| OCR Text |
Show DESERET A3 NEWS, Here's text of President Nixon's Watergate statement W ASHINGTON (AP) Following is the text of President Nixons statement Tuesday on the Watergate scandal: Allegations surrounding the Watergate affair have so escalated that I feel a further statement from the President is required at this time. A climate of sensationalism has developed in which even second or third-hanhearsay charges are headlined as fact and repeated as fact. d Important national security operations which themselves had no connection with Watergate have become entangled in the case. persons who were subject to these wiretaps were determined through coordination among the director of the FBI, my assistant for national security affairs, and the attorney general. Those wiretapped were selected on the basis of access to the information leaked, material in security files, and evidence that developed as the inquiry proceeded. Information thus obtained was made available to senior officials responsible for national security matters in order to curtail further leaks. As a result, some national security information has already been made public through court orders, through the subpoenaing of documents and through testimony witnesses have given in iudicial and congressional proceedings. Other sensitive documents are now threatened with disclosure. A distorted view Continued silence about those operations would compromise rather than protect them, and would also serve to perpetuate a grossly distorted view which recent partial disclosures have given of the nature and purpose of those operations. The three-fold- purpose of this statement is : First, to set forth the facts about my own relationship to the Watergate matter. Second, to place in some perspective some of the more sensational and of the charges that have inaccurate filled the headlines in recent days, and also some of the matters that are currently being discussed in Senate testimony and elsewhere. Third, to draw the distinction between national security operations and the Watergate case. To put the other matters in perspective, it will be necessary to describe the national security operations first. National security matters In citing these national security matters, it is not my intention to place a national security cover on Watergate, but rather to separate them out from Watergate and at the same time to explain the context in which certain actions took place that were later misconstrued or misused. Long before the Watergate break-in- , three important national security operations took place which have subsequently become entangled in the Watergate case. The first operation, begun in 1969, was a program of wiretaps. All were legal, under the authorities then existing. They were undertaken to find and stop serious national security leaks. Intelligence directive The second operation was a reassessment which I ordered in 1970, of the adequacy of internal security measures. This resulted in a plan and a directive to strengthen our intelligence operation. They were protested by Mr. Hoover, and as a result of his protest they were not put into effect. The third operation was the establishment in 1971, of a Special Investigations Unit in the White House. Its primary mission was to plug leaks of vital security information. I also directed this group to prepare an accurate history of certain crucial national security matters which occurred under prior administrations, on which the governments records were incomplete. Here is the background of these three security operations initiated in my Highly secret leaks By my administration had begun a number of highly sensitive foreign policy initiatives. They were aimed at ending the war in Vietnam, achieving a settlement in the Middle East, limiting nuclear arms, and establishing new relationships among the great powers. These involved highly secret diplomacy. They were clostly interrelated. Leaks of secret information about any one could mid-196- endanger all. that News happened. accounts appeared in 1969, which were some of obviously based on leaks them extensive and detailed by people having access to the most highly classified security materials. Exactly There was no way to carry forward these diplomatic initiatives unless further leaks could be prevented. This required finding the source of the leaks. wiretap program In order to do this, a special program of wiretaps was instituted in and terminated in February 1971. Fewer than 20 taps, of varying duration, were involved. The produced important leads that made it possible to tighten the securI authority of highly sensitive materials. ized this entire program. Each individual with tap was undertaken in accordance legal at the time and in Mid-C- 3 mid-196- 9 procedures accord with longstanding precedent. . The The summer of 71 In the spring ad summer of 1970, another security problem reached critical proportions. In March a wave of bombings and explosions struck college campuses and cities. There were 400 bomb threats in one period in New York City. Rioting and violence on college campuses reached a new peak after the Cambodian operation and the tragedies at Kent State and Jackson State. The 1969-7- 0 school year brought nearly 1,800 campus demonstrations, and nearly 250 cases of arson on campus. Many colGun closed. battles between leges guerrilla-styl- e groups and police were taking place. Some of the dissruptive activities were receiving foreign support. Complicating the task of maintaining security was the fact that, in 1966, certain types of undercover FBI operations that had been conducted for many years had been suspended. This also had