| Show SEN ON KURO confiscated HISTORY merciless criticism of men an and d measures which caused the ru russian asian defeat Kuro Huro history of the russo I 1 japanese Japa neso war copyrighted 1907 by the press st petersburg feb 14 general Kuro history of the russo 0 japanese war which was confiscated by the russian government has at last become accessible despite the most extreme precautions to prevent this galling official indictment from f rm reaching the tile public the work Is Js remarkable for its historical value as the closing chapter of the war from the pen of gf the commander in chief and for the hier merciless elless criticism of the men and measures which in Kuro eata e hl mate swept russia and its arav to defeat the work con consists sistR of three bulky volumes respect respectively ivel y devoted to the tide battle of llao liao yang of the sha river and of the mukden the voluminous general statistics reports and other documentary matter with the con clu alons constitute most amazing reve lations of disorganization and incapacity and even of diso disobedience obedience bedi ence of specific c and arg urgent ent orders by certain general e ral officers entrusted with high corn com mands in the field notably general kaulbars Kaul bara against whom a formidable indictment is framed saddling upon him entire responsibility for the de feat at mukden why the war was failure reasons for the failure of the war are based chiefly on oil a comparison of the warlike spirit of the japanese their preparedness and valor which he says had bad never been seen in any previous war and their ability to maintain the numerical superiority perio perfo rity necessary to assume the offensive with the disadvantages of russia owing to the inadequacy of the single track railroad from europe with commanding off officers leers disobeying orders and in a hopeless hofele state of confusion n and cross purposes with a low state of morals a and purposes d confide confidence pee among the troops and continuous news from home of internal trout troubles les and of insults and reproaches against the army the general pathetically concludes that wat it if russia had been united and ready to make the sacrifices necessary ri to safeguard her dignity and integrity the valiant russian army would have striven till the foe was subdued 1 the mukden volume opens with a sketch of the early events of the war sli growing owing that there were divided counsels from the outset over the defense of port arthur during the earlier period of the campaign the general wrote the emperor our chief task must be not to permit our troops to be beaten in detail but gradually to strengthen them and to prepare ourselves for an advance we must begin it sufficient force and not until we have all the necessaries for an uninterrupted advance during a comparatively long time 1 1 russian army deficiencies kuropatkin shows how his efforts to realize this tills were checkmated check mated by tho deficiencies of the arav army and the lack of or I 1 transport and artil artillery lerv horses dwelling on the details deball given in order to show the utter inadequacy of the manchurian army to cope with the situation kuropatkin admits that had gen kuroki gra grasped sped a critical position on oil the russian east front which fortunately tuna tely for us he did not he could have seized liao yang as early as the beginning of june kuropatkin says that in reviewing t the ha russian troops he noticed the sig ant lack of strength especially in officers among the reservists ninny many of whom were old and the majority heavy clumsy or undersized the company commanders did not know their men and among them were many who bad just been appointed to commands and were quite unfit for their posts so constituted the tenth corps from which so much was expected met successive defeats and fell far short of justifying the expectations which we had the right to entertain of famous old regiments of the russian army I 1 the narrative is a dismal retrospect of disorganization and cross purposes regarding the general causes of the retreat of the manchurian army kuropatkin ro in reporting to the emperor summed up as follows japanese preparedness the preponderance of the japanese forces their incomparably better prepared pa redness nesa tor for action in a mountainous country and in hot weather greater youth lighter equipment and plentiful mountain artil artillery lezy and pack trains ex extreme redic patriotic spirit energetic and capable officers and finally the insufficient warlike spirit of our own troops in consequence of the obscurity surrounding the objects and I 1 causes of the war gen Bild erlings tactics at llao liao yang arc are severely criticised criticized hia his troops are described as raw encee and untrustworthy and they met with con constant stant f failure a gen orloffe Orl offs force fored of men simply bolted the field in wild bisot der and a splendid position was lost what was lacking throughout the fighting at Lla oyang Kuro kuropatkin says was greater effort on the part of the troops and more capable handling bandling by their leaders the dangers and disadvantages of the retreat from Lla Lia oyang to mukden are pointed out when the troops got among the high hills they lost their heads beads and gave way to panic the russian position at mukden lie be saya gays offered extremely sailous detects defects why not a success the indecisive result of the battle of the sha river Is acou nied ted for thus first Fl laok of skill displayed by the I 1 eastern army chief in handling thel th elarge alge force entrusted to him second absence of a firm handling of their troops oops by the leaders of the western detachments third unsuccessful tactics and lack of energy of the tenth army larmy corpa corps corAn commander iander who retired u unnecessarily from the left ban bank bof of the sha river without eyen warning his neighbor tho commander of the first army corps fourth unsuccessful operation cf ef t commander of the thirty first infantry Ji vision who several times retired his troops fifth insufficient firmness of many troops who left their ranks under the pa pretext tk at of carrying wounded to the rear rear or without any pretext I 1 sixth lack of operation cooperation co of the unita of the sixth Si siberian beilan corps during the fights on the sha river 11 I 1 I 1 I 1 the s senior alor commanders ihor and Bil derling were responsible ollif ohly I 1 for independently the irown tasks and acted entirely regarding the capabilities of the tile trans siberian