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Show in the German defeat were: " 7 !!ST "1, Failure to Invade England. "2. The Campaign of 1941 in the Soviet Union. "3. Stalingrad. "4. Invasion of North Africa. "5. The invasion of France. "6. The Ardennes Counterattack. "7. The Crossing of the Rhine. Comment follows each of these divisions. He gives an estimate of Japan's plan for the accomplishment ac-complishment of her objectives. "On August 6, 1945, the entire world learned that atomic power had been harnessed." "The world does not seriously regard the desires of the weak. Weakness presents too great a temptation temp-tation to the strong, particularly to the bully who schemes for wealth and power." He takes up each campaign in a strictly military point of view, follows each with the major battles, covering "The Strategic Concept" as laid out by the Allies to be accomplished in fullest cooperation, and then takes the phases of the war, first in Italy and then against Germany, and briefly reviews the unfolding un-folding of that plan, to the knockout; and with Japan the same way, from The Burma Road, to the Final Victory. . We have re-read the volume several times, and endeavored to fix the material in memory. It is very .valuable, authoritative, and such a book as one should study. It is placed in our library for reference. refer-ence. After the military material is stated, General Marshall Mar-shall speaks of Our Weapons, giving a comparison of ours with those of the Germans, and drawing advantage ad-vantage we possessed in more of the automatic and rapid fire smallarms, but superiority in some of the heavy German tanks, noting that theirs were built in their own land, but ours had to be taken there in shipping, hence smaller. He praises the men of our armies, and gives them full credit for their share in Allied success. Then follows a final chapter on For the Common Defense, in which he forecasts what war may hereafter here-after be, and the role of each kind of weapon, with special stress that our nation never be caught weak again. He points out the need for universal military training, and with effect. "The training program would be according to the standards which have made the American soldier in this war the equal of the finest fighting men. It would be kept abreast of technical developments and the resulting modifications modifica-tions of tactics." He wants research to be maintained main-tained at the very highest level, so that no nation will secure advantages which we have not developed devel-oped in equal measure. We must have a position of complete defense, in training, in technology, in research, for in no other way can the United States keep itself ready for any emergency. There is much food for thought given. OFFICIAL REPORT OF THE WAR By General Mars'aall General George Marshall, Chief of Staff of the U. S. Army made his biennial report to the Secretary of State, embracing the period from July, 1943 to July 1, 1945. A copy of this report was sent to all newspapers, news-papers, with privilege of quoting from it. "Never was the strength of Amercan democracy so evident. And never it seems to me, has it been so imperative that we give thorough and practical consideration to the development of a means to provide pro-vide a reasonable guarantee from the horrors and colossal waste of war as well as security for that freedom we recently left to the hazard of mere hope or chance. "In the black days of 1942 when the Japanese conquered con-quered all of Malaysia, occupied Burma and threatened threat-ened India, while the German armies approached the Volga, Germany and Japan came so close to complete domination of the world that we do not yet realize how thin the thread of Allied survival had been stretched. "In good conscience this nation can take little credit for its part in staving off disaster in those critical crit-ical days. It is certain that the refusal of the British and Russian peoples to accept what appeared to be inevitable defeat was the great factor in the salvage of our civilization." Then he speaks of the lack of overall ov-erall policy of the Axis, internal bickerings and the rise of Hitler's power caused by his quick conquests, and reviews Italy, Japan and Germany. . . "Here were three criminal nations eager for loot and seeking seek-ing greedily to advance their own self-interest by war, yet unable to agree on a strategic over-all plan for accomplishing a common objective. The steps |