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Show KILLING OF MEN IS THE OBJECT. German strategists held General TJ. S. Grant to be a master military pen-lus pen-lus and they studied Grant's methods until ilu .nlopi-d his warfare. Grant, it will be recalled, threw his men into battle regardless of the sac- rifice.s entailed. He kept steadily in view his objective and was ready to p I the price. As a result, he became known as the butcher, Just as the German Ger-man generals today are termed butchers. butch-ers. This kllllnc of men Is spoken of by the rhroniclc of San Francisco as enld-butcherv. and thnt paper reasons: There is no longer opportunity for "brilliancy'' in strategy. War has be-eomi be-eomi a mere matter of brute force, skillfully directed. It is practically an encineerinc proposition in which masses of human bodies are pitted against masses of steel and poisonous passes. The German commanders arp of the opinion that the masses of animated human flesh at their disposal are for the present so much greater than those at the disposal of the allies that th y can endure the losses Incident to continuous attack and still have ar mles left after those of the allies are exhausted It has been demonstrated that in our present state of knowledge' I no artificial barriers can be created I which cannot be demolished by trun ! power. The way, therefore, to advance, Is to first destroy the opposing artificial artifi-cial defenses which cannot be prevented, prevent-ed, and thereupon advance huge masses of men sure to be destroyed by 1 sh-'ll an. I machine guns, to be followed by similar masses whose remnants press on regardless of losses, until j finally the survivors are In such nam - j ber IS to be able to overpower the de fenders. That is the present policy of the German command. It involves! fearful losses of men. The policy of our side Is to yield as ' little ground as possible, to yield it as slowly as possible. a.nd not at all If It I fan be prevented, but at all hazards to have effective armies at the end of the (operation it la not possible against a! i determined enemy to repeat the sur- j nd capture of great armies' by which our Phil war and the Euro I pean war of 1870 were brought to an end. The conflict in Europe is a case ! J of attrition in which, temporarily, the j : enemy has the advantage, which, how-ever how-ever in the end must rest with us. |