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Show most non-existent for days. There were hints of a stronger German Ger-man defensive line, some thirty to sixty miles from the coast. What do these things mean? They could indicate definite enemy en-emy weakness or a deliberate de-fens de-fens policy, including plans to halt our forces further inland, out of range of supporting naval guns. This is unlikely to succeed because our advance will depend in large measure upon artillery, which will be available to blast enemy positions posi-tions when the advance into the interior (jets underway. to isolate and capture the port of Cherbourg. Represents Only the Beginning j The reader should understand that occupation of the entire peninsula, pen-insula, including Cherbourg, is only the first step in the major purpose of the cross-channel invasion. in-vasion. The Allied armies are now deploying for heavier blows against the Germans, which cannot can-not be delivered without adequate bases. Some surprises of the Normandy Norman-dy campaign are unexplained. While shore defenses were formidable formid-able there was no impregnable Atlantic wall. No luftwaffe smashed at the channel crossing or the beachhead landings. There were no secret weapons to blast our soldiers. In short, the Germans Ger-mans exhibited none of the super-defense super-defense that Nazi propagandists have boasted would stop the invasion in-vasion in its tracks. Strange Developments Reported Moreover, some strange reports from the battlefields require analysis. an-alysis. German mechanized divisions di-visions were using old French tanks, Tiger tanks were assigned defensive roles, reserves were thrown into battle piecemeal and at places the enemy seemed to lack adequate artillery support. In the air German planes were al- 4 FORWARD ; MARCH J By n. S. Sims, Jr. i --Xj-TjJJ. ' ' " " " ' ' ' ' - ctRIKIX rOWKR OK AI.I.1KD m V KVHIKNT AS NAZI W PKKKNSKS KAIL ON' NOSJIAN Cj BK.U'HKS - The invasion of Normandy de-J de-J n,eg the high praise bestowed upon it ry Marshal Joseph Stalin, of Russia, who declivres that "the history of war does not know any , ' such undertaking: so broad in con-1 con-1 ception, so grandiose in scale, and so masterly in execution." nglo-American forces assaulted' assault-ed' fixed defenses, prepared by the enemy during several years, and they crossed more than a hundred ) miles of the English Channel to get at the enemy. There is noth-L noth-L ing to equal the feat in the record u' of military history. Warships And Aircraft Help While the enemy had the ad-vantage ad-vantage of fortified beachheads 5 and a fixed defense zone these were overcome by absolute control con-trol of the sea and the air. Not only did the Allied navies trans- port the bulk of the ground forces forc-es but warships offset shore batteries bat-teries and gave the support of - their big guns to land operations that would have been doomed to 4 failure without artillery support. The sudden descent of our airborne air-borne divisions, transpoted above coastal defenses, paralyzed the enemy's secondary zone and prevented pre-vented sudden counterattacks along the beachheads. Aircraft pounded enemy positions everywhere every-where and broke up attempts to move troops and supplies into the battle zone. Infantry Fights Bloody Battles There was bitter fighting be- tween ground forces, however, despite de-spite all the support that aircraft and warships could offer. In the last analysis, infantrymen had to storm strongpoints and rout enemy en-emy units. Air-borne soldiers, often isolated, fought sternly against superior forces. Losses were in svi table but apparently not excessive considering the nature of the operation. Complete coordination between planes, ships and men enabled the invaders to seize and hold and ample bridgehead by the end of the first week of fighting. Vicious Vici-ous counterattacks by the Germans Ger-mans slowed down but did not check the gradual advance across the Norman peninsula, designed |