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Show HBimBiFfflIl IPeiPSIliiMsj9- iiii" ' Sttdwpy Dfl tlllae Ao Eo IFo ill T. w W production tn who!. erlnpertprohlbnsdj : My Gen. JoFim . Persuing ' 1 -u-te test that this Is not satisfactory. "I am not discussing the figure of 120,000 men; I am prepared to accept that these men go to the British In May. I am asking to receive the same number of troops In June. There are close to 400,000 Americans in France at present, but only five divisions, or about 125,000 men, can be considered as combatants. That Is not a satisfactory satis-factory proportion." Lord Milner arose, much Incensed In-censed at M. Clemenceau's statement, state-ment, which be considered quite unjust "M. Clemenceau has intimated," he asserted, "that there was something some-thing mysterious about the London agreement I believe that an explanation ex-planation Is necessary. He appears to believe tbat the agreement we signed Is a reversal of the supreme war council's decision. I know only of a Joint note embodying the recommendations rec-ommendations of the military representatives, rep-resentatives, but It Is of no value without the approval of the governments. gov-ernments. "Besides, M. Clemenceau seems to be -under the impression that half of the American troops were to go to France and the other half to England. I do not recollect any such decision. All that General Pershing and I have urged is tbat Infantry and machine gunners Should be sent to France. We bad no Intention of depriving France of any American troops. I do not know that anything has been said regarding their allotment on arrival ar-rival In France. We simply wanted want-ed to hasten their coming." Pershing Upholds Independence. "In making the agreement with Lord Milner," I Interposed, "I had in mind bringing troops as rapidly as possible to meet the existing situation. Lord Milner Is quite cor- flghtlng and has suffered heavy losses. Ail 'available drafts' have been sent to France and we shall send all who are available in May and June, This would be the case even if all the Americans who arrive ar-rive In Europe during these months should be assigned to the British army. "At present certain British divisions divi-sions have been so severely handled han-dled that they cannot be reconstituted. reconsti-tuted. General Focb will remember remem-ber the number." "Yes, ten," Foch answered. "As we cannot again put them In line," Mr. Lloyd George continued, contin-ued, "they must be replaced by new units. The Germans are now fighting with the object of using up our effectives. If they can do this without exhausting their own reserves they will some time deal us a blow which we shall not be able to parry. "In the meantime, I suggest that the decision for the allotment of the American troops for June be taken up when that month arrives. In May, In fact either of our two armies may be hard pressed. That Is the one which should be re-enforced. re-enforced. It Is not desirable now to decide how troops arriving in June should be allotted." Foch Also Cites France's Need. To this, Foch replied: r "It Is undeniable that the British Brit-ish army is now exhausted; so let It receive Immediate re-enforcement tn Mny. But lately the French have had grave losses, notably at Montdldler, and both during the last few days have been fighting shoulder to shoulder. So American aid Is now needed almost as much for France as for Great Britain. Above this question of aid to the French or to the British is aid to the allies. I CHAPTER XXXVII Continued Foch What we need now la Infantry, In-fantry, especially the British, on account of the present crisis. That is why tie supreme war council at Versailles recommended that all tonnage be devoted to that purpose for the time being. I hope tbat America .may aend over as much Infantry ,as possible during the next three months. The other arms to complete your divisions can m come afterward. What do you think of tbat plan? Pershing I cannot commit my-, my-, self to such a proposition. If nothing noth-ing but Infantry and machine gunners gun-ners are brought over, to the total of 300,000, tt will be October or November before the artillery and auxiliary troops could arrive, and we could not foresee the formation of an American army until next spring. Foch I think your calculation Is rather pessimistic for we could begin bringing your other troops In August but without considering that point we can furnish you with artillery and Its personnel and you can have your divisions reconstituted reconsti-tuted beginning with October. What would you propose In this connection? Pershing I think we should limit lim-it the transportation of infantry to May, and that the artillery and auxiliary troops should come in June. They should not arrive more than a month later than the infantry. Under what conditions would you employ the American Infantry In-fantry units? Foch A final decision cannot be made on that subject That will evidently depend upon the degree of Instruction of the units. In the crisis that actually confronts the allied armies it is effectives that we lack. The method of employing these units Is a question to be handled han-dled In due course and according to their elilcicncy. Pershing I would like to have the conditions under which these units are to be employed determined deter-mined now, and to fix the time during dur-ing which the regiments and brigades bri-gades will be used separately. Foch Make your proposition on that subject I then explained the details of the system that was