| Show Slow ilow Japan J n Lost Her Her Ga Greatest e test Chance ChanceL ance L i I Russians Had Hod Only Troops In When tho the War Begin Began cc n and ad Were Kept Busy Doing Theatrical to Hide Elido Their Weakness At last we wc have a cler LONDON i 1 authentic statement of ot tho the Hun nua nuaL L sian military position In the tho far tar farI 11 I 1 ca l ot et forth In which make mako tho situation understandable by says the Nov Nt v York Sun It comes III In a n long letter r from front Muk Mukden II uk den lien written by II B J one on oll of the ablest war correspondents who gIveR the result of ot two months ob orvit of ot the forces Ho lie how desperate was wan the front Croll tho the outbreak of the Iho nr until almost almont alm st Ie ditto of Ills his In III the thu IC of f June JUlie J une anti and points out that great were wen tho th Japanese OS they might have ho been hicen fur far greater If full advantage had hail been taken ot of the tho helplessness The letter Is la BO tio Illuminating that the tho extracts which follow tallow deserve careful attention If we ve rc the Iho men necessary for tor Guarding the tue railway nfl and on 1 the lie small garrisons at nt hike Harbin anti and a there worn were not noL more morl titan than the tho troops in it southern Manchuria when war broke brolo lout out Of at this force orca some were be between between betseen tween rakt falm M tho the Yalu In the ty of ot Kin 1 ln Chau Chati land and Port Arthur and an anthe anlie the tho lie remaining had to garriso and The latter point fortunately S for tho the Russians was van protected by hy Ice In tho the river The garrison actually consisted of troops and n a 1 few military police It Jt Is freely treely asserted ly ily tho thu stich Buch being the tho strength of tho ho lu army the Japanese att aft after atter er or tim tho first torpedo attack on Feb I cb S could have hac landed a single army corps on Ott tho Iho ho shores of nr bay or nt at ns na thoy dill did later and ond Port Arthur Arlhur must have fallen Imme Immediately Thero There Is 18 n a great deal to be said for or this thin theory Thirty thousand men could have hlo havethe havethe the tho coup COllI long Ion before tho thit Russian troops nt ot the tho Yahl could havn hava marched I II tp Ita relief and ond the effect of the tho ho blow would S been Tile The solo good gool excuse for such lIuch a 0 lost opportunity to bo be that Ihal the Japa Japanese neRO nese wore were always Intent before any anything anything thing else eiRe In securing Korea Korc anil they plans for throwing n a 1 tinny army across the lie Yalu long before they de do declared dared war warThe The rite success of at tho the torpedo attack and tho ho consequent demoralization of tho ho lie at conditions which could not be forenoon and ond therefore could not bo he fully utilized when they occurred A sudden Budden change of ot might have hav lon and nothing could be left to hazard at the tho beginning b the iho campaign DurIng February tho south small army In southern southe n Manchuria was waa reinforced slowly Iy BO tio slowly that hat the gravest t fears fenn about tho the capacity of the Ih rail roll railway railway way WilY began to be lie entertained Troops TroOP wore oro landed at ut Harbin itt It arate a arato 1 rate rato of less loss than GOO OU a n day and theto were sero days when no men mon came caine through In reality the tho railroad wan vuI not BO 80 ta much touch to as 18 the military organization za 11 lion Ion I The simple fact was that no tion hind had been mada niada for the tho tar 11 antI It took weeks to In mobilize even eln regi resl regiments ments In eastern Siberia which are aro sup Blip supposed posed to 0 be on onu n a war footing Not until the end of lurch Murch did thu a sen ily tl low flow of begin Even Kven J en then Ihen It 11 was necessary to bring artillery to the front and for tor that more reason re son the tho Infantry 10 ton II were considerably delayed