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Show " 1 '" 1 " " 1 . -i . WSaatntBtaaatMaaHtaM The Kaiser as I Knew Him for Fourteen Years By ARTHUR N. DAVIS. D. D. S. American Dentist to the Kaiser from 1904 to 191 8 taasssssis- - (Copyrlcht, I91S, by the McCluro Nowipaper Syndicate) CHAPTER VII. The. Japanese. According to tho talk of tho German diplomats beforo tho war tho expectation expecta-tion was that Japan's power would bo used against America at tho first opportunity. op-portunity. Whether tho obect of this campaign was to stir up troublo be- twecn Japan and America or only to waken this country to n senso of tho danger which tho Germans professed to bellovo threatened her I don't know. I do know, however, that prospect of a Japanese-American war seemed to worry tho Germans considerably moro than It worries us. Tho day England declared war against Germany, August 0, 1014, tho Princo von Plcss called to seo mo professionally. pro-fessionally. "Thcro will bo two wars fought," ho said, oracularly. "Tho present one, by which wc shall gain control of tho continent' con-tinent' of Europo forever, and then n war with tho yellow races, In which wo shall probably havo your country to. assist usl'( That this opinion was moro or less general In Germany may uccount for tho fact that from tho tlmo war, was declared until August 23, 1014, when .Japan declared war ngalnst Germany, tho Japancso residents In Itcrlln wcro H mndo tho subject of tho most sickening sicken-ing attentions. It was reported that Japan was going to attack Russia, and tho Germans could not do enough to show their dowly boru admiration for tho yellow raco which they had hitherto hither-to so deeply despised. The Japs were carried through tho streets on tho shoulders of tho populnco and kissed and cheered wherever they appeared In public. " And then Japan declared war against Germany I Instantly thcro was n wild demonstration In tho streets of Berlin, which would havo resulted most disastrously disas-trously for tho .Japs who had bo recently recent-ly been hailed as friends but for tho , astonishing fact that every slnglo Jap had succeeded In getting away from Berlin before tho news of Japan's on- (" try Into tho war becamo generally known. In the absence- of Japancso upon which to vent their spleen, tho Germans Ger-mans did everything they could to make life miserable for those who resembled re-sembled Japs. Tho few Chinese who were there werer terribly treated cither becauso they wcro taken for Japs or because they wcro of tho sumo raco. Tho Siamese minister, Prince Traldos, who was ono of my patients, told ma that when his wlfo and children went out on tho streets the crowds followed them and Jeered, referring to tho Japancso Jap-ancso as monkeys and using other opprobrious op-probrious epithets. They even went 'so far as to spit In Princess Trnldoti' face, and tho minister finally decided to send her and tho children to Switzerland, Switzer-land, ulthough he himself remained nt his post. I saw the kaiser shortly after tho Japancso declaration of war, and ho was very bitter ngalnst the Uqltcd States .because of that development. "What Is your president thinking of to allow a yellow raco to attack a white rncol Now tho Japancso uro attacking at-tacking Ktau-Chnu, and America could have prevented It. All that America had to dp was-to rulso a finger and Japan would have known enough to keep her placol" He spoke In this strain on several subsequent occasions. When Klnu-Chou fell he again criticized crit-icized tho United States for not having stopped Japan. "How can your president allow Japan to Increase In power at tho ex-penso ex-penso of a whlto racor he usked, Indignantly. In-dignantly. "Now China U lost to tho world forever. America Is the one power that could havo prevented It, but now Japan has got her fingers on China and she Is lost to us forever I" After we were In tho war, tho kaiser expressed to roe his opinion that our object in taking this atcp was fourfold; four-fold; "First, ho said, "Wilson wants to save the money you have loaned to the "allies. Second, he wants to have n seat at the peace table. Third, ho 'wants' to give your army and navy a little practical experience unfortunately, unfortu-nately, at our expense. And fourth, and principally, ho wants to prepuro for tho wnr with Japan which ho knows Is Inevitable. The Japanese are the ones which your country must look upon as Its. real enemies." . . A German offlcer of high standing 'told me lust before I left Berlin that America, had made tho great mlstuke IC ;of sending ammunition, guns and sup- 'pllesr'.to luss!u, via Japan, becauso