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Show DATA HELPS WIN MASTERY OF AIR "Now, after two years of actual use in combat, we have the proof that we were right, and that the Japanese, who sacrificed so much for climb and maneuverability, were wrong. Fire power and armor helped our American pilots gain command of the Pacific air. General Bissell Describes in j 'Aerosphere' How Facts I Are Compiled. NEW YORK. One of the principal princi-pal reasons for the development of Allied superiority is the effective use of air intelligence or information on how United Nations' planes and those of the enemy function under combat conditions, according to an article by Maj. Gen. Clayton Bissell in "Aerosphere-1943," this aviation year-book's newest edition. General Bissell recently was named assistant assist-ant chief of staff, intelligence division, divi-sion, United States army, after serving serv-ing as assistant chief of staff, intelligence, in-telligence, army air forces. Outlining the application of air Intelligence, General Bissell said: "We must evaluate the enemy's aircraft and his tactics, and compare com-pare them critically with our own. We must collect, correlate and condense con-dense all the available data on enemy en-emy aircraft, aviation equipment and technique, and make it available avail-able to those who design or modify our planes. We could produce planes without this constant check and continuing con-tinuing study, but probably not one that possesses the degree of superiority superi-ority necessary to insure our air crews those advantages in combat so essential to the development of the maximum effectiveness of air , power. Three Sources of Data. "The collection of this vital data Is in some respects the most important impor-tant work done by air intelligence. The greater part of it comes from three principal sources: First, by the thorough and systematic interviewing inter-viewing of combat crews by squadron squad-ron intelligence officers as soon as the crews return from their missions. mis-sions. Second, by thorough investigation investi-gation by 'crash officers' who search out and painstakingly study the design, de-sign, construction and equipment of all enemy planes brought down in territory we control. Third, by actual tests and analysis of captured cap-tured enemy aircraft and aviation material. "By making full use of what we have thus learned, and by exploiting fully United Nations' genius and initiative, ini-tiative, we have so far been able to stay several jumps ahead of the 'Japanese, and at least one jump ahead of the Germans. "Through detailed knowledge of enemy aircraft we were able to discover dis-cover weaknesses in the combat performance per-formance of our aircraft which we could and did correct. An example of this is the now obsolescent P-40 fighter. ' ". P-40 vs. Zero. "In the early months of the war much was heard about the Japanese Zero outperforming this plane. In fact, two conflicting theories in design de-sign were pitted against each other. It was perfectly true the P-40 could, not turn or climb with the Zero. We' had loaded it with guns and ammunition ammu-nition to give it deadly fire power. We had self-sealing tanks. We had ample armor to protect our pilots. "The Japanese built the Zero with lightness as a primary consideration, considera-tion, and sacrificed those characteristics. charac-teristics. We built heavily and ruggedly rug-gedly so the P-40 could take punishment punish-ment no Zero could ever take. We insisted that our fighters not only have superior fire power and defensive defen-sive armor, but that they have also the strength that would permit the pilot to get home after severe battle damage. |