It was during this thia t period of at great grett un Ull uncertainty certainty that Gen Clou iou arrived at nt Ho Ito found tau nil himself In command of an 1 army of men I IORa Ies M titan than 20 of ot strung out along a 1 line guns Port Ai At Aithur Atthur S railway rail WilY from rain to thur with ono lIng Ing thrown out HO ItO S miles to the tM Yalu the right Hank flank except by b a It guns In 11 the old fort fOlt at al of The enemy had complete mastery tho lie sea It Jt could certainly land lall anywhere be he between tween Port lort Arthur mod tho hue Yam 1111 anti and antiS PO fIt cut cult off tr the tho left wing while by S lug tho that passage of transports Arthur they the could 1011 1 seize S S and threaten not only olly tho ho right Honk hank but Jul the tho rear a All sorts of at expedients WIO to In order that hot the tho be bo too apparent nt ot nn an attack w was 1111 dally daily dal apprehend cd ell lold foul guns sere nt ot tho station halt but only to tivo batteries hail had horses Tho The rest wore were tIters there for tor show put PUI I Nearly overy every day duty the troops marched through the tn U tint fort torI borIc back In order to tu gl give gle glet t 4 4 the lie hut there lucre WAR 1 rge h force In III the Ito neighborhood When len den earns orne to visit lIt tho the port ho lie wan wac received by b men mentS near the fort tort of which 1000 came am with tS him front from and 1 ph with sIh him the lie same name afternoon F It was n a of tho ho simple theatrical device 8 by b twenty men are oro made tn to do duty duy for far an un army but hilt butr It II t luau hall a n certain carIn effect Inc for the corre corres r telegraphed t to 10 I that i there thero was wall M a n garrison of ot from tram 10 OO tu to II ct Sc men mell at itt whereas the lie entire force toree never naver OX on L the tho day of the review 2 oo Hut reinforcements were beginning to arrive and trains were vere ro bringing 2000 a ft 1 day to 10 Harbin 1 II besides be It a number num bel of ot guns uns S j I tI t I I Iio io 1 e VII innately about tho th end of at April delay won caused by the tho breaking of ot a it bridge near Then Chen there wn a II new lIew when the Iho ice lee In I ralle alte tu to thaw HO so ta there were verO two tIVO when no troops arrived At nt Title was exactly the period which flue tho Japanese e chose to force the Yalu Oon did dill not hac huc fuel mn of at nil artun but he was wall better hett r sup BUp supPlied tilled Plied with lIh artillery having thirty hat bat of UI guns besides a n number of pt th ICo Still 11 t hit In hI could not risk a n serIous bat mit mittIe tIe nt ot l the lie Yalu because with the lie army distributed on oi fo va 0 large largo a ho lie was WaR running a n serious danger of cut rUI cutto cutto to pieces The Japanese nil all this time never nover di 11 divulged their plan of campaign BO lit though hb nu had hud only to face nt at tho the ho lie was continually threatened at rut every overy point along the tho he coast coust between Imd Now New The second arll and third of Japan though thought still In tho the nebulous oiling hind hod hinda hatlA A n far for creator moral effect than they have havo ha vo bait hiatt If It they had landed any anywhere anywhere where In Manchuria Gon aen I with between I and the hue Yam Yalu another OOoo nt at Iho tho southern end of If the tho peninsula was WIl left heft with only nt at hla hie own disposal with which ho he had hlll to face tace nil all emergencies especially to ward oft off tho IhO threaten cd ell attack on his right Hank Hy fly this time the tho hIs osler nutter had bind so tar crippled the hue already damaged fleet that lint the tho were trIo free to 10 come romo past pant Port Arthur Aithur arid and nd land hand any anywhere whore on the tho ito roast of the tho Ilao Itao Tung Tun gulf gult With tIm the addition Millon of ot f more moro than lhnn an on army carps to protect hK hit Hank flank Con lell IOu might have held