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Show Anti-Fascists in Italy Lack Uniform Program Immediate Circumstances Necessitate Allied Cooperation With King and Badoglio As Leaders of Only Unified Group. By BAUKHAGE News Analyst and Commentator. WXD Service, Union Trust Building Washington, D. C. How can the Allied governments, the Allied armies, sworn to defend the cause of democracy, continue to deal with Italy's Fascist king and Marshal Badoglio and refuse to recognize rec-ognize the anti-Fascist conference of political parties recently organized at a meeting held in Bad, Italy? The so-called "junta of the Committees Com-mittees of Liberation" named following fol-lowing the Bari conference, telegraphed tele-graphed to members of the British house of commons a message which ' contained this passage: "Here Fascism, at first confused and fearful, has taken courage. It has assumed a mask and has rallied around the crown. Affecting a friendship which is too recent to be sincere, it has attempted to distort the judgment of your political and , military officials. Once more oppressing op-pressing our people as it has always al-ways done, it is putting all manner of legal and illegal obstacles in the way of any genuine popular initiative initia-tive which tries to render more efficient effi-cient and serious the contribution of liberated Italy to the war against the Germans." Addressing the Bar! conference, Italian Sen. Benedetto Croce had said: "It is a fact that the waning prestige pres-tige of the king and the lack of confidence in him prevent the king himself from rallying an Italian army; he himself, fearing the opposition oppo-sition against his person, has prohibited pro-hibited the formation of an army of volunteers. Many young men who came to me from German-occupied territory full of enthusiasm were forced to disband, disappointment in their hearts, because they did not find anyone to rally them and give them the opportunity to fight." Those statements seem forthright and fair. After reading them, I was not surprised when a fairly important impor-tant but not "fairly" informed person per-son said to me: "The Allies are lined up with the Fascists in Italy. Is that what we are fighting for?" That seems to me a typical attitude, atti-tude, and one that the average man reflects when he considers the so-called so-called "deals" the American government gov-ernment has made, the arrangement with Darlan in North Africa, for instance. in-stance. Think of the abuse heaped upon the state department in that case the deluge of fiery "liberal" criticism at home and in England, the wrath of De Gaulle and the rest of the French anti-Vichyites. Bitter Reaction And then, when on the tenth of last month it was announced that our famed AMG, the carefully trained, objective military government govern-ment provided by the Allies, who had taken over the civilian adminis- tration of liberated Italy, had turned over the government in these provinces prov-inces from which the Germans had been driven, to the Badoglio government, govern-ment, what a deluge of bitter and cynical comment was hurled at the Allied leaders. Is there any explanation? Can there be any excuse for the United States government, loudly anti-Fascist and violently against all forms of totalitarian government, playing ball with the little king and his satellites satel-lites who danced to the tune of Mussolini? Mus-solini? Well, there is another side but because be-cause of the delicacy of the situation, it cannot be set forth officially. I am permitted to state it without attribution, quoting no source, but assuring you, that to the best of my knowledge and belief, it represents the reasons behind the policy of the Allied leaders. First let me quote from the guarded guard-ed remarks of Winston Churchill before be-fore the house of commons in February: Feb-ruary: "The sanest and safest course for us to follow is to judge all parties and factions dispassionately by the test of their readiness and ability to fight the Germans and thus lighten the burden of Allied troops. This is not a time for ideological preferences prefer-ences for one side or the other, and certainly, we, His Majesty's government, govern-ment, have not indulged ourselves in this way at all." And he might have added, the American government, the American Ameri-can army, is equally uninterested in ideologies. Another point Churchill made should be noted for later comment: "Should we succeed in the present battle and enter Rome as I trust and believe we shall we shall be free to review the whole Italian political po-litical position and we shall do so with many advantages which we do not possess at the present time." One more Churchill quote before I try to present the American viewpoint: view-point: "I should be sorry, however, to see an unsettling change made at a time when the battle is at its climax, cli-max, swaying to and fro. When you have to hold a hot coffee pot, it is better not to break off the handle until you are sure that you can get another equally convenient and serv iceable, or at least that you will find a dishcloth handy." So much for the shadowy outlines of the defense. Let me give you now, from my notebook, in the order in which I took it down, the story as told to me by one "who ought to know." "At the Bari conference, there were a number of parties which seemed to agree, but they failed to offer a concrete program or one that there was any firm guarantee would receive unified support. In war, we cannot guess, we must know. There is no definitely established estab-lished leadership among the anti-Fascists. anti-Fascists. "We know there is no future fot any leadership under the king and Badoglio. But we must operate in the present, not the future. At present, pres-ent, there is but one unified group, small or large, loved or hated as it may be, and that is the government which surrendered to the Allies, under un-der King Victor Emmanuel. Must Be Realists "We have to be realists now, and what is more, military realists. As Churchill said, what the Allies need are Italians ready and able tc fight Germans. Such a group exists. ex-ists. Italians are fighting side bj side with Americans and British. Although the Italian fleet has not been called to action, it surrendered without resistance. The Italian officers offi-cers on duty are still loyal to the symbol (the king) to which thej made their oath. We are perfectly willing, we are anxious, that thej choose a new democratic symbol. But until they do get a new symbol to which the majority of Italians can adhere, we are not going to throw away the old." (Churchill's coffee pot.) So- much for what seems to be the Allies' viewpoint with my added unofficial, but none-the-less I believe, be-lieve, authentic, interpretation. But there is something more that no official offi-cial would dare whisper. It is the problem which the Allies know thej are going to face in every re-occupied country. Italy is a sample. II is something unpleasant but something some-thing we must face. I understand that the Italian people peo-ple in the liberated regions have not been inimical to the Americans. But they are resentful. They are hun gry. They cannot understand whj these strong young soldiers, whe have freed them, do not feed them The trucks go by loaded with munitions muni-tions and supplies. Some food hai been distributed. Not enough. Tc feed all the people would mean halting halt-ing military operations while the Germans made hay in the sunshine of our charity. The present Italian governmem has still some discipline over the people; it is brutal, perhaps, but effective. ef-fective. A new government whict really expressed the people's wil today would have to demand food, would increase the pressure on the Allies for supplies that they cannol spare while they are fighting foi their lives. That is another realistic, real-istic, military reason, for the policy of the Allies. And, unfortunately, that is something some-thing that the Allies can expect tc face as more and more Europear territory is liberated. The liberated people cannot be blamed if resentment resent-ment that they do not receive more, wipes out the gratitude for the modicum modi-cum that military men can spare Armies cannot be idealistic. And armies or governments ai war which support them, cannol worry about ideologies. It is toe bad. But it is likewise only too bue. |