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Show arryf th war t0 Panese bases despite the necessity of advaS by sea. siting In brief, the Navy has regained necessary superiority and Z lenges the Japanese fleet tn if fend what It has seized. 6nly tt future can reveal where the jar. anese are willing to risk the T battle that will decide the strut gle in the Far East. S" .Japanese fleet, on sea, will know that they have made their last stand and that they can no longer protect the fatherland from crushing crush-ing and conclusive defeat. Our Offensive In the Pacific . . . Recent fighting In Russia shows that the German army retains a punch or two but gives us no cause for alarm as to the future progress of the Soviet campaign which seems reasonably certain to drive the Nazis out of Russia with great losses. In the Pacific the attack upon the Gilbert islands reveals the beginning be-ginning of our offensive, directed toward the central Pacific and a smashing blow against Japan. The significance of the offensive is the fact that we are now ready to I 1 I 1 I I I I I I I I t I I 1 I t ' ' t FORWARD MARCH By R S. Sims, Jr. I I I I I I I 1 1 I.. 1. 1 1 .Ii.I.iIi.L.I.iI. 1.. I. I.. I ' TREND OF WAR SHOWS SUPERIORITY OF UNITED NATIONS AT POINTS OF DECISIVE CONTACT The trend of warfare reflects the relative fighting power of combatant nations at their points of contact. When one side steadily loses ground it is being overpowered overpow-ered by its opponents. Defeat is indicated. j These obvious statements mean much when we study the course of the present war since Guadalcanal, Guadal-canal, in the South Pacific, and El Alar.iein ,m Egypt. Neither enemy en-emy nation has made a successful advance or won a great battle since thfse outstanding engagements. engage-ments. The unmistakeable inference, regardless of proprganda and official of-ficial talk, is that, despite their possession of the inner circle, our enemies cannot meet the forces that attack them at selected points. Axis Nations Badly Over-Extended . . . In the case of both Germany and Japan it is clear that lines have been too far extended and that resources, in men and material, mater-ial, are insufficient to ward off The third stage opened at Guad- alcanal and El Alamein. The United Unit-ed Nations were able to exert insufficient in-sufficient power to inflict defeat. The process nas continued until today, with every indication that it will be accelerated greatly in future months and that the day will come when the Axis aggres-sore aggres-sore will be utterly powerless to resist the power thrown against them. Outcome, Not End, of War Is Seen . . . This is the broad outline of the trend of the war to date. The location of battles is not import ant; the result would have been Occurred elsewhere. The future can be read in the past. Regardless of where the decisive de-cisive ana conclusive engagements occur, the result is assured. Our enemies know this as well as we do but their leaders are desperate and they may not be willing to surrender to avoid the death of the same, even if the fighting had men and the destruction of more property. Regardless of how long these outlaw leaders persuade their people peo-ple to continue the war the inexorable inex-orable day will come when the German army, on land, and the attacks that are being delivered in increasing power. Germany, with a far-flung land front, which once reached the Volga Vol-ga river in Russia and extended to the Atlantic ocean in the west, is desperately attempting a readjustment, re-adjustment, designed to reduce its commitments in accord with declining de-clining power. The Japanese, with a sea front extending from Burma, through the East Indies, down to New Guinea, including the Solomons, the Gilbert and Marshall islands, and Wake, are involved in the same process as Germany, although al-though her retreat Is on sea instead in-stead of land. Neither the Japanese nor the Germans are giving up vital areas voluntarily. They' are slowly retiring re-tiring under the pressure of their enemies but neither is risking all-out all-out decisive battle to avoid inevitable inevi-table readjustment. Both nations follow a strategy of conserving strength, as far as possible. They hope to make us pay dearly for small and inconclusive incon-clusive gains and to bring about something like a stalemate in the war, without - suffering annihilation annihila-tion of their fighting power. Identical Strategic Elements . . . While the, war in the Pacific is a sea-air struggle and that in Europe is a land-air contest the essential strategic elements are identical producing the same results re-sults from the same causes. Striking suddenly, after careful preparation, both nations took advantage ad-vantage of the weakness of their enemies. They brushed their foes aside without much trouble and seized vast areas for their exploitation exploi-tation and control. Gradually, however, they found their enemies growing stronger. The easy advances met stronger resistance, then every gain was paid for and finally there was not significant progress, either in the destruction of their antagonists or the accomplishment of their great aggressions. ' |