V-tlppnri hqd "lust retained tho finely rando"" .American articles ttud had . .dumped '6nRussla n lot of good-for-nothing material of her own In their , place. "My ndvlco to America," ho declared, de-clared, "is o cut the throat of every Japancso In America and get rid of thu Internal danger." no did not sug-gtn sug-gtn cutting tho throats of nil tho un-, un-, ueslriiblo Germans who wera In America Amer-ica and who had already' demonstrated that they wero far more dangerous than the Jnpnnosn hod ever been. CHAPTER VIII. Tho Kaiser's Confidence of Victory. About twclvo years ago I attended tho German military maneuvers at Ltegnltz, in Silesia, having been Invited In-vited by somo Journalistic friends of mlno to accompany them In tho motor allowed tho press. Tho military representatives repre-sentatives of England, France, America Amer-ica and other countries wcro there with tho kaiser's staff to witness tho display of Germany's military power. Apparently they wcro very much Impressed, Im-pressed, for I heard afterwards that ono of the French officers who had been present had written n book In which ho sold: "With such an army, Germany could annex Franco in six months I" I happened to mention this fact to tho kaiser shortly afterwards and his significant comment was: "Six months I I should hopo so. It wouldn't tnko that longl" Tho confident belief that when "Dor Tug" "tho day" finally arrived, Germany Ger-many would crush her enemies and accomplish ac-complish her object within n few months at tho outsldo was held not only by tho kaiser but by the people generally and their conduct when tho wnr broke out clearly disclosed It. When Germany's man power wns mobilized, no ono In Germany believed It would bo very long beforo they would all bo back and every effort wns mndu to mnk'o their fow weeks of active ac-tive scrvlco as llttlo Irksomo as possible. pos-sible. "Llebesgaben," gifts of love, consisting of clothing nnd food of every description, wcro forwnrded to them by their relatives and friends In tho most lavish manner, although, of course, at Uiat tlmo tho German com-mlssary.was com-mlssary.was ablo to satisfy all tho soldiers' sol-diers' requirements. Ono of my patients told mo that sho had sent seventeen hundred pounds of sausages to ono regiment within n week, and when I asked her why she. had been so generous sho replied that her chauffeur was n member of the regiment I Tho extent to which tho country's resources' wcro squandered In thoso early months Is evidenced by tho fact that tho soldiers had such an excess of UlrOttlng woolen wearing apparel that they used many of the knitted articles ar-ticles as earpieces and covers for their horses. No one bad tho slightest Idea that the tlmo might como when tho whole, nntlon would be clothed In paper pa-per I At this lato day It can hardly bo necessary to establish how thoroughly prepared tho Germans wero for the war, but an Incident which occurred In tho early days of tho conflict may not bo out of placo to show tho self-satisfied and confident nttltudo which all thu Germans assumed. Two officers sitting nt n tnblo In nn out-of-door enfo shortly aftor tho war began overheard ono of several ladles who wero passing remark: "Look at thoso officers sitting there drinking. Why ore they not nt tho front fighting?" fight-ing?" Cso of tho officers got up and, approaching tho ladles, cald: "Our work was completed months ago. "We worked from early morning till lato at night on plans which our armies are now carrying out. It, Is our time to rest." Tho resistance that Franco would be able to put up wns always very lightly estimated, and If tho Intervention of England wns at all taken Into consideration, consid-eration, tho comparatively small army sho could placo In the field was regarded re-garded as but n drop In tho bucket compared com-pared with tho well-trained German hordo that was ready to. sweep across the border. How could England's 60,000 inen copo with Von Kluck'a 600,000 or the hastily mobilized French armies resist re-sist .tho thoroughly prepared, equipped and welt-dlsclpllned Gcrmnn warriors? It is really not to bo wondered at thut tho Germans firmly believed that they would bring the allies to their knees within' a comparatively few weeks and that tho conquering German Ger-man armies would celebrnto Sedan dny, September 2, In. Paris. What actually ac-tually happenedis, of course, too well known hero to rcqulro recital, but I Jthow that tho Germans wero kept in ahsoluto Ignorance of the marvelous resistance tho allies were able to put up In those critical days of August and September, 1014, nnd to this day tho majority of Germans