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Show I I Qeheral Pershinq's ) Storq of the A.E. F. Copyrlctit.mi.la lit aoontrlai hr the North Anwkan Newapaper Alliance. World tfll f!inAr.il rtthte reeerved, iadodui the Scandinavian. VH VJtSnerai Reproduction la whole ec la put prohibited.) , , , . " ' -WNU 6vfc. John J. Pershinq say that there was considerable criticism of some who held prominent promi-nent places. The coalition government govern-ment came In for Its share because of its attitude toward the military high command. I took advantage of t'te opportunity opportu-nity while on the British front to visit the Nordaques area to Inspect the advance elements of the Seventy-seventh division, one of the divisions selected for training with the British. We took luncheon with Brig. Gen. Evan M. Johnson, then temporarily to commnpd, and his staff officers. Be praised the soldierly sol-dierly qualities of the men, hut said they were very much behind In their training. Makes Agreement With Haig. At Sir Douglas' headquarters he and I reached an nnderstnndlng as to the training and administration of our troops that were to be temporarily tem-porarily with the British. In the first place, they were to be allocated allo-cated by regiments to British skeleton skele-ton divisions under such a schedule as might be agreed upon. ' The training stufTs of British divisions were to be at the disposal of these regiments, especially for Instrue- after the completion of 'his program, pro-gram, It was agreed that all the American and British shipping available for the transportation of troops was to be used under such arrangement as would Insure Immediate Im-mediate eld to the allies, and thereafter as fur as possible provide pro-vide other units necessary to complete com-plete the organlratlon of our divisions divi-sions and corps. It was further agreed that the combatant troops mentioned In connection with May shipments should be followed by such services serv-ices of supply and ether contingents contin-gents as we ourselves might consider con-sider necessary, the shipment of a large number of these troops having hav-ing been postponed, and that all these troops should be utilized at my discretion, except that the six divisions which the British were to transport would be trained with them. Washington Makes Concession. Jlcarhing Chnumont, I found that a cablegram dated April 20 had been received, transmitting a memorandum fluted April 19, that had been sent by direction of the President to. the British smbnssa- sound him out regarding the prospects pros-pects of uniting our divisions In a sector of our own. I told him that the secretary of war, when In France, had expressed an earnest desire to hasten the formation of an American army and that this-was this-was also the wish of the President. It was my opinion, I said, that early action would be of greut Importance Im-portance In stimulating the morale of our troops and of our people. Now that the First division was to go Into line the people at borne would expect soon to hear that an American army was engaged on Its own front., I suggested the possibility possi-bility that the corps might be assembled as-sembled near the First division as a beginning. General Foch agreed In principle to the suggestion, but was uncertain uncer-tain when the other divisions could be spared, which I, of course, fully appreciated. He pointed out that the enemy was very aggressive and referred to the severe attack against the British on the Lys between be-tween Lens and Ypres, which began on the 0th and was still In progress. prog-ress. But looking beyond, I insisted insist-ed that the Twenty-sixth and Forty second divisions might be withdrawn with-drawn at any time from quiet sectors, sec-tors, to be followed by the Second and the Thirty-second and also the Third a few days later. I pointed out that this force cf six divisions, Including the First, would equal twelve French divisions, divi-sions, and gave It as my opinion that It would be better to use this American group for active operations opera-tions In quiet sectors and send French divisions to the battle front My understanding after this discussion dis-cussion was very definite that the -.4. v fi.'. The Red Cross Was on the Job. 1 CHAPTER XXXIV Continued "It may be that you would think 1 It advisable to go to London, or I else to Intimate to the President 1 by cable the urgency of Great Brit- 1 aln's putting into, the ranks every I possible man to withstand the pres- I ent German onslaught eyen If I they have to promise to withdraw I thera In six months, and of their 1 doing so without waiting on us or J V. punting on us In the slightest de- 1 gree. There will be few enough I men even with the best we all can 1 do. It Will' be time enough for I Great Britain to consider the de- I fense of England after she bos put I forth -every possible energy on the J continent - Here is the place to I beat Germany; and not on British 1 soli. In writing this I have In mind 1 what you told , me regarding avall- I able men In England." I CHAPTER XXXV I On April 12, 1018. Washington I reported a 140,000 Increase In car-1 car-1 go tonnage by the use of Dutch 1 ships. Infantry and machine gun personnel of four divisions were I promised for that month. 1 The allies were at last thorough- I ly alive to the necessity of an ex-1 ex-1 traordtnary effort to provide ton-1 ton-1 nage for transporting our troops. I After months of delay and discus-1 discus-1 slon they realized fully that the su-1 su-1 periority of forces vitally necessary 1 to avert defeat must come from 1 across the Atlantic. I America had become their sole I rellunce, not only for the forces I necessary Jt4 save them from defeat I but for unlimited financial aid as 1 well. I Mr. Baker's first-hand knowledge I of the situation In France enabled I blm to give a fresh Impetus to the J efforts of the. War department I With Gen. Peyton O. March as I chief of staff, the general staff and the supply-, departments began to exert more energy. The war Industries In-dustries board, reorganized under the leadership of B. M. Baruch, had taken definite control and direction f the nation's Industries "With the sole aim of aiding us to win the war. In the face of the crisis, activity ac-tivity at B'nme had at last