substantially impaired our ability to collect foreign intelligence information. of events related to the ietnam War, on which the governments records were inadequate, many previous records having been removed with the change of adminAll the government knew, at first, istrations and which bore directly on the was that the papers comprised 47 volnegotiations then in progress. Additional umes and some 7,000 pags, which had assignments included tracing down other been taken from the sensitive files of the national security leaks, including one Departments of State and Defense and that seriously compromised the U.S the CIA, covering military and diplomatnegotiating position in the SALT talks. ic moves in a war that was still going The work of the unit tapered off on. around the end of 1971. The nature of its Moreover, a majority of the docuwork was such that it involved matters ments published with the first three inthat, from a national security standpoint, stallments in The Times had not been were highly sensitive then and remain so raisincluded in the study today ing serious questions about what and These intelligence activities had no how much else might have been taken. with the break-iconnection of the There was every reason to believe this Democratic headquarters, or the after-matwas a of they existed. No senior official of the government had read them or knew with certainty w hat they contained. Relations deteriorate At the same time, the relationships between the FBI and other intelligence agencies had been deteriorating. By May 1970, I met with the director of the FBI (Mr. Hoover), the director of the Central telligence Agency (General Donald V. Helms), the director of the Defense Intelligence Agency (General Donld V. Bennett) and the Director of the National Security Agency (Adm. Noel Gayler). We discussed the urgent need for better intelligence operations. I appointed Director Hoover as chairman of an interagency committee to prepare recommendations. On June 25, the committee submitted a report which included specific options for expanded intelligence operations, and on July 23 the agencies were notified by memorandum of the options approved. After reconsideration, however, prompted by the opposition of Director Hoover, the agencies were notified five days later, on July 28, that the approval had been rescinded. Approval withdrawn approved had resumption of certain intelligence operations which had been suspended in 1966. These in turn had included authorization for surreptitious entry on breaking and entering, in effect specified categories of targets in specified situations related to national securityBecause the approval was withdrawn before it had been implemented, the net result was that the plan for expanded intelligence activities never went into The options initially included effect. The documents spelling out this 1970 plan are extremely sensitive. They inassessand are based upon clude ments of certain foreign intelligence capabilities and procedures, which of course must remain secret. It was this unused plan and related documents that John Dean removed from the White House and placed in a safe deposit box, giving the keys to Judge Sirica. The same plan, still unusued, is being headlined today. Coordination fell short Coordination among out intelligence agencies continued to fall short of our national security needs. In July, 1970, having earlier discontinued the FBIs liaison with the CIA, Director Hoover ended the FBIs normal liaison with all other agencies except the White House. To help remedy this, an Intelligence Evaluation Committee was erected in December 1970. Its members included representatives of the White House, CIA, FBI, NS A, the Departments of Justice, Treasury, and Defense, and the Secret Service. The Intelligence Evaluation Committee and its staff were instructed to improve coordination among the intelligence community and to prepare evaluations and estimates of domestic intelligence. I understand that its activities are now under investigation. I did not authorize nor do 1 have any knowledge of any illegal activity by this Committee. If it went beyond its charter and did engage in any illegal activities, it was totally without my knowledge or authority. The Pentagon Papers On Sunday, June 13, 1971, The New York Times published the first installment of what came to be known as The Pentagon Papers. Not until a few hours before publication did any responsible government official know that they had been stolen. Most officials did not know n secunty leak unprecedented proportions. Compromise feared It created a situation in which the ability of the government to carry on foreign relations even in the best of circumstances could have been severely Other governments no compromised. longer knew whether they could deal with the United States in confidence. I considered it my responsibility to see that the Watergate investigation did not impinge adversely upon the national security area. For example, on April 18th, 1973, when I learned that Mr. Hunt, a former member of the Special Investigations Unit at the White House, was to be questioned by the U.S. Attorney, I directed Assistant Attorney General Pet- - - ment: The Wnite House staff. Attorney General and FBI director were told last year to limi the Watergate investigation to prevent exposure of other covert national security activities. A three-pronge- d program, and a including burglary, wiretapping squad, was auspecial plumbers thorized between 1969 and 1971 to tighten national security. The burglary plan was never implemented on the advice of the late FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover. Hoover