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Show THE CITIZEN 7 TERROR OF 1917 By F. P. Gallagher , for traitors France conprobe with special thoroughness and industry the mysterious period of defeatism' in the spring and summer of 1917. It was a period in which France, because of panic, almost collapsed and investigation has shown that the panic was due to an elaborate system of propaganda which Germany had been able to introduce into France through the instrumentality of a traitorous ring of French officials, journalists and adventurers like Bolo Pasha. The French are still confused by the issue because in it are involved not only political intrigues, but personal and factional feuds growing out of the war. They still suspect that, perhaps some of their highest officials either were traitors or so infected with defeatism as to act almost mechanically as the traitors wanted them to act. Defeatism created a state of mind that weakened the wills even of officials whose loyalty vras without stain. its quest INtinues to ls, . two officials for the conduct of the war were M. Ribot, the premier, and M. Painleve, the minister of war. Since the signing of the armistice M. Painleve has been the target of suspicions and accusations. No official, called upon as he was to remove a commanding general, could have escaped the fiery and poisoned It shafts of factional controversy. was he who dismissed General in May, 1917, after that able soldier had failed to break the German lines in what was known as the offensive of April 16. that time the ATchiefly responsible Ni-vel- le country the elders will the confusion which existed in the public mind for many years regarding the merits of the controversy between the champions of President Lincoln and those of Genour own INremember eral George B. McClellan. That dispute led, even while the war was on, to a defeatist presidential campaign in 1864 with McClellan as the Democratic candidate running on a platform which declared the war a failure. In the heat of the controversy there were unwarranted suspicions and f .. i charges of disloyalty. The French situation of 1917 differed from that of 1864 in the fact that German espionage and propaganda, operating on a scale undreamed of in our civil war, had created in France a complex enginery for the production of panic. And the situation was really so discouraging that, by artificial means, a state of despair caused was throughout civilian France and even among the regiments at' the front. PAINLEVE, the then minister of war has undoubtedly been the victim ot misrepresentations by the supporters of General Nivelle. Departing from the facts and even M changing dates and coloring circumstances they have made out a damagwho ing case against the has not remained silent under fire. Recently he has made a number of statements in his own defense and has been successful in showing that much of the matter used against him is hisex-minist- torically incorrect. But while his statement tend to re- lieve him of personal culpability much of what he says and especially those things which he neglects to say show that his administration was caught in a veritable whirlpool of defeatist intrigue and terrorism. Curiously enough the case made against M. Painleve in France was founded on an article which Wythe Williams, former war correspondent of the New York Times, wrote for Colliers and which appeared in that, publication on January 5, 1918, nearly a year after The Terror of 1917. It purported to give the facts that have never been published facts that are now vital to every American. Translated into French and widely circulated in France, it created the impression that General Nivelle had been on the point of breaking the German lines when the minister of war telephoned him to suepend the offensive. The article declared that the German defence had been crushed and that two reserve armies were waiting to plunge through to victory, but that French politicians intervened to stop the slaughter, thus permitting the enemy to escape. The of 1917 and its sequel which is not yet played to the end it is necessary to get the proper perspective by viewing some of the salient events immediately preceding the breakdown of Nivelles attacks. The terror was not confined to France. It existed in every allied country and notably in administration circles at Washington, where the desire to preserve peace resulted in the most craven maneuvering in the face of Hun threats. In December, 1916, Ambassador Bernstorff had informed Mr. Bryan, (meaning, of course, the United States secretary of state, in an insulting note that inasmuch as neutral countries above all others) had acquiesced in the violations of international law by Great Britain, Germany felt herself free to take whatever measures she saw fit, or words of that significance. It was the forerunner of the proclamation of ruthless submarine warfare. Bryan saw the lightenings Hash along the horizon and made for the cyclone cellar as speedily as possible. Mr. Lansing, his successor, some time in January, sent an amazing note to the allied powers in pursuance of the