being followed where our divisions were in training train-ing with the French and the plan agreed upon with the British. I added that It was fully understood that If an emergency should arise while our troops were In training they would go Into battle as part 1 of the divisions with which they were serving. Pershing Refuses to Consent General Foch then said: Baker, consented to thla plan. As far as the employment of the units on the front is concerned, the question ques-tion should be decided by General Pershing according to agreement with the commander In chief to whose army they may be attached. Foch Fears Disaster. Pershing I have been discussing this question of training our units for the last eight months, first with General Petain and then with Marshal Mar-shal Halg. The method agreed upon leads naturally to the formation forma-tion of constituted American divisions. divi-sions. General Foch said he wished to see American divisions constituted and an American army formed as large as possible, but the policy he was then advocating would have made It impossible to form an American army without serious delay, de-lay, If ever. Continuing, he sold: "But do not forget that we are In the midst of a hard battle. If we do not take steps to prevent the disaster which Is threatened at present the American army may arrive In France to find the British pushed Into the sea and the French driven back behind the Loire, while it tries In vain to organize on lost battle flplds over the graves of allied al-lied soldiers." He was assured that It was fully understood that If an emergency should arise while our troops were In training with the British or French they would go into the battle bat-tle and do their part I then gave him the number to be shipped during dur-ing May and told blm that It had been agreed between the British and ourselves to consider the question ques-tion for June later. I Informed him that the British shipping authorities au-thorities now thought it would be possible within the next three months to transport to France 750,-000 750,-000 men. Our Troops Surprised. With reference to the German attack at-tack at Selcheprey on the Twenty-sixth Twenty-sixth division the night of April 20-21, mentioned at the beginning of this chapter, that point was the focus of a German raid covering a three-kilometer front extending west from the Bols de Itemieres. It came during a heavy fog and was a complete surprise to our troops, who were considerably outnumbered. out-numbered. Selcheprey was taken by the enemy, but co-operation was re-established throughout the division divi-sion and the original front was recaptured re-captured on the following day. In this affair we lost one officer, 80 enlisted men, killed ; 11 officers, 170 enlisted men, wounded; 30 officers, of-ficers, 211 enlisted men, gassed, and five officers, 1S2 enlisted men, missing and prisoners. rect In stating that there was no agreement as to the allocation of American troops either to the British or French armies. There Is no agreement between my government gov-ernment and anybody else that a single American soldier shall be sent to either the British or French. "There is In existence an agreement agree-ment between Mr. Lloyd George and myself that six divisions should be brought to France. M. Clemenceau Clemen-ceau will remember that I spoke to him about going to London to arrange ar-range for the shipment of American Ameri-can troops to France and that he approved because It would expedite their arrival. I also spoke to General Gen-eral Petain about it." Clemenceau Is Insistent M. Clemenceau remembered my speaking of It but disregarding his previous approval continued hla objections, saying: "I do not doubt the excellence of the method, but in the crisis through which we are passing I return re-turn to the decision of the supreme war council, and I ask you to transport trans-port during May, June and July JaVy infantry and machine-gun units. Will you consent?" Pershing No, I do not consent. I propose for one month to ship nothing but .Infantry and machine-gun machine-gun units, and after that the other arms and service of the rear troops to correspond. Foch If you adopt the plan I propose you would have by July 81 300,000 more American Infantry. Pershing You Bald Just now that you would furnish the artillery, artil-lery, and even artillerymen, which would be Joined with our Infantry to complete 'our divisions. Then why not consent to transport our artillery personnel along with our infantry? Foch I repeat that It Is the infantry in-fantry of which we have the greatest great-est need at this time. I would like to have General Bliss tell us the considerations which led to the decision de-cision taken by the supreme war council at Versailles. Bliss The collective note recommended recom-mended to the United States to send only Infantry antil the supreme su-preme war council ahould give instructions in-structions to the contrary. The government of the United States, in conformity with this note and with the recommendation of Secretary CHAPTER XXXVIII The question of the shipment of American troops and particularly their allotment to the allied armies, had assumed very great importance impor-tance In the minds of the allied leaders. Accordingly a session of the supreme su-preme wsr loiincll was called at Abbeville May 1, 1918, and Premier Pre-mier C'emenceau opened the meeting meet-ing by referring forthwith to the previous recommendation of the council's military representatives f.s to the disposition of American troops. "The