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Show CADORNA'S FALL. Reorganization of the Roman army seems to have had a strengthening effort. ef-fort. Although the Italians boasted that" theirs was the only army -which had retained its thief coniander from the beginning, that commander has vir- t n a 11 v been deposed to make wav for 1 , the allied council ol three generals. La-dorna La-dorna is associated on this council with one French and one English general. It will be recalled that Premier Lloyd George recently said that the alignment al-ignment of Cadorna's forces beyond the Isonzo had beeu criticised by Italy's allies. Presumably one of the critics was General Foirh. who broke the German Ger-man line on the Ma me and forced the retreat to the Aisne. Some mouths ago he visited the entire Isonzo front, carefully inspecting the disposition of the troops, and made a report to his government. It is probable that it was he who pointed out the weakness in the Italian line and suggested changes which Cadorna did not see fit to follow. "What the weakness was is shown in Premier Clemenceau '& newspaper, L "Homme Knchaiuc. It is signed by :''XXX." who may be the premier him-! him-! self. The writer says; j '"Without touching the question of I treason always an easy, but often j shortsighted, explanation of disas- : ter let us consider the military s- j pect of tho Italian situation. To bejziu with, the principal error of I the Italian high comma nd-alone sufficient to bring about the ca-i ca-i tastrophe was the faulty disposi-i disposi-i tion of its armies. The second I army, after crossing the Isonzo. was drawn v.yi laving borthward on the j high mountain? of Mzli. Monte j Xero. and Yricb. without having reached the crests, which were still j in possession of the enemy. The j third army, on the other hand, had conquered the i-rests and held J Cucco. Monte Santo, and Vodice. I 1 1 faecd eastward and had ad- vanced across ihe Eainsizza plateau ! toward Laibn'd;. P-it between these I two armies the Anstrians tdill held j a whole sector which formed from ; Toiminu t o Santa Lucia a kind o f i outpoat separating the Italian j iorces. Military critics had already ' drawn a; Lint ion to the danger of ; this situation and pointed out that ' the 'trateH: arraueemeuts of both Italian armies might be thrown into fonfusion by the enemy if the lat-j lat-j tor. holding the intermediate high ground, should decide to attack on both sides with sufficient force?. I That is precisely what happened when the Germans were aole to transfer part of their troops from t .Russia to the Italian Alps. The second error: enind these j armie3, drawn up in so perilous a position, there were at least reserves re-serves ready in case of a surprise. In -May, Iftlti, in the course of the Austrian offensive in the Trentino, ; General Cadorna bad profited by a moment of respite to constitute the fifth army a reserve. It was the intervention of this for-e at the critical moment that forced the enemy to retreat. For reasons that wp are unable to understa nd, this fifth army wn? dissolved one fine ! day. Xot that man-power was j wanting; it wat and still is plenti- i ! ful in Italy. The reserves ot man-. man-. po wer we re n u me rou ? enough to ' f urn i-h othr a rnde? as well. But I 1 the talian ccnraiissimo had always seempri nuwij'ing to keep them nar I ; the front. 'o. when ued came. j they ronld not intervene, and thus ' the rout of the hceond army, fob -j lowed by the beating up and prc-j prc-j eipitate retroat oi' the third, carried evr-.'thin- away. ! This error is eor:rierted with sv-j sv-j oral ethers, all of whbdi are to be I e-piaii;ed by blind confidence in : the solidity of the conquests made. Otherwise, what excuse is there for j the m i 1 . V of making all tho main supply depots at so hort a distance i rom the f ron between Ihonio and the Tagliamentn ? To take th" ra of wheat alone: More than :J'Vh'j0 tons t H us fell into the hands of the t ami-hed enemy. Mow. tori, a re u c to ex'-ne he. eoinplete lack of i nt re rje h m c ti t in view of a possible retreat,, and the fact that, not. a single road of retreat re-treat w ;i prepared, or a finite bridge beyond five obi ones- thrown a- ro-H the Tagliamento ? Tho congest i on pi odiK-rd a lmot from the out-.pt ,bv the. enormous j mas of men and ma t eriaj on the ; r i ' e r b a t i K s , all trying to c o u at j the s.'i ino m nun-ii t . cnst the Italian j army almo.-t, as b;irly as the Mid-i Mid-i den o-h of all 'r " f ;ippl y foii r-en which had to be left to the eneniv, Tho-p x-ho have isite the fn.n front mi;"! h:r.e been tirpri'-ei that, de-pjte all ermr-, fos'tioii- ai Mrong a1' those of the (..er-ond annv . before I'lez.o and Toirnino g;n'e, 1 wav 'so eadiy. The f;,et. is that j even the be-d. fortified po.-iljotiH '. are worth jiit wha.t. hobl-irig hobl-irig 'hem are worth, and the men h :i!ne it in e;n-t pr(ni t ifm to that ! of their Kid'T. i TIht is a terrible i ndi t ment of icn-eral icn-eral ' 'adornn. who, ijnI:I the ratast.rophe, j was ra tci one of the f ; r-f sold iers in L ii rope. Something, howc r-r, n to bo y: id in hi1 def or-e, e hail good f.i-son f.i-son to beiie e Hint, h i h line would hold or, in rn-n of a ree;e, would break po gi ad o;i 1 1 y that, he won Id )ia ve time i to rCfilign hi-, (ro'ipf, im the T gl ia men I o. The w i iter in L ' I Com mo Kucha i nf I'loe not. givf! tf f'icieiit weight lo j 'he eernent r,f tre;ieherv. In nil hi fxpcrie.iiee iif the war tieueial 'admna I had t'fi not hi n g t i tid ia t e that any j of hi;-i arrnb1- would nuil'e f.tjidi n timid ' and ineffi c'uaj -ttand that, made by the Second aimy. lie mav ;e lo blame fr.r f,t ha-.n,; , -, u.'-l the ,,(' C-ermau pr''pae;i'nla m th" b'oman raid-'. Jor lite -i-at ;m i :. J no 1 be ..i,!. . -C-. -i -I- ;:;! .- that work for sucess or defeat,, but treachery within a general's own ranks is the most difficult of all elements to calculate. The result of the weakened morale was the flight of the Second army after a puny jH stance. And so rapid was the flight that Cadorna could not establish es-tablish himself on the Tagliamento. Tt is almost incredible, however, that he should not have constructed a line of trench" es along that river, and yet the writer in Clemenceau 's paper must have more or less accurate information on that subject. On the other hand a single, sin-gle, crossing of the Tagliamento was sufficient to outflank the whole river line. The Germans easily forced the fleeing Uomans of the Second army back beyond the Tagliamento and it would have been impossible for Ca-dowha, Ca-dowha, even if the entire line had been fortified along the lower courses of the stream, to have stopped his 'retreat wheu outflanked. . .1 1 must be conceded, however, that Cadorna s lame has been irreparably injured. Enough of the indictment against him is true to demonstrate that he is not a leader of the class produced on either the British, French or German Ger-man fronts. |