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Show News rjx BehindM By PaulMallon Released by Western Newspaper Union. AMERICAN REPRESENTATIVES FOR F.D.R. PEACE PLAN SAN FRANCISCO, CALIF. Mr. Truman called in privately most of the American delegation to this world conference soon after he took office (several days before the announced an-nounced conference.) He told them they had their instructions in-structions from Mr. Roosevelt and he did not wish to change those instructions in any particular. His words implied that while he could not go with them, he would hold them responsible for following every ev-ery detail of the Roosevelt plan. The plan, of course, has not been made public, any more than was this Truman warning, but it can be outlined upon the highest living authority au-thority as running along this following follow-ing line: We must not fail to establish the Dumbarton League of the United Nations, no matter what its defects, or the limitations placed upon our program. We must do this because our first duty is to do everything possible pos-sible to see that war cannot happen again. The next war would destroy civilization. No matter what we think the best answer to peace is, we must come out of this meeting with a final formula for-mula for international relationships. To do this we must give and take, but essentially we must make a beginning be-ginning toward peace. WE CANNOT FAIL. We have taken two or three big initial steps (Atlantic charter, Dumbarton, Dum-barton, Livadia) and we are now ready for the next. We must succeed suc-ceed in this one. We cannot afford to fail. We cannot stick it out for perfection. We must make some start, whatever it is. This is the explanation behind all recent Roosevelt - Truman international inter-national policy developments as well as the official background tone and guide for the conference. In my opinion, there was a time a few weeks back when the late Mr. Roosevelt and his State Secretary Stettinius may have had their doubts about going ahead. Their inability to gain their most important objectives for small nations and full democratic freedoms universally may well have disappointed them, and at that time there was a chance this conference might have been called off. Evidently they decided in favor of the above outlined course, and since then after direct request. Britain Brit-ain changed its mind and sent its Foreign Minister Eden and Stalin changed and sent the equally ranking rank-ing Molotov. This conference, in accordance accord-ance with these objectives, is to be thrown wide open. It is to be a free forum for airing the causes of the little people primarily. pri-marily. Officially, Mr. Stettinius has been saying it will last four or five weeks, but is more likely to last a couple of months. Discussion pf everything is to be allowed. Every nation will be invited in-vited to say all it wishes. The Dumbarton Oaks setup is to be thrown literally upon the table, as if to say to all: "Here it is; go to it." Any hope that such a program can be concluded in four or five weeks is therefore, concededly optimistic. op-timistic. In the end, if there are "not too many changes" in the Dumbarton proposal, the conference will be judged by this government to have been a success. ALTERNATIVE TO PLAN Now some authorities may well differ with these fundamental conclusions con-clusions of the government. The alternative to Dumbarton Oaks is not necessarily chaos or another world war. Rather it is bi-lateral agreements or hemisphere defense or spheres of influence maintained by individual understandings and alliances and substitute courses for peace. These do not necessarily require re-quire wars, or make them any more likely, than a weak or impractical im-practical formula for a league, containing, as this one does, the right of big nations to veto any interference with their own wars and no disarmament. It is unreasonable to say that unless un-less any specific course is followed there will be another world war, or, as the emotional extremist Mr Wallace, to contend that anyone who is against his tariff views is "advocating "ad-vocating another world war." Russia's excuse for at first deciding de-ciding to send an inferior ranking diplomat to this world conference was never made public, but it was pas?ed privately and officially to ! Mr. Roosevelt and Mr. Stettinius. i ! The Kremlin pointed out to them I that Molotov was not only the for- ' eipn minister in the Soviet setup but the second man of the Stalin , government. Stalin said he could not spare Molotov from his side , for so long a period just at the 1 critical time of victory in Euror?. i and because his government is des- I perately shorthanded on diplomats. |