railroad kuropatkin declares altho although aig li the minister of war reported that it could carry twelve pairs of trains dally daily this number wa not reached lip tip to the end of the war blames Grip griepenberg I 1 after the fall all of port arthur kuropatkin describes his plan for a great turning movement and the blame foi its failure was thrown on general it Is regrettable says kuropat kin hin that a fortnight before the commencement men cement of our advance tha chances cliance of success were overturned by certain orders of Gripper griepenberg Grip iberg which revealed to the enemy the nu nh ture of our intended movement concerning the revise at Sande pu kuropatkin says it was impossible that it could havo have ende ended q otherwise in view of the abao lute luta 1 of the attack thee the environs n and fortifications of that village had been studied and no sketches of the ground had been prepared for the tile troops As a result the artillery fired for a whole day against w Bait Balt aize instead of Sande pu tho the fourteenth division attacked baota dze west of Sande pu and having occupied that village the commander thought he was occupying Sande pu and so reported to me Sande Pus outer wall was even mistaken by the fourteenth division for the redoubt inside of Sande pu and not supposing itself strong enough to take this redoubt the dIvi division gion returned to its former position Stac kelberger noticing that san deau was not taken in spite of the order twice given by kiy Grip griepenberg to I 1 stop the advance did not find it possible to obey aik and after a very verv hard battle coq tock k the greater part of san deau toward the evening but at dawn he was attacked by superior forces and forced to retire continuing his description tion and criticisms of the operations kuropatkin again com complained plaine of griepenberg Grip for failing to report and confer with him at the critical juncture though he had been telephoned to his command adding however personally grip could not take me on account of his big deafness cause of failure thus ended our first attempt to adopt the offensive it cost about men of the causes of the failure of the chief was of course negligence in falling failing seriously to prepare for storming Sande pu 4 indicating an absence of deserved d respect for ou resource resourceful eaul enemy such disregard to fo the enemy wag was noticeable throughout the whole war on the part of the almost all of the higher officers on their arrival at the front but after the first collision this contempt was unfortunately changed into almost equally equably extreme oer oer estimate showing absence of proper communication muni cation between 5 the commander of the array and the various corps kuropatkin declares portions of the fifteenth division retired without permission and without awaiting the enemas attack griepenberg Grip later reported that he was ill III and left for st petersburg his proceeding saya says kuropatkin Kuropat kirt set a most deplorable example both hot to those under him and to the other armies and was wa calculated to undermine discipline his expressed opinion that the campaign campain might lie ie considered lost lo stand and that a retreat first to mukden and then to haralz harbin wai was necessary produced dangerous bewilderment in the minds of the more fainthearted faint hearted regarding Aluk mukden den kuropatkin says quick measures were necessary to save the city and its defense was entrusted to general Naul kaulbars Ka bars 1 I again he be says insisted on speedy action and gave kaulbars full freedom in carrying out this 0 order kaulbars did not carry it out giving as an excuse the non arrival of troops I 1 how Kaul kaulbars barg ailed failed to stop general victorious advance is related with much detail and constitutes in itself a vivid recital of the blunders cross purposes incapacity and consequent disaster kaulbars Is directly accused of failure to carry out his instructions and of fatal inactivity in defiance of urgent reiterated orders at crucial periods of the conflict the manner in which kaulbars directed the operations of his cavalry was ineffective and unhappy kuro kur says his unfortunate choice of off officers leers resul resulted ed in n operations which were unskillful and marked by lack of devotion the cavalry under gen drekoff and two forces under elcho t and general lof in disobedience to specific orders operated against oku instead of against nogi there wag was no combination and most of the tile detachments ot of cavalry remained ren inactive and refused to to separate themselves from the infantry the second admy infantry ordered to advance advance rs remained entirely fassl passive ve and made no attempt to challenge the enemy tha cavalry aleo did lid nothing 9 kaulbars was ordered ona february to ascertain the precise strength of the enemy the of their movements and intentions these orders frequently were repeated but bia not paid the commander consequently was wag forced to make his decisions hastily on false and incon incont information kaulbars Kaul bara as assigns signet i i to arresting n noels turning movement acted epoxy erroneous information and devoted all lits time and attention to the movement of kiis army on oil the west brodt front mistaking it for army conclusions declare that kaulbars Kaul barq in spite of the commander ln in celere orders to attack re gained inactive ands anddie did not even biell know the disposition of his own troops the next day kaulbars Kaul kaulbars pars again I 1 made no move and disregarded orders energetically to attack the left le wing details ot 0 forces at Kaut kaumars Kau bars ilia MR dosal are tabulated and it is to shown that down to february 25 thirty five bat battalions never went into action allo v the Japa nefie were uc cess fully carrying ona on a turning m movement M before theli very ey eyes s at this time kuropatkin con coil the commander in chief ordered kaulbars TO 0 o send all troops possible to the right bank of the tile rive he did exactly the contrary movin moving two regiments over to the left bank we could have concentrated more than battalions and thrown then against noff aul kaulbars barr not only ris obeyed the order to throw troop troops across the river bilt having loat lost days he went soa far in allowing the tha turning movement that on february 22 part of his force was still operating not against bogl but against okus left wing the loss of time tiffie and the weakness of force opposed to bogl constitute the entire explanation of our mukden failure |
