Show SUPREME COURT DECISION THE PRATT YOUNG toung oase CASE gup r omo emo court ot of the tho Tor ritTy hitty of utah juno term AD 1878 sarahm sarah M pratt respondent vs brigham young app ilant 1 on appeal from the district court 1 opinion ollion by IT schaeffer chief justice this proceeding was originally 1 instituted in the probate court of salt lake county under the act of the Legisla legislature turo of the territory 0 of f utah approved feb 17 1869 entitled an act prescribing rules rulea and r regulations eg lons ions for the execution pf af the trust arising under an ah act oo 00 congress both parties appellant and respondent despondent claiming title to the halt lot in controversy by virtue of the act of congress entitled an act for the relief of the inhabitants of cities and towns upon the public lands in the probate court it was adjudged that the appellant was entitled to said half lot F erom from rom this judgment an appeal was taken to the third district court of this Terri toy tuy by the respondent and on the trial in such district court the i judgment of the probate court wp was to versed and for nought declared and a judgment rell rendered ered to the effect that tho respondent sarah ba M pratt was justly entitled to said half lot appellant Ap now brings this cause here hero by appeal from the judgment of the district court and dasig assigns ons ous for errors first that the court erred in overruling respondents motion to dismiss the appeal we think the appeal from the probate court was properly taken and there was no error in overruling the motion to dismiss the second and main error as signed is that this court erred in its findings and judgment under the evidence by which we understand the attorneys of the appellant to mean that the evi evidence dence denee does dues not su support port the flu findings dinge and that the judgment Is against the law section 2387 of the revised statutes of the united states which in 13 part of the act of congress 1011 gress approved march 2nd and 1837 1867 provides provi dos doa that whenever any portion of the public laud laudi i i have been or may be settled upon and occupied as a town site not nol subject to entry under thoen the agricultural gri cultural preemption pre emption jaws it lawful is lawful in case such town bu be incorporated corp orated for the tho corporate authorities ties thereof to enter at abe proper land omee office and at the minimum price the land jand so settled and occupied in trust for the several use and benefit of the occupants thereof according to their respective interests the execution of which trust as to the disposal of the lots in such town and the proceeds of the sale thereof to be conducted under such regulations as may be prescribed by tho the legislative authority of the state or territory in which the same may be situated 11 under this thia act of cone Cong congress tess the lot in que quo question alon tion was entered by the mayoros mayor of salt lako lake city he HO is i therefore the trustee who holds the lewal legal title in trust for the cestus cestui que trust tr i 1 e ho he holds the lot for the tho several beveral use and benefit of the occupants thereof according to their respective interests in this particular case two thin things 3 must i i concur concar to give the right to the title to the lot in n controversy to either cither of the contestants first there must have been a town or city with resident occupants on the public lands duly incorporated to saure the title frem fram the national government this is conceded and therefore the legal title is in the mayor as the representative of ruch such town or city if there thero Is no proper ces tet tut tua que trust as provided by the aforesaid act of congress Con erese then the mayor holds the title for tua tuo tv benefit befit of the corporation po ration ratton but bat if there be an actual occupant of sach each lot at the tho time of the entry bythe bytho mayor then he be the occupant becomes comei tho the legal ical ces tui tai que trust and the tho mayor holds the legal tio tit titie title lefor for fon his benefit there must nult therefore be secondly an actual bona fide occupancy by the indi vidual who is entitled to such benefit and when there Is mere than one of such occupants then the title is held in trust for tho the use and benefit of such occupants according to their respective interests whilst this act of congress confers certain cartain tights lights and privileges upon the tha aggregate egg regato inhabitants of the town or city thus thua located I 1 upon public p lands it la Is nevertheless apparent that th at the primary object was to secure individual rights to the respective inhabit ants auts of the towns and cities who were aio nio nato alo the respective occupants of the several lots jots or parcels of land claimed by them the power conferred by this act of congress M ress ness upon tho the territorial legislature is to make malce regulations for the execution of the trust athas it has no power to interfere with or to modify the rights conferred by the act of or congress and wad if the territorial legislature I 1 by its act approved a royed roved february 17 R ail all ATI att and for the execution of 0 the t arising under an act of cn reff 11 undertook to confer rights upon perso persons associations association or corporations other thad than than those mentioned in the act of bf congress such attempt to confer euch rights is void we can readily conceive of a cabe case where an individual was prior to the e entry r by the mayor mayon in the actual bona sid fid fide e occupancy of a lot and where ho he wa wab was s w wrongfully ousted b by bv v an intruder or t trespasser rs c passer beloro tora fora such entry was made in wh which ieh ich cabo caso we t think hinic the orl ori original inai inal bonafide occupant should receive the legal title thereto notwithstanding the wrongful occupancy C u by the other at the time of the tle entry but we do not understand that the act of congress in any case confers the right to the title of any lot upon any individual who was never the personal occupant P rint fint of such lot but suppose that the territorial legislature by its act approved february 1869 conferred the right to the title of the half halt lot in upon persona claiming to be the rightful owner of possession occupant or occupants sor or to bo be entitled to the occupancy or possession of such jot lot and supposing that such legislation isolation la Is in harmony with or justified lubbe by the act of congress con ress above referred to which we only admit for the tho purpose of the argument what are the respective rights of the parties herein to the half lot in controversy it is clearly shown by the evidence that the respondent sarah 31 pratt occupied this lot from 1851 to 1861 and that during that time she mada made valuable improvements thereon and that in 1861 bho eho with her husband and family went south in this territory and remained there until that during the time she was south ar a aforesaid the sald said kotwas lot wab was occupied by bome some of the family of the appel lant by virtue of a purchase by appellant from the husband of respondent that on the L oth of march 1863 bhe ehe the respondent with ler der children w with ith and by the consert consent of appellant resumed the actual possession of the raid half lot made valuable improvements thereon and anc continued to occupy the E ame same from thence hitherto that orson pratt the husband of respondent spon dent has not lived with respondent and her family hince since march and that ho he has fite five other families with some of whom he Is suj suf supposed posed to have hate resided and that the respondent and her children have supported themselves since 1863 with very little if any aid from the faid eaid orson pratt it also api cars from the evidence that the possession posses slon gion of the taid aid i hair half lot was freely and voluntarily given to respondent in without any contract for rent or 11 any ny or agreement expressed or implied that she should become or he be the of appellant or any one lse ose ise at will or otherwise even if that were possible under the peculiar circumstances of or the case which we think is not the fact fet whatever interest the appellant had in I 1 he the Prem premises ibes lEes on or bea re march 1863 yanis yania vanished hed upon the abandonment or surrender of the possession to the respondent and she bhe being tor the purposes ol 01 this eIng the head of her family and actually occupying the said paid h hair half 1 I if lot jot as the ret reb irenec and home of herself aud and family from the of march 1868 1808 niall fone lone after the tho entry made mado by the mayor of salt la lake ke city she the Is la in our opinion entitled to a deed for the same came the admission or rejection of the evidence which the court b below mcclin declined ed to consider neider co does docs not affect the status of the cas car case e and if it had heen been reen neen admitted as competent by the district court and if the court had bad r licu it all nu the tho force which could reasonably be claimed for it the appellant would not nok in our opinion lon ion be entitled to I 1 the he half lot in controversy contral tro verry versy the judgment of the court below must therefore he it Is ordered and adjudged and decreed that the fin dinErs and the judgment of the third district court count rendered in this cause be and the game are hereby approved and affirmed and that the appellant t brigham Brij drik sham young pay the costs of this court |