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Show TRIBUNE, SUNDAY JHE $ALT LAKE have spent their money and must their tickets to get home, that tlie business Is In order. Then the man wants something has to pay. the who haa something which la wanted cash in. TRIPLEPROBLEM Wilson Forced unonds Explains Mistake j -- of Expanding Field o Conference Continued ' Discussions. Im On. many, and we firmly resist Japanese profits In Shantung. AU of this Is easily comprehensible, but we are face to face with a square ' Issue. The United States and Japan might the thing is entirely concelv able meet In conference as France and Britain met In 1904. Then the clash be tween French and British colonial ptratlona and claims was the gravest French peril to world peace existing. and British soldiers and explorers were in collision on the lower Niger, the upper Mekong and the White Nila French as ptrattons in Morocco were vetoed by the British concern for Gibraltar, and British ' administration In Egypt was handicapped Fashoda had by French Interference. brought the two countries nearer to war than they had been siQce Waterloo. But, instead of fighting, France and Britain sat down at the green table and Indulged in a general liquidation. Com. promise adjusted ali of the troublesome points. France retired from Egypt, Britain withdrew her prohibition of French advance In Morocco. Africa was divided between the two rivals, and Siam paid h the price of conflicting claims In the far east. When the settleFranco-Britlsh ment was ended, relations were put on a basis of mutual agreement which lasted right through the World war, and the liquidation itself was the first and the decisive step toward the association of Britain and France, which doomed German hopes. It Is then, equally possible for the United States and Japan to sit down at a table and reach an agreement as to the far east. A point of departure must be fixed, a date selected, behind which no question will be asked. Obviously, this date Is Important, for Japan has steadily through the years been building up her position. Shall we agree to Japanese possession of Formosa, taken from China a quarter of a century ago, as undebatable, like our acquisition of the Philippines taken from Spain In 1191? Or shall we oome down closer to tho present moment and concede Jap anese domination In Korea and possession se at Port Arthur the fruit of the war? Anglo-Frenc- Ruaeo-Japane- Other Nations to Take Part. Japan Sskp much more: she asks that wa recognise as outside of sll discussion what has happened up to the end of the World war and tha proclamation of the treaty of Versailles And unless all signs fail Japan will stand or fall upon this contention. But this not only gives Japan Shantung, with the Klau Chau .conces- alon balancing the Port Arthur, but In realltv it confirms her supremacy In Manchuria, In Mongolia; It recognises her course In interfering within China, in promoting revolution, and In subsidising factions. ' In truth; it demands in terms ths recognition by us of what must ha viewed as a doctrine, asserted by Japan with respect of all of tho Paclflo coast from Siberia to Indochina. Suppose w on our side with a proposition to accept interpose the situation which existed up to the moment of tho World war; we can do less but undertake to procure hardly a reopening of the questions raised by the settlement of Ver. allies; suppose, In addition, we Insist that for the future the Integrity of China must be assured, the Independence of Siberia recognized. Suppose we Insist thst "the open door must henceforth be tho established policy In tho far east. This Is. In reality, what we are maintaining In principle now. Then Japan and the United States, sitting together about table, must declds whether they can each as . Franca and modify .their . position Britain did In 1904, or. Insisting each upon Its own view separate, to try out tho question by war, the only alternative method. But we ere not to talk with Japan alone. Wo have asked Britain and France and Italy to "sit In. It follows thst towill result. tally new complications France, Britain and Italy are at odds In Europe and their quarrels have deadlocked the supreme council In which we sit, but do not vote on purely European questions. Neither France nor Italy caret much about the far east. France hat and some Interesting Islands In the Pscaflc, but they art outside the area of Immediate discussion. Italy baa nothing east of the Somali coast. super-Monr- ) l Indo-Cht- Europe Works for Self But France and Italy are exceedingly enxloiis to gain the United States support for their European interests; for example, both are solidly united In their wish to check British expansion In tha Mediterranean, to prevent the creation of a Greater Greece which shall, acting for Britain, give the English control of the Aegean, tha Black sea and tha straits guarded by Constantinople. e may have their support InObviously, the far east, provided we give them ours in ths pear east. But this U getting down to the level of s political primary. Yet. after all, this Is what has been happening In the supreme council for three jears. This Is what happened at Paris sll through the conference. Americana are accustomed .to think In terms of abstractions so Tar as International conferences are concerned, but Europeans - Wlth-know ..better, lf.Francavotgland, no ons Imagines that the French heart or the French mind has been penetrated by British argument or dominated by the appreciation of immediate Justice. No, nothing of the sort; tho European mind looks round to sea where France "got hers. As long as ths agenda of the Washington conferencs was limited to the discussion of naval