havo not heard of the battlo of the Maruo I Just after tho English passed their conscription law I was called to seo tho kaiser at the great army headquarters, headquar-ters, which at that tlmo wcro nt Plcss. Although tho war hod then lasted two or threo times as long as tho Germans had expected, tho kaiser masked tho depression ho must have felt by putting put-ting on n bold front. "How foolish for England to start conscription now," ho declared. "Sim thinks she can accomplish In n fcW months what It has taken Germany n hundred years to attain. Armies nnd officers cnntiof bo developed over night. Wo hnvo nov.er stopped preparing sluco tho days of Frederick the Great I" "Yes, your majesty, but tho Northern North-ern stirtcs In pur Civil war put In conscription con-scription two years after tho beginning begin-ning of the war," I suggested. "But just look how long your war lasted," tho knlsor replied quickly. "This war won't Inst that long. Tho allies will feel what tho power of Gcr-mauy Gcr-mauy Is long beforo English conscription conscrip-tion can avail them anything 1" "And whllo England Is slowly building build-ing up her Insignificant army," tho kaiser went on, "sho will bco Amcrlcn's navy nnd merchant marine constantly growing nnd tho dollar replacing tho pound ns tho unit of tho world's finance. No, Davis, Englnud wilt soon bo rick of tho war and wilt look with fear upon America's growing power 1" Tho French army, too, was generally belittled, and tho Hussions wcro bo-Uovcd bo-Uovcd to bo absolutely negligible. Tho French army was so poorly equipped, It wns pointed out, thnt tho officers had to go to tho field In patent-leather boots, and on tho Itusslnn front, only the flrst-llna men had guns, tho others being armed with clubs I Eventually, officers and soldiers returning re-turning from tho western front on furlough fur-lough or passing through tho countrj en routo from ono front to tho other brought the report of the defeat beforo Paris. Soldiers who participated In thnt disastrous retreat wroto from tho new trenches to their friends nnd relatives rel-atives telling of tho terrible experiences experi-ences they had undergone, when they, went for days with nothing to cat but raw potatoes and turnips which they picked from tho fields. When theso reports flnnlly spread through Germany tho people began to renllzo that their generals In tho west wcro not meeting with tho snmo success that Von Hlndcnburg had had In tho cast and Von Hlndcnburg becumo tho Idol of tho pcoplo Immediately, u fact that was very distasteful to tho high command. ' Tho kaiser's dlsllko of Von Hlndcnburg Hlndcn-burg was of long standing. Ho had never forgiven that general for tho mls-tako mls-tako he mado during military maneuvers maneuv-ers In pcaco tlmo when by a brilliant stroko of strategy ho had succeeded In capturing tho kaiser's forces, Including tho kaiser nnd his wholo staff I I have referred In a previous chnptcr to tho kaiser's unbounded confidence after tho Italian collapse, In 1017. "Now, we've got tho nlllcsl" he- exclaimed, ex-claimed, with an nlc of 'conclusiveness which emphasised tho optimism ho displayed. After tho capture of Itoumanla, ho exhibited a similar degree' of exultation. exulta-tion. Ho believed that In thnt achievement achieve-ment ho had successfully solved tho food problem the one cloud which constantly darkened tho kaiser's horizon. hori-zon. "Now tho allies will never succocd In stnrvlng us," ho sold to mo In ray office of-fice shortly after tho Roumanian drive. "With Itoumanla In our pockets and Scrvla already ours, their wonderful" agricultural possibilities will supply our food needs and foil our enemies' efforts to starve us. Indeed, they had belter look out for themselves. Don't forget wo havo n monopoly on tho potash mines of tho world. Without proper fertilization, American crops will go on decreasing, and decreasing and they won't get any potash until wo get ready to let them havo It I" Tho failure of tho Zeppelins from a military standpoint was undoubtedly a great disappointment to tho German peoplo at largo, who had counted so much upon them to bring disaster to England, but It cannot be said that tho kaiser shared their chagrin. On the contrary, I huvo reason to believe thut ho never expected very much from thnt arm of his military force except as it might bo useful to terrorize the civil population. A day or two after' Zeppelin's denth, In 1017, a patient of mine, u lady, happened hap-pened to remark that it was too bad that the count had not lived to see tho triumph of bis invention, nnd when I saw the kaiser shortly afterwards I repeated her xemark