Immediately whom he handled with InBinte patience and tact. CHAPTER XII In view of the gravity of our tonnage ton-nage situation, it was highly Impor tant that It be brought forcibly to the attenlion of the allies. Apropos the approaching inter-allied conference on shipping, I cabled Washington August ' 1!H7, in part as follows: "... The British and, especially, the French have reached absolute limit of man power and any augmentation theii military force cannot be expected. 1m perative hasten our organization and training so that we will have the troops contemplated your project in Kurope for active service by May oi June. CHAPTER XI Continued. The attack of the Second French array, although made nstride the Meuse river, was directed principally against Hill Mort Homme and Hill :?04, both famous In the struggle of MHO. To destroy the wire entanglements and demolish trenches, as precaution precau-tion against heavy losses, the infantry assault was preceded by four days' continuous bombardment, and relatively rela-tively the amount of artillery ammunition ammu-nition expended exceeded that of any previous engagement, Its value being, as I remember It, some $75,000,1X10. The proportion of the artillery force as compared to the infantry in this battle was as eleven to ten. The firing fir-ing attained such precision aim volume that the German troops In the forward positions were submerged and the attacking Infantry reached most of Its objectives by nightfall the first day trMSCK : : : - : r 11 ,W,, m engage him in a war of movement. Instruction In-struction in open warfare was based upon individual and group Initiative, resourcefulness and tactical judgment, which were of equal advantage in trench warfare. Therefore, we took decided issue with the allies, and, without neglecting neglect-ing thorough preparations for trench warfare, undertook to train mainly for open warfare, with the object from the start of vigorously forcing the offensive. Rifle Practice Urged. ! Intimately connected with the question ques-tion of training for open warfare was the matter of rifle practice. The earliest earli-est of my cablegrams on this subject was in August, in which it was urged that thorough instruction in rifle practice prac-tice should be carried on at home because be-cause of the difficulty of giving It In France : "Study here shows value and desirability desir-ability of retaining our existing small' arms target practice course. In view of great difficulty In securing range In France due to density of the population popula-tion and cultivation, recommend as fast as practicable the complete course be given In the United States before troops embark. Special emphasis should be placed on rapid fire." My view was that the rifle and bayonet bay-onet still remained the essential weapon's of Infantry, and my cable stressing the fact that the basic principles prin-ciples of warfare had not changed, were sent in an endeavor to Influence the courses of training at home. Unfortunately, Un-fortunately, however, no fixed policy of instruction in the various arms, under a single authority, ever was carried out there. Insensible to advice, the inclination was to accept the views of French specialists spe-cialists and limit training to the narrow nar-row field of trench warfare. Therefore, in large measure, the fundamentals go thoroughly taught at West Point for a century were more or less neglected. The responsibility for the failure of the War department to take positive action on my recommendations in such matters must fall upon the military head of the department, which was the general staff. There were other causes, as we shall see later, that led to confusion and Irregularity Ir-regularity in training to such an extent ex-tent that we often were compelled during dur-ing the last stages of the war to send men Into battle with little knowledge of warfare and often with no rifle practice at all. Military Police Provided. ".Military activities of allies on land should be strongly reinforced by combined com-bined navies and destruction U-boat bases accomplished if possible. High British army officers confidential! condemn waiting policy British admir alty. ... In view of gravity of ship ' ping question recommend our government govern-ment insist upon aggressive policy by combined British and American navies. "... Our position in this war very strong. . . . Allies now fully recog nize dependence upon bur co-operation and we need not hesitate demand both aggressive naval policy and full share commercial shipping. Eecommend American representative shipping conference con-ference be instructed accordingly." U. S. Advised on Powder Needs. Meanwhile, a study by a joint French and American commission of the question of production of powders and explosives in France showed that the greater part of the raw materials must be imported and that, due to the shipping situation, France in December Decem-ber would produce only about half of the current output. It was apparent, therefore, that to avoid calamity the United States must not onlj furnish powder and explosives for all of its own forces, but must supply about half the Freneh requirements, and the War department was so advised. By this arrangement a large saving of tonnage