disarmament, there was no field for bargaining. In any event, restriction of a nations and natal forces will be arrived military at by the full and free will consent of only the nation concerned It is inconceivable that the British would agree to reduce their naval strength under pressure from a combination of powers, say of the United States, France and Italy. Nor would we bow to the majority made up of Britain, Japan and Italy, But when the bars were lowered a discussion of tho Pacific problem, for all was changed. So far as tho Pacific problems are concerned, the votes of France and Italy will be determined bv their estimate of the advantage to themselves, not In tbs Pacific, but In Europe, along the Mediterranean shores. or even for France, on the banka of the Vistula. Wa esn get votes for our program In the Pacific, but we shall have to trade In our vote In the supreme council on Issues - In Europe. When, In addition. It Is suggssted thst tha Washington eon fere n re may taka up the unfinished business of the Paris con-- J ferenees of 1919 and 1921, then all limit t removed. We xrebacfc tw the game of diplomacy, and It la worth noting there is no other kind and ne ever will be. We talk there thst promise much In this country of the wickedness of this diplomacy, but then we go right ahead and employ It in every national convention and In every ward council. diplomacy. In the last analysis, consists only in knowing what ntsyou want and what tha other fellow-waend getting yours by preventing him from having his otherwise. Thst is what Mr. Wilson discovered at Paris Everyone who knows anything about the stats conventions knows thst ths first days are devoted to noise and nonsense. It is only toward tho and, when a decision presses, when time la about used up and tha delegates En G, AUGUST 28, mi. J use real whs man eaa t Surrender. Now exactly this Is what happened In Parts In May, 1919. The Germans were tha balcoming, ths Italians had ance of power law with thaquit, tt was Shantung or no , treaty,Japanese; no league, and Mr. Wilson surrendered. He bed to surrender about the freedom of tho seas to tha Britisn in advance because it was a condition antecedent to ell British He had to agree to the treaty guaranteeing France, because without thst treaty France would not play. Europe recognised that Mr. Wilson, given hia political situation at home, had to take beck a league of nations agreement. Hie own political situation at home demanded that he should at least seem to have . achieved great results abroad. I do not question that Mr. Wilson believed the league covenant actually acquired was substantially tha great prime sought, I am not seeking to criticise. But to get hta document hs had to pay. What la not yet clearly perceived here, although It la fairly understood In Europe, Is that Mr. Harding will hare to pay for hie prise. Tbs United States can have tha moral support of Europe In the far east. Japan hasnt the proverbial "Chlnantans chance of enlisting support when It comes to outbidding uo for European favor. President Harding can have the Washington conference indorse any pro poaal for an association of nations whlcl ha presema which Is within reason, f1Iven the situation of Europe with President Wilson's league on its hands.. He can have a shining, victory, but will heve to pay for President Harding biasing It Just as President Wilson did. If ho doesn't pay hs wont get ths results. But if .he doesn't get ths results his will be difficult In ths extreme, position because the Democratic press and publte will seise upon his failure not for Its own value, but to set it over only against President Wilson's experience. Ths moment when hs position will become awk-nar- d la precisely the moment when his domestic political problems become acute. It was never possible to make the American delegates at Parts aee In profitable time that they had lost control of the situation, because they had arrived at the point where they had to have something themselves which they could only acquire from the representatives of other nations. V i error Clothes For Men and Young Men IMPORTED AND AMERICAN TWEEDS AND HOMESPUNS f f r t , i rf Fashion has decreed- - herringbone tweeds and homespuns as themovelty suitings lor this season. t Old Experience, Invited. I remember the dry comment of a man close to Lloyd George Just before Mr. Wilson returned to Paris, after bis excursion to Washington.' We were talking about the league of nations covenant, and my friend said "Lloyd George was opposed to letting him (L e. the president) have It at this time." Wbat he meant, of course, was that George believed it was wiser not to pay too far In advance. This was tho real fact at Paris, this is the real fact at every International conference. Everyone knows that rand almost etole the Congress of TalleyVienna from ths victorious allies by throwing French support to conflicting claims. wa have again invited Now, after-all- , a Paris experience. We have asked the European nations, divided among themselves, each looking to uo for support which might bo decisive, to come over here and discuss that problem of the Pacific which is. In feet, a matter In dispute between Japan end ourselves. We ere going to present our side of tha ease and we are going to endeavor to have Europe take our side Japan And the Japanese know against well that they cant find rewardsperfectly for Europe which might counterbalance our offers, thus the Japanese will have to find substitute method. -- ' , We are showing them in the best models as adopted by the National Merchant Tailors convention. We fit you better; arid save you from $10 to $30. , t A direct comparison will convince you that we do. Quick