tho Ih Yulu position which for tor tactical pur purposes poses was Immensely strong Jilt hut d dds s weak ns as ho was ws In tho the center lie ho hind had no alternative butt but to retire from ruin the tho Yolu Tab and anti concentrate at nl and Tho Thu retirement was WR badly badh executed Gait Oell not only no proper IHO of oC the lie advantage of at lilt hili position but bul actually threw w away awny two regiments and four lour batterie The fhe Japanese could base boon been madi mado oty expensive with any auy sort Bort of OS the lie was wan not lint the tie fault tault of ot the tho nor can ciui his hIli stunt strat strategy egy be he blamed After Alter the Iho battle of the tho Japanese landed nt lit last on tho the peninsula and Vort Port Arthur Arlhur wan cut oft off offIt It Is lB hard to say Hay exactly how hots many moli were iere left tt under J ol The Tho say there thero A ere vere exclusive Io of the navy and ond tho Iho garri garrison garrison son of artillery The fhe number Is IR more mOIe likely to tt i o 0 fo 10 O of at whom wore were put Jilt out lIt cf f ac no action lion tion nt tl That flint left heft Ion leli I with nn an army concentrated between anti of only end r f ml not nol more attire than n gunso guns gUllS Ho o weak wan 1011 the Russian HIIs lm army at ot moment that bitt the had hunt onto alice one nn an opportunity for attempt Int a it great grent coup There were ero utter after thu tho Yalu YIu tight light when hol It seemed pro 1110 ro b ible that the tho enemy Instead of III lint I on out would lid vance by 13 II back haCI roads u In itt 11 the tile mountains dl ell l on mu where there thero was tras no of at any sort rind n few fow troop a a Oen Oon won woe not nol notto to Lo resist such lIuch an nn hut 1119 vole fole line lino of ot retreat was threat nod and there was danger of it Llao Lino becoming a second Accordingly ho lie to tall fall bark back barkon on nIl and uund was bode mude tenth ready for till the Viceroy wits to 10 lute hla hl from Mukden to Harbin while withIn Clen was 18 to 10 the ua its aul nt itt whIch was waR tta the tho In hi tho the whole Llao LIRO This xa on un the Ito tIny day of or May 1111 Suddenly on ill tho tho the orders wore The run who hal hail come Conle with a tremendous rush from rota the Ihil Yalu halted hailed mud actually fell foil back buck and Mukden were both holh lytt if for or the moment rind the tho iroe tilt did not HOt go ZO to I Harbin To sitting In iii Mukden and Know Itu iho ho weakness 8 of or the hit It would once mice more that tho the Japanese Il n it 1 great opportunity If It they tile could have l It l is II utile certain that there have been heen n a 1 very orY retreat Into inti a 11 in 11 Situ tho 81 ut tIt the tho Tin iii Jit nune une u had hall only to o eji Iu h bit Inic ton lOll 1111 1 anti and ilin l uro UIO tIu Mi uld not have hae a I von InUit It Ir i that both bout In iii 11 HUH cal mra 1111 In lit thus ca case caN of or tim tho first in un Juju the Ja allo In ha 1 of ut secret service In hit 1 t DO no DOta nota ta 1 hov hoy terribly weak antI and I the Ilu luc Inn ert Again In lu 1 both bolh ou eases ee their th lr success lund lind been unexpected I III The attack on Oil the lie Yalu WOK Intruded Intended to hold hioki tho Ito troops engaged on tho thun left heft Hank anti so a II way for tor fora a fI landing on all the thus Aa Au It turned out It ins WOH es ful I all nil calculation hind might hax been to 10 a much grouter grantor ex IX extent x tent hut the refused to 10 run even overt to secure a 11 greater prize They rhey merely modifIed their heir original plans very vary slightly and went vont ent on with tho hue business hu In III hand hund which wits was lS the tho Port Arthur IS From that time on tho ho troops which hod hall h en delayed by hy b tho ito op o of ot l Lake began h nA to pour our li In t to n a rato und IIII by lIY thu Iho beginning of f Juno JUlin On Oen Kuro n kin lint hall men arid and 10 