to see what bo would say. "I am convinced thnt the count lived long enough to seo all that tho Zeppelins Zep-pelins were capable of accomplishing," was his only comment. It recalled tho answer he bad given mo some years beforo when both Zeppelins and airplanes air-planes wero In their Infancy and I had asked him which held the greater promise. "Wo do not know. Tlmo nlono will tell,' was his reply. Tho last time L conversed with tho kaiser was on November 20, 1017. Up to that tlmo we had sent over 100,000 troops, according to thefigures Which have since been revealed by Secretary Baker. According to tho kaiser's Information, In-formation, howeVcr, we had only 30,-000 30,-000 men In Franco nt that time oiul he was of tho opinion that we would noyer havo. many more, ' "America Is hnvlug a flno tlmo trying try-ing to raise an army," ho declared satirically. "I hear that 1,000. mutinied tho other day In New York and refused re-fused to get on a transport, and n town In tho Northwest composed principally prin-cipally of citizens of Swedish blood refused to reg'ptcr at jtll I Wo are getting get-ting excellent information about all conditions in .Amer'cn.." Shortly beforo this had como tho revelations rev-elations from Washington of tho Intrigue In-trigue of Count von Luxburg, thu German Ger-man minister to Argcntlnn, and 1 knew where tho kaiser was getting tho In formation ho referred to. In nenrly every case, it appeared, tho kaiser's Informants In-formants wcro misleading him. Both beforo nnd after wo entered tho war the kaiser was thoroughly convinced con-vinced that wo could play only a nominal nom-inal part In It so far as mnn power was concerned and his assurance on that point undoubtedly accounted for his decision to carry through his submarine sub-marine program even though It resulted re-sulted In bringing us into tho war. "Do you realize how many tons of 'shipping It takes to ship a slnglo soldier?." sol-dier?." ho nsked mo on ono occasion. I confessed my ignorance on that point. "Well, It takes six tons to tho mnn I To send over an army of 500,000 men, therefore, your country would require o.OOO.OOO tons of shipping In addition to tho tonnage required for regulnr traffic. Where Is It coming from, with my. submarines sinking the allied vessels ves-sels faster than they can ever bo replaced? re-placed? My U-bouts uro doing wonderful won-derful work nnd wo nro prepared to tako care of nil tho troops America may try to land In France." "How foolish for Amcrlcn to havo como' into the war," ho went on. "If sho could succeed In landing n rcnl army In France, what good would It do? ' America Can see how easy It was for me to break through and to capture cap-ture 1100,000. of the Italians, nnd they must realize that I can break through on the western front nnd do tho snmo thing there. It America had kept out of tho war sho would havo gone on making untold profits nnd when peaco was finally declared she would havo been In a most enviable position among the nations of tho world. As It Is, Wilson will never hnvo a scat at the pence tnblo If I, can help It, und now America shall havo to pay all the costs of tho war I" Evidently ho Imagined Imag-ined that his triumph would bo so complete that there would bo no pcaco table, but that tho warring nations would bo compelled to accept tho terms ho offered them, In which ovent, knowing tho magnanimity of tho German Ger-man make-up, I should say tho world atlargo would hnvo to bo content with very little. How tho kaiser feels now that the falluro of tho U-boats to Intercept American troop ships must bo painfully pain-fully npparcnt to him, and America has so overwhelmingly overcome, tho shortage of shipping, I don't know, but It Is more thun probablo thnt for some tlmo to como tho real situation will, at any rate, be successfully concealed from the German pcoplo. I know that tho failure of the U-boat campaign was unknown to tho Germans up to tho tlmo I loft Berlin In January, 1018. Whllo tho kaiser and tho Gcrmnns generally felt confident that' wo would never bo ablo to send many men across, they professed to feel little concern even if we did. According to somo of tho Gcrmnn officers of-ficers with whom I spoke, oven If wo landed 2,000,000 men In Franco it would not bo enough to break tho deadlock, as tlio Germans wcro taking a similar number of trained troops from tlio Hussion front. Tho only menace of American participation In tho war lay In tho possibility that wo might add considerably to tho allied air strength. Man power alone, they contended, would neve.' bo sufficient to help tho allies much, but overwhelming superiority In the air