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Show i AMERICA'S WAR AIMS AND PEACE TERMS Kb', SH-: fafti WUMMtubm B '. came from Germany,, at tie close ef B 4, the?year 116, at a Urn whea, la V Owmit'i eyes, victory for kr Rt ''.. ay wu already at head, la the west K the knit had ao mora thai. held ,tM, &; , , " f.iTM; wl,ll 1 the -t U' Hl 'f . Central Powers had gala the aM py '; of TarW ad Bulgaria, had erar- M':' 4roa IJoJaad, Jtarbla, Xovasaalei.eaa LV ""had iaflletl serious rmtM aaea Bk ' -(irtoiK a"'" MesoaeteaMe. The p ItaUaaa; pare advaaeing . 'l..'.tte 'mVai el4 a f, '(iWii.aliuW,,kt4at $t 'Wlwa'ysars Ww.elag.'.IM k'T vrtaatitaaeiji Jha. $raitB , Javew- H'V tfce'erfVshe TADftHRDLtTCMT B tjdaat that K tie Allies accepted the jA. oKer aha could get what aha waated sMfwr' "M if y reraMd " " e0Bl Hp?(v' juade te -appear that they vera re- HpP epoaelble far prolonging the conflict. jP' MBA!t jjfOTB OF DB. Kvj taiaMm it, itt H(P' , ThiLMfar waa contalnei la a aote Bbbsb , I' -Js')- K . dated December 12, 1016, and for- K' .. warded to the belligerents through Bfy the neutral powers, Spain, Swltzer- H, slaad and the United States. The $fp" esseatal paragraph of the note, la as pf ' follows: Hfe.,, "0ur lm mo not to shatter nor fo, . annihilate our adversaries In aptie MC . , of our consciousness of cur military BpW ' "nd .eoaomloatrengUivaBd our rea- f eiaess to continue the war (which LbhP ,ored upoa 5B) ' tB Dlt" 1& tw eBd " eeeaaary; at the seme M m , tlrge prompted by the dculre to avoid H, ' further aloodahad And make an end Bfe' o' the atrocltlea of war, the four al- aK'.A,' lied. (Central) Powers .propose to IeaUr. forthwith lata aeaa aafaila-tleaa" aafaila-tleaa" Oa what tanas Oeraaanr was raady at this tifiia to eater late pease Is aot kaawa. la respect to this pelat, the aote said aethlsf except that "Tha propeeltloas whlsa) taaf: (the onr Ceatral Powers) brlag forward for each anetlatlea, and whlea have for their esjeet ajtaar-aiiee ajtaar-aiiee of tha-asdtUaee, of the hoaor, asjf afftrlaftaaaf e-atre seat 'af itsWta Oefctrei) 'awtleis aw , asieiwlag '.eaair ?flrm -lkr, apareKW iterate ifar;'4aa 'ettaaHsa-aaaat 'ettaaHsa-aaaat af laatls aaas" t ' 'tfjpwmf'jf ssjbjtp7 B9spV, HW Wbbbjbbbbbj patsafsi,afMtyto-'Haa' Poa, iNs aiata warrexfraaaadiMifelsaws: Jaiaar MjaafrylMiaaiawar.iaf 4af eaM .aaUaX aar aassuJas, .whleav atm at fcr dsstraetlea. the fights $ w mpff 'ft? w ? AJgja J-jJ ;'&fB4 tW AaWaVaaiBr UHW;ff.fflF f RF'Hff 'V1, raw. .7 ;,fcf WWlWljfcW Mr latallae- a'a;;aa .eaergln la paaee-'sMjpstliioa' paaee-'sMjpstliioa' ad oa equal' foot-j las; wttk' other aatleas." I Such aa, offer, clearly, eould hare been, 3iade only by those who felt ' that they had the upper hand. It1 was not an offer of terms, but an of-' fer to stop the war on condlllon that the alll)s should "signify a willing-nees willing-nees fo adept such terras as Germany might propose . For the Entente to, have accepted the offer of a peace conference under the circumstances' would hare been equivalent to aa '"unconditional surreder" to Germany. Ger-many. , REPLY OF TIIK AliLIRO GOVERNMENTS j So at least the Allied rovernmenta regarded the matter. "The French mlntlster, Brland, denounred the of fer as a ''trap"; and' Premier Lloyd George, rpeaklog la the Hoasa ef . Commons oa December IS, 11, dsr" ekured that "To ester oa the invitation of Germany, Ger-many, preeiatmiag herself Ttetorloas wftheut aay knowledge of .the proposals pro-posals aba iBteads to make, Has a eafefreaee, Is pattlag avr heads lata la-ta a aotee with the reps sad la the haada of tho Germans." Aa to the objects of Great Brltala la the war, he tasted t Uaeola'a ttateaHttt: "Wa aceeWjthe'war far aa ea)eat, a worthy eijaet The war will sad whoa thet;ejeet Is attalaed.'' .Dader Oed Xaeta It will aever sad. aatll that jUme." Mora speaifleaUy, jha stated the terms at breat "Uriuia and her sJlles to be .'$OMlia reetltatloa, falf repara-tleiand repara-tleiand .effective, guarantees.' The . pat . w uui " formal reply to the Qarmaa offer was contained l a joint aeU ,of .all the 'Allied goTerameat, peeember 30, 1111. The AUIm rtfaaed to eeasrder a priteMt-wa,ls,,esspty and Inslacere." They aaeUrea that "no aeaia Is, jcaslble so teag j'lw save 'aet aeeared reaaraUea for vi-olatd vi-olatd ralsj aad UberUer, .tea ree egalUoa of the righto ef aUoaalHy aad'.ef,. (ha free exlateaci of amail states, so long as they have aet brought about aettlemeat ealculated to sad oaee for all forces which have constituted a perpetual meaaee to the nations and to afford, the sonly effective guarantee for the future security of the world." i I The reply of the Allies amounted only to a refusal to entor Into peace negotiations until they had, obtained the objects for which thty went to war. What these .objects, were are state only in the most general terras they would have 'reparation, for injury in-jury done; they Would have security for thetiaelvoa and for small nations against a like offense. PRESIDENT WILSON'S NOTE DBCEMBKft IS, 1B16 I It. was at this stage that President Wilson addressed 'a aote to tho bel- ligereaet aatloas. The note was dated dat-ed Decmber 181916 that la