cut off normal liaison in 1970 with the CIA and all other government intelligence agencies. The documents which former White House counsel John W. Dean III hid in a safe deposit box in Virginia and later turned over to federal I plumbers. This was a small group at the White House whose principal purpose was to stop security leaks and to investigate other sensitive security matters. I looked to John Ehrlichman for the supervision of this group. Egil Krogh, Mr. Ehrhchmans assistant, was put in charge. David Young was added to this unit, as were E. Howard Hunt and G. Gordon Liddy The unit operated under extremely tight security rules Its existence and functions were known only to a very few persons at the White House. These included Messrs. Haldeman, Ehrlichman and Dean. At about the time the unit was created, Daniel Ellsberg was identified as the person who had given the Pentagon Papers to The New York Times. I told Mr. Krogh that as a matter of first priority, the unit should find out all it could about Mr. EUsbergs associates and his motives. Vital importance Because of the extreme gravity of the situation, and not then knowing what additional national secrets Mr. Ellsberg might disclose, I did impress upon Mr. Krogh the vital importance to the national security of his assignment. I did not authorize and had no knowledge of any illegal means to be used to achieve this goal. However, because of the emphases I put on the crucial importance of protecting the national security, I can understand how highly motivated individuals could have felt justified in engaging in specific activities that I would have disapproved had they been brought to my attention. Consequently, as President, I must and do assume responsibility of such actions despite the fact that I, at no time approved or had knowledge of them. I also assigned the unit a number of other investigatory matters, dealing in part with compiling an accurate record invoked in the Watergate investigation or in testimony involving any other criminal conduct. ersen to pursue every issue involving Watergate but to confine his investigation to Watergate and related matters and to stay out of national security matters. Subsequently, on April 25, 1973, Attorney General Kleindienst informed me that because the government had clear evidence that Mr. Hunt was involved in of the office of the psychiathe break-itrist who had treated Mr. Ellsberg, he, the attorney general, believed that despite the fact that no evidence had been obtained from Hunts acts, a report should nevertheless be made to the court trying the Ellsberg case. I concurred, and directed that the information be transmitted to Judge Byrne immediately. A complete surprise n The burglary and bugging of the .Democratic National Committee headquarters came as a complete surprise to me. I had no inkling that any such illegal activities had been planned by persons associated with my campaign; if I had known; I would not have permitted it. My immediate reaction was that those guilty should be brought to justice and, with the five burglars themselves already in custody, I assumed that they would be. Within a few days, however, I was advised that there was a possibility of CIA involvement in some way. It did seem to me possible that, because of the involvement of former CIA personnel, and because of some of their apparent associations, the investigation, could lead to the uncovering of covert CIA operations totally unrelated to the Watergate break-in- . In addition, by this time, the name of Mr. Hunt had surfaced in connection with Watergate, and I was alerted to the fact that he had previously been a mei ber of the Special Investigations Unit in the White House. Therefore, I was also concerned that the Watergate investigation might well lead to an inquiry into the activities of the Special Investigations Unit itself. maters In this area, I felt it was important to avoid disclosure of the details of the national security matters with which the group was concerned. I knew that once the existence of the group became known, it would lead inexorably to a discussion of these matters, some of which remain, even today, highly sensitive. Thursday. I wanted justice done with regard to Watergate; but in the scale of national priorities with which I had to deal and not at that time having any idea of the extent that tributed to took place, extent that should have , 7, . Z , -- To the extent that I have been able to determine what probably happened in the tangled course of this affair, on the basis of my own recollections and of the conflicting accounts and evidence that I have seen, it would appear that one factor at work was that at critical points n fendants. Sought assurances In the weeks and months that followed Watergate, I asked for, and received, repeated assurances that Mr. Deans own investigation which included reviewing files and sitting in on FBI interviews with White House personnel had cleared everyone then employed by the White House of involvement. various people, each with his own perspective and his own responsibilities, saw the same situation with different eyes and heard the same words with different ears. . ; . ii! Bring out truth What might have seemed insignificant to one seemed significant to another; what one saw in terms of public responsibility, another saw in terms of political opportunity; and mixed through it all, I am sure, was a concern on the part of many that the Watergate scandal should not be allowed to get in the way of what the administration sought to achieve. In summary, then: 1 I had no prior knowledge of the Watergate bugging operation, or of any illegal surveillance activities for political purposes. 