might occasion tlu Germans somo annoyance. Tho kaiser himself had but a poor opinion of the fighting qualities of tho American soldier so far as modern war requirements nro concerned. "Tho American soldier would possibly pos-sibly glvo a good uccount of himself In open fighting," ho declared, "but ho Is not built for the kind of warfare ho will encounter In France. Ho lacks the stolfdlty to enduro life in tho trenches.. Ho Is too high-strung and couldn't stand tho inacuvo life which Is such nn Important part of modern warfare. Besides, he lacks discipline and trained officers." CHAPTER IX. The Kaiser's Plan for World Dominion. The history of modern Gprmany Is, pcrhupa, In Itself sufficient Indication of tho underlying plan of tho Teuton war barons to control tho wholo of Europo nnd, eventually, tho world. The program has been slowly unfolding It-self It-self sluco tho time of Frederick tho Great and tho present generation Is now witnessing what was Intended to bo tho climax. Tlieco can be no doubt that If Germany Ger-many hod succeeded In her efforts to gain conjroj of the major part of Europe Eu-rope .sho would havo booh looked toward tho western hemisphere and tho cast,. This program Is fairly Indicated by tho course of events .as history Inys them bore, but I hnvo the actual word of tho kaiser to substnnUato it. At one of his visits to me shortly after tha beginning of tho war we. were discussing England's participation In It. ' ' "What hypocrites tho English nro I" the kttlW exclaimed. "They had always) treated m bo well when I visited them I never bo llovcd they would havo como Into thin war. They nlwuys acted as if they liked me. My mother was English, you know. I always thought tho world was big enough for three of us nnd wo could keep It for ourselves that Ocrmany could control tho continent conti-nent of Europe, England, through her vnst possessions and licet, could control con-trol tho Mediterranean nnd tho far east, nnd America could dominate tha western hemisphere I" How long It would havo been beforo Germany would havo tried to wrest dominion from England can readily bo Imagined, nnd with tho wholo of Europo Eu-ropo nnd the far cast under her thumb America would undoubtedly hnvo proved too tempting n morsel for tho kaiser's or his descendants' rapacious maw to havo resisted. Ho said that he believed thut tho world was "big enough for three;" ho didn't say It was too big for one. What was really In his mind, however, how-ever, Is Indicated by n passage In on address ho mndo somo twcnty-llvo years ago, In which, ns Bcv. Dr. Newell New-ell Dwlght IIIUIs has pointed out, ho used these words: "From my childhood I hnvo been under un-der tho Inllucnco of five men Alexander, Alexan-der, Julius Caesar, Theodorlc II, Napoleon Na-poleon nnd Frederick tho Great. Theso fivo men dreamed their dream of n world empire: they foiled. I nm dreaming my dream of n world cmplro, but I shall succeed I" Tho kaiser's plan to domlnnto Europe Eu-rope Included the control of Turkey, and he mndo every effort to strengthen thnt country so thnt sho might bo a valunblo ally In the war to come. When Italy took Tripoli from Turkey Tur-key before tho Balkan war I mentioned men-tioned to tho knlser how opportunely Italy had acted, but tho kaiser dismissed dis-missed my remark with nn exclamation exclama-tion of displeasure, realizing, of course, thnt Turkey's loss was In a senso his own since ho had planned to inako Turkey his vassal. To that end he had sent German officers of-ficers to train tho Turkish army and hnd supplied them with guns and munitions. mu-nitions. With an eyo to tho futuro, too, ho had constructed tho great Bagdad Bag-dad railway. When tho Balkan war broke out In 1012 tho. kaiser had great confidence that tho German-trained Turkish nrmy would acquit Itself creditably nnd that In tho outcomo of that conflict his European program would mnko considerable consid-erable progrcsH. Ho told mo that ho had n map of tho war area placed In his motor and that with pegs he followed fol-lowed tho fortunes of tho fighting nrmles whllo he was traveling. The kaUer had little regard for President WlUon from the time the latter was elected for tho first time. "A real scoundrel" scoun-drel" was the way he characterized character-ized the president on one occasion. occa-sion. The kalier admired Boost. velt very much, but was greatly disappointed at the stand taken by tho former president after the war started What the kaiser kais-er thought of Wilton, Roosevelt, Henry Ford, and other 'Americans 'Ameri-cans Is dlsclssed In the next Installment In-stallment of Doctor Davit' story. (TO HE CONTINUED.) |
