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Show on the misguided campaign which took Philadelphia at the sacrifice of Bur-goyne, Bur-goyne, Washington placed himself between be-tween the British and the capital. He was defeated at Brandywlne, but in spite of that he later attacked at Ger- j mantown and nearly won. It has been said that his plan of action was too good, that it required movements his officers and men were unable to execute. exe-cute. This attack was regarded as another an-other audacity proving that Washington Washing-ton did not know when he was licked and consequently could not be. The battle of Germantown, although lost, had its part, along with Saratoga, in convincing France that In supporting the Americans it might pick or make the winner. Glorious Victories, When Howe withdrew from Philadelphia Phila-delphia to return to New York, Washington Wash-ington undertook to harass and, if possible, pos-sible, Intercept the movement, and at Monmouth he again attacked an enemy which was not hunting trouble at that time or place. The taking of Stony Point by light infantry under General Wayne was an example of military maneuver obviously obvious-ly attractive to the character of Washington Wash-ington as a soldier. It was without powder, and the men who climbed the bluffs in the night knew that the nearest near-est officer would kill anyone who fired a shot. They had nothing but their bayonets. Again, at the taking of redoubts re-doubts No. 9 and No. 10 at Torktown, the French the one, the American light Infantry the other, there was no powder. pow-der. At every opportunity Washington took the aggressive with courage and confidence which disregarded cautious consideration of what he had to hit and of what he had to hit with. When he took command before Boston he had many military lessons of generalship general-ship to learn from experience, but he did not have to acquire courage. That was in his stout heart, and it was the quality which made the Declaration of Independence good. Superb Courage of Washington When Washington took command of the New England troops besieging Boston he assumed responsibility for more men under arms than he had ever seen before. The numbers were embarrassing not only as a problem of direction but as one of organization. He owed his appointment to two things, one the necessity of overcoming overcom-ing the colonial jealousies in New England Eng-land and the other of bringing the South definitely in with the North. Principally for the second reason John Adams opposed the appointment of John Hancock as chief in command and procured the appointment of Colonel Col-onel Washington. Probably at no time was the professional profes-sional soldier's contempt for untrained citizens in arms, for trained bands, militia, and an armed rabble greater than it was before Concord and Bunker Hill In New England, but the attack on the hill taught respect for the Colonials behind earthworks and in entrenchments. However, it went no farther than that. In spite of the inherent defects of the troop organization and supply the New Englanders had done their work well. Their chief, Artemas Ward, and his associates, Heath, Knox, Arnold, Stark, etc., may not have been skilled soldiers, but they were determined and brave, and devotion never reached a higher level of courage than It did in such men as Warren and Prescott. The 17,000 Colonial militiamen whom Colonel Washington found about Boston Bos-ton had taught the British professionals profession-als two costly lessons. Distinguished British generals with a competent force were besieged and uncertain both as to what to do and how to do it. Knew British Weakness. Several things, dictated Washington's subsequent military course. First was his own physical and moral courage. That was his best military equipment It was unhesitating and unfaltering. Second probably, was his experience with British regular troops. He had seen them lose their discipline under terror. It was not a proper indictment of Braddock's regulars that they could not tight the French and Indians as the Virginia riflemen could fight them. The disaster was that they would not obey orders. The third was his distrust dis-trust of minute men, militia, and of undisciplined riflemen. It Is true that men of that type won the principal American successes, as at Oriskany, Bennington, Saratoga, King's Mountain, and Cowpens, but it was Washington's army which kept the pressure on the British points of concentration. con-centration. It was Washington's distinctive characteristic char-acteristic that he would attack. That quality was developed In him as if he had the experience, the genius, and the resources of any one of the great generals of history. He had two plans to throw the British out of Boston. Both were vetoed by his council. Both were amazingly audacious. Both may have been very foolish. One was to attack across the Ice If it became solid enough to permit it. The other was to attack in rowboats. It Is one thing for an untrained general and an untrained command to resist behind cover, but only a man with Washington's Washing-ton's courage would have seriously considered assaulting a fortified city supported by a fleet and held by disciplined disci-plined troops. His Greatest Exploit. When he attacked at Trenton his army had been shattered by its experiences experi-ences at Brooklyn Heights, by Its narrow nar-row escape from the easy-going Howe, by Its retreat across New Jersey, by losses In battle, by desertions, and by the defection of the surrounding countryside. coun-tryside. It Ls true that something had to be done to revive the expiring flume of American resolution and courage, but here was an exploit of pure determination determi-nation and serene heroism which took the fragment of a beaten army across the Delaware to risk an adventure which might have meant the end. Wbeu Howe moved out of New York |