would be effected, as the weight of raw materials was ten to twenty times that of the finished prod duct. As nitrates for the manufacture of powder and explosives had to be imported from Chili, the hazard to shipping would be reduced by avoiding the long haul to France. Millions of dollars were expended in the construction construc-tion of plants at home In an attempt to produce nitrates, but none had been turned out before the end of the war Dawes Made Supply Chief. In view of the uncertainty of obtaining obtain-ing more than a limited amount of ocean tonnage it was natural that we should procure abroad as large a pro portion of supplies as possible, and oui supply department began at once to make inquiries to meet the demands for construction material, subsistence stores and engineering equipment. Many sources of general supply had been developed by the French and we soon found ourselves not only in competition com-petition with them and the British bu1 our different departments also began to bid against each other. To my mind the solution seemed to be merely a matter of co-ordination. Therefore, I established a purchasing board to consist of one or more representatives repre-sentatives of each service making purchases pur-chases of any sort, including the Bed Cross and Y. M. C. A. Lieut. Col. Charles G. Dawes, Seventeenth Sev-enteenth engineers, well known as a man of large business experience, was nmiolnfpd as the head of this board, making an advance of five kilometers and capturing 6,000 prisoners. The sector where the French attack took place- was to have a peculiar interest in-terest for me before the end of the war. My headquarters as commander of the first army one year later occupied occu-pied the building In Souilly. then used by Major General Guillaumat, and the line reached by Corvisart's troops in the battle became our jump-off line In the Meuse-Argonne battle. In fact, every foot of the ground covered In this Inspection with General Petain became associated later with America's Ameri-ca's greatest effort in the war. Petain's Contact Valuable. After visiting the French installations installa-tions and the manifold activities carried car-ried on behind this front with the shift ing masses of con'ibat troops and tlif thousands engaged in the services of supply and transportation, it seemed quite Improbable that we should be able to marshal a suflicient army in time to replace the French on this front before 1919. I found it most agreeable as well as Instructive to he with Petain in tills intimate way and have an opportu nity to hear something of his experi- ence. His discussion of the defense of Verdun, In which he played an impor tant part, be:g second in command was especially entertaining. As we drove about he spoke of the courage of his troops and of the tremendous losses they had sustained. He pointed out the vast amount of road work, including the Vole Sacree from Bar le-Duc to Verdun, rebuilt under his direction for the constant movements ' of large bodies of troops and supplies necessary to maintain the defense. In lighter vein his comments on Freneh politicians during this trip were amusing, if not always complimentary, compli-mentary, and he congratulated me many times on being so far removed from political interference. One afternoon after-noon the conversation drifted to painting paint-ing and he asked me how many times 1 had sat for my portrait. "Several times already," I said. "The last one, which was very good, was done by a distinguished artist by the name of Jonas (English Jonah) for l'lllustra-tlon." l'lllustra-tlon." Immediately he said : "Don't let them publish it! Don't do it! Every officer whose portrait by Jonas has appeared in that journal has been relieved re-lieved from his command." Not that I am superstitious, quite the contrary, but I immediately forbade for-bade the publication of the portrait and to this day It has never appeared. Builds Up French Morals. From the time of Nivelle's failure in April the depression in the French armies had been so great that Petain. Gen. W. W. Atterbury. under the direction of some man of outstanding reputation in the railroad world. In accordance with the principle of obtaining the most competent men for important positions the following cable was sent July 29: "Have made thorough study of railroad rail-road situation and am convinced that operation of railroads must be under man with large experience in managing manag-ing railroads at home. Successful handling han-dling our railroad lines so important that ablest men In country should be selected. After almost disastrous results re-sults with Inexperienced military men running railroads British selected ablest man could find to have charge transportation. "Question here mainly one of physical operation and management in intimate relation with French, who retain general gen-eral control, which is necessary to handle ordinary commercial traffic. Question of railroad transportation of course involves equipment, maintenance mainte-nance and new construction at front as army advances, and should be practically practi-cally Independent department, although al-though nominally under engineers. Railmnn chosen should be sent here without delay, together with three or four able