president's desire to keep this country out of war at all costs. The note said that as privateersmen no longer sailed the seas any merchant TO understand the drama of vessel armed for what was called defense must really be presumed to be armed for offensive purposes and it urged the allies to comply with the German demand that all merchant vessels be disarmed. It was a disgraceful act and would have been humiliating to the last degree had the American people known of it, but the note was not published until many months afterward. marked the most acute stage After panic at Washington. that the people of the United States saw that war must come and terror was replaced by a determination to be prepared for any eventualities. The spirit of the people produced a firmer tone in the administrations communications with the German government, which was warned that if it resumed ruthless submarine operations, war would follow as soon as American interests were affected. THIS WHILE there was deep concern in Britain and France there was no official indication of weakness. The recent peace offer of Germany had been refused in spite of President Wilsons plea that both sides seemed to be fighting for the same things. There was a noble resolve to carry on to the last drop of hearts blood, but in civilian Tanks the threat of unrestricted submarine warfare was viewed with consternation, especially in France. Having decided to prosecute the war without thought of surrender the allied governments saw that they must begin an offensive in France and try to break the power of Germany on land before the kaisers submarines should be able to break the allied power on the seas. There was no telling when American armies could be landed in France and it seemed as if it was essential to crush the foe sped-il- y on land if the allies were to save themselves from defeat. There were many grounds for optimism. Although Germany had defeated Russia and Rumania and although Austria, with the aid of her ally, had rendered Serbia impotent and Italy immobile, it would be months, perhaps a year, before Germany could concentrate her forces on the western front for a great offensive. will be remembered that the IT lied offensives al- began auspiciously. and Messines Vimy ridges had been captured and the enemy compelled to retreat to the Ilindenburg line with the British in pursuit. The allied plan contemplated such unity of action that the French, coordinating their attacks with those of the British, would be able to ruptur9 the prolongation of the Ilindenburg line in the triangle Laon-Soissons-Rheim- s. Soissons and Rheims were in possession of the French. Laon, at the apex of the triangle, was in the hands of the Germans. The French, it was hoped, would be able to pierce the line ,take Laon and points southeast along the prolongation of the Hindenburg line, thus all of the enemy armies facing the British. It was much the same plan as that which Field Marshal Foch carried to success a year later with the aid of 1,500,000 American troops. Then as was the case a year afterward, the al- lies expected that they would be able to drive the Germans back to the Meuse river. i ou'tT-flanki-ng . . . . Wythe Williams story read special pleading for General Nivelle and his faction. There can be little doubt that he obtained some of his information either from the general himself or from the generals apologists. The story exploited a theory rather than a fact. It was based on the supposed fact since successfully disputed that General Nivelle had broken the enemys defense and was about to deal the death blow when the parliamentarians intervened. The truth is that General- Nivelle had overestimated the power of the allied offensive. He had .been deceived by his triumphs at Verdun, where, in a few days, he had wrested from the Germans all the ground they had captured during months of attack. What he had neglected to take into account was the improved enemy method of coping with his style of attack. The allies, having perfected their artillery fire with barrages and having acquired tanks and other potent weapons of offens, had cherished the expectation that the enemy could be overwhelmed by a sudden blow. But the Germans had found the answer improved methods of machine gun fire. THE - is essential to take ITtion elements into considerawhich, wholly, aside from military tactics, contributed to the frustration of the French offensive. So demoralized were the French' in high positions that they distrusted one another. General Nivelle would not impart even to Premier Ribot the plan of attack, reserving the secret for himself and General Haig. On March 13, 1917, almost a month before the offensive, a council of war was held in London. Wythe Williams gets the date wrong he places it in January but he evidently knows the dramatic story of the days proceedings. The meeting was attended by Lloyd George, Bonar Law, General Haig, General Nivelle, Premier Ribot and the French Minister of War Pain4 leve. What took place is revealed, pre- sumably with sufficient precision. After a long discussion the Nivelle (Continued on Page 18.) s |