military representatives," he began, "expressed the opinion In their Joint note No. 18 that only Infantry and machine-gun units should be sent to France for the present Since then the agreement between Lord Milner and General Pershing, signed at London April 24, 1918, has Intervened. This agreement makes a change. "It had been understood at Versailles Ver-sailles that America would send 120.000 men per month, which the French and English armies would share equally. Under the Mllner-Pershlng Mllner-Pershlng agreement It appears none go to France. The French have not been consulted. We might suppose that In compensation compensa-tion the American troops arriving In June would be given to France. But it now appears they are also to Join the British. I wish to pro- "We have been Informed that nothing had been decided on at Versailles, but something has been decided on at London, and France was closely concerned In this. It was decided that six divisions should go to the British. Well, I will not argue about that. You announce an-nounce to us artillery for the month of June. "Where four are In alliance, two of them cannot act Independently. Nothing has been provided for France In June. "The appointment of General Focb as commander In chief Is not a mere decoration. This post Involves In-volves grave responsibilities; he must meet the present situation ; he must provide for the future. "I accept what has been done for May, but I want to know what is Intended for June." M. Clemenceau said the French had not received certain specialists they bad asked for, and also quoted quot-ed from the conversation I bad held with General Foch with reference ref-erence to sending over troops in May and June. Mr. Lloyd George then said: "I am of M. Clemenceau's opinion. opin-ion. The Interests of the allies are Identical; we must not lose sight of that otherwise the unity of command com-mand has no meaning. We must consider what Is best for the common com-mon cause. "What la the situation today? The British army has bad heavy "We are agreed that the American Ameri-can army Is to re-enforce the British Brit-ish army at once; In June we, too, shall need Infantry and machine-gun machine-gun units. So let us make the agreement for June at once by saying: say-ing: the same shipment of Infantry Infan-try and machine guns as for May. If there Is tonnage available we shall devote it after that, to the elements necessary for filling up the American divisions. I am sure that General Pershing, with his generosity and his breadth of view, will grant the fairness of this view and will extend for June the agreement agree-ment decided upon for May." Whereupon Mr. LloyeV Qeorge gave support to the principle, saying say-ing that British recruits would not be available until August and be understood It was the same for France, when both would be able to furnish their own recrulta. He then asked that the May program be extended over June, in which M. Clemenceau Joined. Pershing Insists on Own Army. In reply, 1 said: "I do not suppose that we are to understand that the American army Is to be entirely at the disposal dis-posal of the French and British commands." M. Clemenceau said that of course this was not the Intention. Continuing, I said: ....... ' "Speaking for my government and myself, I must Insist npon our Intention to have our own army. The principle of unity of command must prevail In our army. It must be complete under Its own command. com-mand. I should like to have a date fixed when this will be realized. I should like to make it clear that all American troops are not to be with the British, as there are five divisions with the French now and there will be two more tn a short time. "As to the extension of the May agreement to June I am not prepared pre-pared to accept it The troops arriving ar-riving In June will not be available avail-able for the front before the end of July or the middle of August So we have the whole month of May ahead before deciding whether an emergency is likely to arise in June. 1 have explained to Lord Milner and General Foch why I do not wish to commit the American army so long in advance. If need be, I shall recommend the extension exten-sion into June. I can see no reason for it now." f CHAPTEft XXXIX "I am commander In chief of the allied armies in France," said Genera Gen-era Foch, "and my appointment has been sanctioned by the signature signa-ture not only of the British and French governments but also by the President of United States Hence, I believe myself In a position posi-tion to Insist "There is a program signed by Lord Milner and General Pershing at London. I ask to be made a party to this arrangement since America has given me the strategic direction of the war, or else I have no reason for holding the position. "So I ask that an agreement be made this evening among Lord Milner, General Pershing and myself, my-self, extending to June what has been decided on for May. "I cannot forget the responsibilities responsibil-ities weighing on me, becsuse of the fact that the allied governments govern-ments have Intrusted to me the direction di-rection of operations In France." (TO BB CONTINUED Iengland.SA " I LOCATION AMERICAN DIVISIONS I .jgllpP V MAY 14,1918 ssisglf fh r Battle line International bdy.-.-.- lrj:-EM K" Bruxelles Numerals indicate Divisions t SSfM k circled numerals those not in Una. li-1-1 'jgF VLIIiei,. O SO IOO MILES nirfmE I t o so too iso kilometers AmiensT X .Quentin Vlikemb?!-0 !eHavre aw- SedanC J sRej (GERMANY srS. q jjn iNeutVhiteau V jT ; fswrrzEmpj |