2 Long prior to the 1972 campaign, I did set in motica certain international security measures, including legal wiretaps, which I felt were necessary from a national security standpoint and, in the' climate then prevailing, also necessary from a domestic security standpoint. People who had been involved in the national security operations later, without my knowledge or approval, undertook illegal activities in the political campaign of 1972. 3 The truth about Watergate should be in an orderly way, recogbrought out nizing that the safeguards of judicial procedure are designed to find the truth, not to hide the truth. V With his selection of Archibald Cox who served both President Kennedy and President Johnson as solicitor general as the special supervisory prosecutor for matters related to the case, Attorney e Richardson has demonstrated his own determination to see the truth brought out. In this effort he has my full support. Considering the number of persons involved in this case whose testimony might be subject to a claim of executive privilege, I recognize that a clear defini-tio- n of that claim has become central to the effort to arrive at the truth. s f h General-designat- Incorrect suspicions 4 Elements of the early reports led me to suspect, inthat the CIA had been in some correctly, way involved. They also led me to surmise, correctly, that since persons originally recruited for covert national security activities had participated in Watergate, an unrestricted investigation of Watergate might lead to and expose those covert national security operations. 1 sought to prevent the exposure 5 of these covert national security activities, while encouraging those conducting the investigation to pursue their inquiry into the Watergate itself. I so instructed my staff, the Attorney General and the Acting Director of the FBI. te My own recollections -- x . not be invoked as to any testimony con- - 2 ceming possible criminal conduct or dis- -' cussions of possible criminal conduct, in the matters presently under investigation, including the Watergate affair and the alleged cover-up- . I want to emphasize that this statement is limited to my own recollections of what I said and did relating to secur-it-y and to the Watergate. I have specifically avoided any attempt to explain what other parties may have said and done. My own information on those other matters is fragmentary, and to some extent contradictory. Additional informa- tion may be forthcoming of which I am 1 also specifically instructed Mr. 6 Haldeman and Mr. Ehrlichman to ensure that the FBI would not carry its investigation into areas that might compromise these covert national security activities, or those of the CIA. 7 At no time did I authorize or know about any offer of Executive clemency for the Watergate defendants. Neither did I know until the time of my own investigation, of any efforts to provide them with funds. jt 0 : Warning signals With hindsight, it is apparent that I should have given more heed to the warning signals I received along the way p . . r It now appears that there were persons who may have gone bejfend my directives, and sought to expand on my efforts to protect the national security operations in order to cover up any in- volverr.ent they or certain others might have had in Watergate. The extent to which this is true, and who may have " participated and to what degree, are v questions that it would not be proper to address here. The proper forum for settling these matters is in the courts. wide-rangin- g cover-u- I may in any way have con- the climate in which they I did not intent to; to the I failed to prevent them, I been more vigilant. Reforms proposed It was to help ensure against any rep- etition of this in the future that last week I proposed the establishment of a top- level, bipartisan, independent commission to recommend a comprehensive reform of campaign laws and practices. Given the priority I believe it deserves, such reform should be possible before the next Congressional elections in 1974. It now seems that later, through whatever complex of individual motives and possible misunderstandings, there were apparently efforts to limit the investigation or conceal the possibile involvement of member of the administration and the campaign committee. I was not aware of any such efforts at the time. Neither, until after I began my own investigation, was I aware of any fund raising for defendants convicted in the break-iat Democratic headquarters, much less authorize any such fund raising. Nor did I authorize any offer of executive clemency for any of the de- a Watergate : A-- 4 about, today only The Deseret News DO IT MAN and OUR MAN JONES today can be found on page The two popular columns will return to their regular locations on J On July 6, 1972 I telephoned the Acting Director of the FBI, L. Patrick Gray, to congratulate him on his successful handling of the hijacking of a Pacific Southwest Airlines plane the previous day. During the conversation Mr. Gray discussed with me the progress of the Watergate investigation, and I asked him whether he had talked with General Walters. Mr. Gray said that he had, and that General Walters had assured him that the CIA was not involved. In the discussion, Mr. Gray suggested that the matter of Watergate might lead higher. I told him to press ahead with his investigation. Executive privilege will not be Highly sensitive For n cal purposes. Therefore during the week following the Pentagon Papers publication, I approved the creation of a Special Investigations Unit within the White House which later came to be known as the . . Mr. Haldeman n n U.S.