to if I say, six days after the German pre-' posal for a peace conference was. fcv sued;. but the aote had been written,' or at least determined upon; before that date, and the President was jcareful to say that his action was in no way associated with the. overtures over-tures ef the Central Powers. In. his note ihe President pointed out that each aide professed to be fighting a defensive war; that each side professed pro-fessed to he the champion of small nations; each' side profersed to be "ready to consider the formation ol u. Leaguo of nations to ensure peace and Justice throughout th world." Thus the objects for which both 'aides were fighting "state la geaeral 'terms ., . . seem to be Use ( same." The President felt Justified' therefore in asking the belligerent J 'powers irit wbuia not be .possible: 'for them to avow the ''precise ob-J Jects which would, If attained, satis-J fy them and their people," The I President felt Justified In making' this request because the United States was virtually aad directly interested in-terested as the governments -at war" In the "measures 'to be taken to se-cure se-cure the future peace of the world." Oil This note had a double significance, signifi-cance, ltassumed that something more was necessary for assuring "the future peace of the world" than th'o mere negotiation of particular peace treaties between the belligerents; belliger-ents; and It, asserted 'that in this larger question the United States would have something to say. The aote amounted to saying that the war ought (to result, not merely In the. establishment of a satsfactory peace oetween the belligerents, but In.the establishment of new International Interna-tional order, in which all nations would take part " 4 The request of President Wlisoa elicited only a perfunctory reply from the Central Powera. The Allied Al-lied gowrnmenta replied in a point note, date Parla, January 10, 1917 TheyTteclared, "in a general wayj their "whole hearted agreement with (Continued on Page Seven)' AMERICA'S WAR AIMS (Continued from Page Two) the proposal to establish a League of Nations which shall assure peace and Justice throughout the world." In addition, they defined their ob Jects in the war In the following terms: "Their objectf rilt not be made :feaewVbi detail, with ail the equitable equit-able eoiapeasatlon and Indemnities for damhfM suffered, until the hour ot negotiations. But the civilised world knows that they Imply, In all eoakty and In the first Instance, the reatoratea et Belgium, ot Serbia, and of llotnonegro, and the indemnities which aro due them; the evacuation ot the Invaded territories of France, of Ruisla, and ot Roumanla, with Just reiaratienj the reorganisation of Europe, tnaranteed by a atable , settlement, baaed alike upon the prtaclple ot aatleaalltlet, on the tight which all peoples, whether small or great, have to the enjoyment enjoy-ment of full security and free economic econ-omic defelopment, and also upon territorial agreements and interna-i interna-i ' tlonal arrangements so framed m to guarantee land and sea frontiers : against unjustified attacks; the restitution res-titution of provinces or territories wrested in the past from the Allies by tore or against the will ot their populations; the liberation ot Italians, Ital-ians, of Slavs, of Roumanians, of Ciecho-SIovaks from foreign domination; domin-ation; the enfranchisement of populations pop-ulations subject to the blood tyranny ot the Turks; the expulsion from Europe of the Ottoman Empire, de. cldedly alien to Western civilisation, j The Intentions of his "Majesty, the Emperor of Russia, regarding Poland have been clearly Indicated in the. proclamation which he has Just addressed ad-dressed to his armies. It .goes without with-out saying that it the Allies wish to liberate Europe from the brutal eovetousness of Prussian militarism It never has been their design, as has been alleged, to encompass the extermination ot the Oerman peoples and their polltclal disappearance." In requesting the belligerents to declare precisely what they were fighting for, the President had a very definite object In view. He "Srea not, as he said In his note, proposing pro-posing mediation or even peace. He was seeking for Information in order ' that the United States might adopt a i mm awjii ! wise policy In respect to to tho war, The attitude 9t the United States to- , wards he war would depend largely upon what the belligerents were fighting for. The President was se-1 verely criticised at tho tlmo for seeming not to know what tho war was about, for seeming to think that the Issues ot the war wot c in doubt, and that the belligerents were fighting fight-ing for the same ends. It Is no longer long-er necssary to say that tho President knew, better than most men, what the war was about. What he said in big nVte was that "the .alma ot the belligerents, aa stated in general terms, seam to be the tame. He wa not trying to find out what the war was about, but how the belligerents would be willing to end it. The President was looking beyond the war to the peace, and beyond the peace to the measures which mlgbt be taken to make It an enduring one. |