replaced the apparent deliberation of our first year In the war. Our hope for an Improvement In methods and a more competent co-ordination of effort ef-fort seemed about to be realized. First Division Moves Up. At Petaln's request the First dl vision was withdraw from the line a near Toul and sent to Chaumont-en-VexIn, northwest of Tarls. to go Into an active sector. I visited the division April 16 to witness the division's di-vision's final - maneuver In open warfore before taking Its place on the front Both oflicers and men were In splendid condition, notwithstanding notwith-standing their long rail Journey, and all were ready for the test of yctual battle. - General Micheler, who commanded command-ed the French Fifth army, to which the First had been assigned, came along to witness the maneuver, and spoke highly of the troops and their efficiency. The weather was clear, but stlU rather sharp. The countryside was radiant with its green meadows and early flowers, and one could not help thinking how different would be those other fields on which this unit was soon to be engaged. Lack of Regular Officers. It Is a comparatively simple matter mat-ter to absorb partly trained recruits re-cruits In veteran organizations, but It Is an enormous and difficult task to create organizations entirely of new material. There was a serious seri-ous lack of regular officers In our organization In both taff and line. The I corps bad only 7 per cent of plan would soon be carried out leaving the exact time and place to be determined. It was Immaterial to me just where It should occur, the point being to get It done. Hard Fighting on tha Lys. The German offensive on the Lys was another formidable effort to break the British line. The attack was made to the north and south of Armentleres on a front of twenty-four miles by twenty-seven German Ger-man divisions. The exhausted British, Brit-ish, though they fought with most commendable courage and skill, were forced again to yield with heavy losses to themselves and the Portuguese, consisting of two divisions, di-visions, who were with thera. , Several French divisions were hurried to the Lys front, but It was a week after the attack began before be-fore they were put Into-the Una They then relieved British divisions at the famous Kemmel bill, only to be surprised and defeated themselves them-selves April 25, much to their chagrin. The battle was practically ended by the last of the month, with a gain by the Germans of ten or twelve miles and the capture of Important territory from the British, Brit-ish, but with failure to take Haze-brouck. Haze-brouck. CHAPTER XXXVI It was always stimulating to one's morale to visit the headquarters headquar-ters of the Canadians, where one soon caught the Hue spirit of that superb body. I made such a visit In the spring of 1918 and talked with their corps commander, Lieut Gen. Sir Arthur Currle; his chief of staff. Major General Weber; his chief of engi neers, Major General Lindsay, and others and had tea with them. The alertness and confidence of these neighbors of ours and the excellent record they bad made and were still making gave us as much gratification as though they had been our own. I remember this vis tlon In the use of the rifle and machine ma-chine gun and the handling of gas. After that, and with the approval of their American division commander, com-mander, the regiments were to be attached to a British division In line, so each of the three battalions of the regiment would have the opportunity op-portunity to serve with one of the three brigades in each British division. di-vision. These battalions were to be commanded by their own officers as a part of the British brigade, while the staff of the American regiment was to be attached to that of the brigade. In the next stage the American regiments, with their three battalions bat-talions united under the regimental commander, were to act as a brigade bri-gade In a British division. The final stage would find the four American regiments of each division divi-sion united as such under Its own oflicers, the artillery being British until the arrival of Its own artillery ar-tillery brigade. In carrying ojit this scheme the tendency at first was for British oflicers actually to assume command com-mand of our units In training. Our officers In most cases permitted this to be done until It was checked by my orders that "American units must be commanded In training by the oflicers and noncommissioned officers who are to command thera in battle," and that American troops would In all cases be commanded com-manded in battle only by Americans. Ameri-cans. Talks Shipping In London. Following a suggestion by Lord Milner, I went to London April 22, 1018, to consider further the shipment ship-ment of American troops. At our first conference there were present Lord Milner and Gen. Sir Henry Wilson, who had succeeded General Robertson as the chief of the general gen-eral staff; Uarbord and myself. The main point of difference that had developed In previous conferences confer-ences as to just bow far the Americans Ameri-cans should be committed to serve dor at Washington In conformity with his approval of note No. IS. In this memorandum the shipment of 120,000 Infantry and machine-gun units per month for four months was conceded, with the understand Ing that their assignment for training train-ing and use should be left to my discretion. It went on to say that the United States, until the situation changed, had no in itIon of departing from as full c. . ii.iance with the recom-mendatlot recom-mendatlot jf the permanent military mili-tary tvpn-sentatlves as the nature of the case would permit This was the first official Information Infor-mation I had received that the administration ad-ministration had agreed to send any specific numbers of Infantry and machine-gun units to France. Lord Reading's Influence. This concession went further than it was necessary to go and much further than I had expectea. Realizing the complications that might arise from commitments so far in the future and the delay In forming an American army that would follow, I did not agree In later discussions at the supreme war council with all that the allies now felt justified In demanding, I was opposed to the action of the supreme war council In assuming the power under any circumstances to dispose of American troops. It was not In any sense a prerogative of the supreme war council. There can be little doubt that Lord Beading received the distinct Impression from President Wilson that Infantry and machine-gun units would be sent to France at the rate of 120,000 men per month for four months, beginning with April. That the President agreed to this "In principle" Is practically certain. It . need not , be further emphasized that such a concession, even though prompted by the most generous Impulse, could only add to the difficulties of our task of building build-ing up an army of our own. It Is nrobable that Lord Readinir. M . HazerucmentiSres Ground gained by German Offensive 6 April ST-26. 