-Sovi- It is clear that unethical, as well as illegal, activities took place in the course of that campaign. None of these took place with my spe- cific approval or knowledge. To the v instructed Therefore, and Mr. Ehrlichman to ensure that the not expose investigation of the break-ieither an unrelated covert operation of the Cl4, or the activities of the White House investigations unit and to see that this was personally coordinated between General Walters, the Deputy Director of the CIA, and Mr. Gray of the FBI. It was certainly not my intent nor my wish, that the investigation of the or of related acts be Watergate break-iimpeded in any way. Discussion with Gray court involved the unimplemented burglary plan for national security, not the Watergate plot. People involved in these national security operations later became involved in illegal activities during the 1972 presidential campaign. Early reports led him to believe that the CIA was involved in the buglast June 17 at the ging and break-iCommittee Democratic National headquarters. No one ever was authorized to offer executive clemency to the defendants in the Watergate case. He had no prior knowledge of the Watergate operation or any other ilegal surveillance activities for politi- Against the background of the delicate negotiations the United States was then with involved in on a number of fronts Middle the to China, Vietnam, regard arms nuclear limitations, East, in relations, and others which the utmost degree of confidentiality was vital, it posed a threat so grave as to require extraordinary actions. 1972. Unit should be compromised. Statement highlights Here is a WASHINGTON (UPI) stateNixon's of President summary searching inquiry that has been focused on the campaign waged in my behalf ip extent of political abuse which Watergate I also had to be deeply conreflected cerned with ensuring that neither the covert operations of the CIA nor the operations of the Special Investigations and less to the reassurances. With hindsight, several other things also become clear: With respect to campaign practices, and also with respect to campaign finances, it should now be obvious that no campaign in history has ever been subjected to the kind of intensive and i unaware. It is also my understanding that the information which has been conveyed to me has also become available to those prosecuting these matters. Under such circumstances, it would be prejudicial and unfair of me to lender-- ; my opinions on the activities of others; those judgments must be left to the judicial process, our best hope for achieving the just result that we all seek. As more information is developed, T have no doubt that more questions will be raised. To the extent that I am able, I shall also seek to set forth the facts as known to me with respect to those Fear of subversives basis of Nixon Watergate defense - President WASHINGTON Nixon is quietly preparing to fight back against the Watergate charges. The thrust of his counterattack isnt certain. But trusted aides are putting together that subversives evidence were conspiring to undermine the political system. These aides, working in to are trying strict secrecy, show that the threat of subver 4 p sion and violence during the campaign justified treme counter measures. 1972 ex- If the President adopts the line they are preparing, the word will go out from the White House that Reds, radicals and subversives sought to bring down the system by turmoil. political creating Some of these radicals, it will be charged, infiltrated the George McGovern campaign. It has always been the first rule of Nixon politics that the best defense is an offense. In private, the President has become militant about Watergate. He has told intimates that he has no intention of going back on television with a long apology for the Watergate offenses. He indicated, instead, he will hit back at his that Jack Anderson It is quite true that the White House was flooded with scare stories on the eve of the Most of them 1972 campaign. came from Robert Mardian, then the Justice Departments internal security chief. He began chasing subversive shadows with such a vengeance that his counterespionge efforts took on the dimensions of a police-stat- e operation. He bombarded his superiors with warnings of civil disorders and political disruptions. Among those who received his intelligence reports were the Watergate conspirators. We have obtained access to resome of these hush-husHouse White which ports, aides are also searching for evidence for .the Presidents counterattack. As nearly as h we could determine from the dozens of documents we have examined, however, the dire warnings turned out to be highly inflated. Typical was a Jan. 18, 1972, memo to Mardian from the chief of his Analysis and Evaluation Section, John L. Mar- disrupt the Republican convention and to defeat Prssident Nixon. of the Re- The disruption publican convention represents the final phase of a three-phas- e program designed to defeat President Nixon in the de1872 presidential election, clared the intelligence analytin, reviewing current intellisis. gence. The "principal objecone was. he Phase tive" of the antiwar leaders, he warned ominously, was to Peoples Grand Jury Demon stration held in Washington,? D.C., on Oct. 25, 1971. Phase Two will consist of individuals following President Nixons campaign around the country urging his defeat. Phase Three consists of to have 500,000 to one'-million people attend the Re-- !, : , publican National Convention-- "' in an attempt to deny Presi- dent Nixon the Republican Party nomination. . -- - 1 , |