assistants of his own selection. selec-tion. Later on It is believed these men should be given appropriate military rank." In reply, the War department recommended rec-ommended W. W. Atterbury, then general gen-eral manager and now president of the Pennsylvania railroad, for the place, and I Immediately requested that he be sent to France. The maintenance of good order among our troops under the peculiar conditions of service in France was most important, and for this purpose a military police was essential. Such a force, under the control of provost marshal general, corresponded to the police department In a well-organized city, except that Its Jurisdiction Included In-cluded only those in the military service. serv-ice. The British, whose situation was similar to our own, gave us helpful information regarding their system, which, with a slight modification, wus adopted for our armies. In our previous wars, the provost guard, so called, usually consisted of troops of the line detailed for the purpose, pur-pose, but without any special training for sucli duty. Col. Hanson Ely was selected to organize the police corps and made a good beginning In laying the foundation, founda-tion, but, at his own request, he was shortly relieved and sent to regimental duty. His successor. Col. W. II. Allaire, Al-laire, became provost marshal general until the following July, when he was relieved by Col. J. C. Groome. Brig. Gen. H. II. Bandholtz, on account ac-count of his special fitness for such work from his experience as chief of constabulary in the Philippine Islands, became the permanent head of the corps in September. 191S. Due credit must be given to each of these officers, but piirllcnlarly to Band I holtz, for the smart appearance and the high efficiency of this force. The military police were indispensable indispens-able in ilirer'.lr.g and handling traffic j dnriTii combat activities, in preventing straggling and in maintaining ordei among scattered groups of our armies ! both before and nfter the armistice. Tiie organization Xoc ml.er 1. 1018. numbered 40'.'. o!Vc-r and 1.1.912 men, I spread over Hie whole of Franca. I (TO P.E CONTINUED.) CHAPTER XIII The most Important question that confronted us in the preparation of our forces of citizen soldiery for efficient effi-cient service was training. Except for the Spanish-American war nearly twenty years before, actual combat ex perience of the regular army had been limited to the Independent action of minor commands in the Philippines and, to two expeditions into Mexico, eacli with forces smaller than a mod ern American division. The World war involved the handling han-dling of masses where even a division was relatively a small unit. It was one thing tc call 1,000.000 or 2.000.IXM) men to the colors, and quite another thing to transform them Into an organized, or-ganized, instructed army capable of meeting and holding Its own in battle against the best trained force In Europe Eu-rope with three years' actual war experience ex-perience to Its credit. A general scheme of scnools for the A. E. F. was prepared by the operations opera-tions and training sectioD, but In ordei that this instruction should be ns complete com-plete and uniform as possible and at the same time be co-ordinated with other activities, I declared that train ing should be handled by officers who could devote their entire time to it. An additional section of tlve headquarters staff therefore was established, caller! the training section, to function nnder my personal direction. As chief of this section Col. Paul B. Malone was chosen, with Col. H. P. Fiske as his assistant. The British methods of teaching trench warfare a, veiled to tne verv strongly. They taught their men to be aggressive n:ul undertook to porfeci them In hand-to-hand fighting with bayom-t, grenndo and dagger A certain cer-tain nino;mt . ti.is kind of training was necessary to stimulate the mural e Yanks Learning to Use the Bayonet. who succeeded him, had been content simply to hold the trenches, and no French offensive operation of consequence conse-quence had been attempted until this one. From the moment of bis assign ment Petain began to build up the shattered morale of his armies and probably no other officer In France could have performed the task so well. Petain's immense success in the defense de-fense of Verdun had won for him the confidence of the army and the country, coun-try, and yet he remained the same modest, unassuming character, consistent consist-ent and conservative. He, perhaps better than any other, understood the temperament of the I rencJi soldier, I the members oi which were to meet together and make known their respective respec-tive needs and thcu agree among themselves them-selves as to where and by which department de-partment such purchase was to dp made, thus mutually assisting instead of compotiug with each other. Cnder the arrangement co-operation with the French was established and the agency became increasingly effective in nan dling our procurement activities. Couldn't Depend on French R. R.'s. The use of railways for the move merit of troops and supplies hail never before attained any such proportion as in the World war and there was no service except sea transportation upon |