batteries In Ott h u O dai thita mOil men M f fanti anti and SOCO count through tho the situ sta station Ion tion at nt a a a af I f have no doubt that nn nit of 2000 a II day with gurus Una and horio In lit proportion tout can b be kept up and oven exceeded I 1 know knol that on June 2 Clen Oen Kuropat Kuropatkin kin 1111 had hi t In his hl Immediate command ex ox elusive of ot tho tue troops nt lit Port Par Arthur and those ut lit Mukden which now num nurn lieu bor exactly lOt battalions of ot In tn Infantry fantry mustered rules rifles He lie also nillo had Gen fan mounted force of Cossacks and 20 guns S S S With nn an 11 army of mon men anti Port Arthur In Jeopardy It seemed necessary UI to do tb something for Cor Us Its relief relict Unfortunately for tOt the It li In practically Impossible for far oven even a much larger army to 10 Port Arthur Arlhur BO so BOlong long as aR the thin Japanese c command the SM sea for any ny force advancing southward must Wave leave both bout honks Hanks and rear open to 10 attack ft from am the sea Rea That is 0 why the tho Japanese had no need to 10 hold haIti the lie Llao Lillo Tung peninsula In intorn torn force north of Kin When flea Oen sent Gen with Ith the First Siberian orm to attempt att Its relief ho hue was und Instruction from St HI Pp r riot pot at ho ito ex ox O help V Arthur As R as we heard hen Oon Sta SIn kelberg kelber hall hail none gone to Val lg rica Tien wo we expected disaster and this morning n a 1 telegram came that the tho disaster had taken place a aGen Gen H orp while endeavoring to turn the thu Japanese right lank thank wall sud suddenly denly donly hit hll on his III own oun right anti and badly routed The Japanese were not greatly superior In numbers but their artillery wits WM Infinitely better both In numbers rs ani In III effectiveness antI nd their tactics ns nR usual sero perfect examples of how battles should be fought Now No tim the army Irmy of Own Oun Oku Is IK from tho ho south and ald Gen den Is coming from the tho southeast When they hey effect affect n it Junction they thoy will 11 III form torm a lighting fighting unit of ot nt at t least and tutu there Is mill the army of ot ion Gen No dzu to 10 rome come 1 S Gen Oon has ban advanced to ex exI I Oen Gen who has lot lost hut but probably proba ly while the III lie rest rORt of ot his hI men are oro badly hadly shaken On Ott the other uther hand the railway Is 18 cv ov overy cry ery day cIa making good the he gaps In tho ho ranks ronks and although h the tho record for or Juno Is In not BO ito goodas hi lit May Iny troops arc aro still arriving nt lit the Ihl he rote rite of ot a n aday aday day do with a n large quantity of artillery arliller so 51 nt at t tho ho limo of at writing Gen Oen Kuro l I uro must have men and not lot less hoes than lion SO guns Considering that two moro more army corps irre already on tho way ho he mav may maylie he lie considered quite unite safe at lit Llao Liao Yang so Sn long ns Ila ho lie does daM not risk another at to leave lease Port lor Arthur Arthura a S S So far I r have dealt only lIh the tue numerical problem and I 1 hope bopo I have made clear ciao r that Ihal lea flen strategy has haM been heen largely determined by the lie poucH of the tho troops As liB regards Uio he guns the Russians haye hye now lost host lo t tI of ot field laId ar artillery artillery tillery and ond Come pome smaller pieces anti and about SO 0 turns gupta which Joined len Gen Stoos ash sel at Port Arthur Arlhur at al tho lie beginning of at June Jon Clout was so short of rut artillery that thuat he hue telegraphed to Chita for tor four tour batteries whIch were Just bo be boIng beIng Ing mobilize mobilized They clime came with men and horses only half holt trained i Five 1155 moi mOIe batteries through not long ago ngo with tile the fittings of another typo of at gun so that lint they were temporarily useless Meantime tho the Is III working well a aTIt Tl TIt division Is beginning II |