1918 9 r eg SQMilea skilled advocate that he was, did more while ambassador at Washington Wash-ington to influence the administration administra-tion to grant allied requests than any other Individual. CHAPTER XXXVII I left London April 25, 1018, and crossed to France In a British destroyer. de-stroyer. Colonel Mott was at Boulogne with a request for me from General Foch to come to Sar-cus. Sar-cus. I learned then that the Twenty-second division, at Selcheprey, had repulsed a severe trench raid on the night of April 20-21, and bad suffered considerable loss. Arriving at General Foch's headquarters head-quarters I found Generals Bliss, Harbord and Weygand already there, and after dinner we entered Into a general discussion about Xmerican troop shipments. The conversation ran as follows: Foch On March 28 you came to offer the services of American troops. I have a vivid recollection of the occasion. As to the American Amer-ican divisions. In what order do you think they should be employed? em-ployed? ? Pershing The order would be the Twenty-sixth, Forty-second. Second. (The First had already been sent to an active front near Amiens.) The regiments of the Thirty-second will be ready by May 1. Foch I do not think they can be used before May 5, but the more we put into the line the better It will be. Your Seventy-seventh division di-vision has arrived, I see. 'What about the Third and Fifth! Pereliing The Infantry of the Third has arrived, and that of the Fifth will soon follow. " (TO BE CONTINUED.) In active operations was again considered. con-sidered. I stated that the main thing was to get our units trained, and that while I was opposed to amalgamation, amalgama-tion, yet If during the period of Infraction In-fraction the units with which they were serving should be attacked or, if another great emergency should arise, of course, our men would go In. Naturally the British wanted unlimited Infantry and machine-gun machine-gun units, but I would consider nothing further than a limited extension ex-tension of the six-division plan. During the conference a cable from Lord Reading to the prime minister was brought forth, which stated that the President bad agreed to the amalgamation of Americans with the British. I had nothing official at hand later than the President's conditional approval ap-proval of Joint note No. 18 of the supreme war council as suggested by Secretary Baker, so I promptly said that It could not be possible that any such concession had been made and that the classes of our troops to be shipped over and their disposition must be left to me. As. a result of these discussions we reached an agreement which provided for the shipment In May by British and American tonnage of the Infantry, machine-gun, engineer and signal troops, together with the various unit headquarters, of six divisions for training with the British Brit-ish army. It was provided that any shipping In excess of the amount required for this number of troops should be utilized to transport the artillery of these divisions; aim-that aim-that such personnel as might be required to build up corps organization organiza-tion should then follow. It being understood that the artillery regiments regi-ments would train with the French and Join their proper divisions when this wns completed. To meet ' any emergency that might require an excess of Infantry officers from the regular army. Less than 1 per cent of all captains of the line In the A. E. F. at that time 4bd been In the service a year, and the thought of possible Immediate activity with such Inexperienced leaders was not reassuring. It was a source of real regret to me not to command the First division di-vision In person, and this, coupled with the fact that Its entry Into the battle was of considerable moment mo-ment led me to speak a word of confidence and encouragement. TCjSJLthe officers, about 900 in all, wefr assembled in the grounds of the chateau occupied as division headquarters they formed a rare group. These splendid-looking men, hardened by the strenuous work of the fall and by two months In winter win-ter trenches, fairly radiated the Spirit of courage and gave promise that America's efforts would prove her sons the equals of their forefathers. fore-fathers. The First division saw Its first major offensive some six weeks later, la-ter, a brilliant counterattack at CantJgny, in the Amiens sector. Tftut afternoon I motored to Sarcus to see General Foch and It with much pleasure and recall the prediction of the Canadians that Americans would soon play an Important part In the war. General Currle deplored the fact that' the British had so easily given up Paschendnele ridge, which the year before be had been told must be taken at all costs and for which .the Canadians mode the tremen-"dous tremen-"dous sacrifice of 16,000 casualties. Calls at British G. H. Q. At the Invitation of Sir Douglas Haig, British commander in chief, I went to the British general bead-quarters bead-quarters April 20 to discuss the training of our troops with the British and study operations In progress. We were always made welcome at British headqunrters. It so bap; pened that on the day of our arrival ar-rival Lord Derby, who had Just been relieved as minister of war by Lord Milner, was there en route to Paris as British ambassador. During Dur-ing dinner the conversation ran along freely, as though we were members of the official family. At length Lord Derby and Sir Douglas drifted to the subject of British politicians. It would betray no confidence to |