Show Round Merry Forces Feud Despite Unification By Drew Pearson W O WASHINGTON O n ne e reason for fr unification of oC the army and navy was to eliminate bitter jealousy between the two servIces services services ices including t the e rival lobbies which each maintained on Capitol Capitol Capitol Capi Capi- tol Hill Hm It was hoped that unification would end the tug of However this column has now obtained a secret memo circulated circulated circulated by the navy which indicates indicates indi indi- cates that navy army warfare has not stopped If anything its it's more intensive and bitter bitten The he dispute now boils down downto to the question which of-which arm of oC the service Is best equipped to deliver the atomic bomb against the enemy Argument in favor of the airplane carrier as the best atom deliverer is put forward forward forward for for- ward in the navys navy's memo extensively extensively extensively exten exten- circulated on Capitol hill Omitting the military secrets pertinent portions of this amazing amazing amazing ing document follow Na Navy Has Been on Defensive Memorandum for the deputy chief of naval operations air Subject Comment on final report war department policies and programs review board Subject r l' report e c p o 0 r t circulated within tho the navy contains certain recommendations of reach far ing importance to the navy This report obviously represents the top-level top thinking of the army and air forces on the concept of future war var It appears that this report contemplates only a minor role in future wars for lor the navy and particularly for tor naval aviation Concept of war envisaged in this document is that of a strategic bombing attack on the enemy conducted by the air force torce from overseas bases For the past two years our defense of the navy has been based mainly on old familiar arguments about exercising control control control con con- of the seas Much has been said about antisubmarine warfare warfare warfare war war- fare naval rec reconnaissance protection protection protection pro pro- of shipping and amphibious amphibious ious bus operations The next war will be a lot different from any previous one It n seems obvious that the next time our Sunday punch will be bean bean bean an atomic b bomb mb aimed at the enemy capitols or industrial centers centers centers cen cen- and that the outcome of ot the war will be determined by strategic bombing The war willbe will willbe willbe be won side sido is able to deliver the atomic bomb to the e enemy emy and at the same time protect its own territory against against similar delivery I think the time is right now for the navy to start an aggressive campaign aimed at proving that the navy can deliver the atomic bomb more effectively than the air forces can The Navys Navy's Na Platform If If It the navy makes delivery of the atomic bomb its major mission and if we develop the proper ships planes and tactics the navy can become the principal offensive branch of the national defense system the branch which actually delivers the knockout blow Transoceanic bombing by planes which come comeback comeback comeback back hom is not yet practicable and I believe that for as far ahead as we can now see Into the future the navy can be in a better position to deliver the bomb than the air forces can That should be the navys navy's plat plat- form To land our Sunday punch ItIs Itis it itis is just as important to have a dependable means of delivery as asit asit asit it is to have the bomb it itself itself itself it- it self The memo memo then gives the navys navy's view that B and B are inadequate to bomb a distant enemy It Is usual to assume that we will be able to use England asa as asa asa a base in the next war It may or may not prove correct If the enemy also has the bomb A-bomb England may be forced to re remain remain remain re- re main neutral and it is difficult to conceive of ot any enemy allowIng allowIng allowing allow allow- ing itself to get into an out all shooting shooting- war var with us until he does have the A So we ve must make our long long- range plans on the assumption we that-we do not have overseas bases when the war breaks out These hese overseas bases would be bo almost Impossible to defend The ideal type of base is a highly mobile one one which could be here today and miles away from here tomorrow tomor tomor tomor- row It is a base which could be In the Arctic for one attack and in the Mediterranean the next week and in the Persian gulf the week after fter The base baBe which we have been discussing above is of ot course the I aircraft carrier The carrier can transport the bomber across the ocean and launch it 1000 miles from i its target Instead of ot building transoceanic range into the tho bomber and thereby penalizing its performance over enemy territory we build a transoceanic range into the car car- rier The air forces will never beable beable be bo able to match the tle performance of our bomb A-bomb carriers with the transoceanic bomber The same will apply to ship-launched ship missiles missiles missiles mis mis- siles versus transoceanic guided missiles Editors Editor's note The remainder of the navys navy's memo opposing the air force orce will follow In an early column S Copyright 1918 Bell Syndicate |