turn of stock at a small profit, and for cash, is the answer. p -- i MOT-TIN- Europe Comes to Bargain. t Meantime, by throwing the Upper Si lesian dispute into tho council of tho league of nations Lloyd Georgs and Brl and have momentarily reanimated that body, which has sat still while two great wars ware In progress in Europe in the past year, and has been unable te die pose of any issue raised between two great powers. Thua Lloyd George and M Brtand will have a league of nations to play against any association Mr. Harding may propose and this them Just so much more bargaininggives power. The Idea that European statesmen go to international conferences with any other purpose than that of ths average cttlsen going to market Is nonsense. It furnishes . political up pea,, but it la totally untrue, as ths of every International from Westphalia to Paris have assembly demonstrated. Most Americans and perhaps few Europeans believed that tha Paris conference of 1911 would prove Borne But in point of fact it thing different. exactly reproduced all of the old sessions. Tha men who made peace had tot deal with new conditions and to forces which were negligible e recogniso ago, hut la the last analysis the century was summsd up In the comment ofprocess Lloyd Georgs to a friend of mine, B peeking of a whole range of questions at issue, divided Into things desired by the British and desired by their allies, the Britishthings prims minister fell back In every Instance upon one of two forms. For things desired by tho British ha said "We must have it" For things desired by the allies of Britain Why should they get It?" Since tho Paris conference there have been eleven meetings between - Britain and France, with Japan, Italy and various other nations present or voting. But In case there has been a bargain, saveevery the lest and In the last, the recent Parts meeting, since neither would meet the price of tho other, tho outcome was fleadlock. Remembering Parts, recalling the history of oil past International It seems to me thst the presentgatherings. administration is running ths risk of suffering all the reverses of the last, by consenting to opening the door to tho discussion of questions which belong to tho order of International Interests which are Invariably settled not upon their merits but by the methods which obtain In our own political conventions A tlmo will con, not impossibly In ths Washington ir n WONDERFUL VALUES AT and SEE WINDOW DISPLAY v Proven to Be Salt Lakes Leading Clothiers confer-rncerT- n lhsT rlicon -- ference. when It will be Mr. Hardings polltkaLfort.Ujnfg and thaaa.of-M which are In the balance ,or when party that association of potions which hs favors Is at stake, and at that moment Europe will present Its bill, either collectively or severally. -- America Holds Balance. In addition, one must recognise thst ev. ery possible effort will be made to obtain our support for each of the contested problems of Europe. If we vote with France on Upper Silesia, it will certainly ito In the main to Poland; If wa vote with 3ritaln and Italy, Poland loses and France suffers s reverse. If we vote with France and Italy, Greece will be circumscribed In Asia Minor end British aspirations In the Mediterranean. We have tha decisive vote all over Europe, our position In the supreme councilgiven and our resources In ths word. When we quit Europe and came borne, when the senate rejected the treaty of Versailles. Europe was at a loss, because It had nothing to offer us which ws needed or wanted, and by the offer Insure our return. President Hardings Invitation to the Washington conference Is the first ray of light which European diplomacy has perceived In the darkness of more than two years. The proposal to expand the field of discussion transforms the ray of light Into tho noonday sun If only Americans would see an International conference In the same fashion they see and understand their own political conventions, we should bo getting on. In both caeee "the ostensible 'purpose la to save the country or the world but in each the actual objective is to nominate end to be nominated. (Copyright, 1921. by the McClure Newspaper Syndicate.) GREEKS BATTUE TURKS. ATHENS, Aug 7. After several sharp skirmishes, one lasting ten hours on Au21. tha Greek forces have come In gust contact with the mein body of Turkish Nationalists east of the ttkarla river, says an official Greek statement. The Greeks had to penetrate the Balt desert and found tha Turks In 7strong positions along tha River Klouk. King Constantine, who has been 111 at r, is rapidly recovering, Eakl-Sbeh- try To work forlt, and It follows that It will have less work to do Itself on the particular articles In which the conqueredIn country pays Its tribute. But, sines course of time the displaced labor can find employment In producing other useful objects, tha country recelring ths indemnity will be, on balance, richer than generatlona, exert adequate force over the German government, or that tha German government can exert adequate authority over Us subjects, to extract continuing fruits on a vast seals from slat e labor? No one believes It In his heart; no one at all. There 1s not the faintest possibility of aur persisting with before. ths affair to Its bitter end. Vice and virtue, reason and folly. InInterests Are Divergent. terest, passion, prejudice and mercy will all combine te defeat tt. 1 do not expect These simple economic truths must be to see Mr. Lloyd George fighting a genkept In mind. But the application of eral on the Issue of maintaining them to tha present case Invokes two an election to compel Germany at army the point In conditions, which, also, must be kept of the bayonet to undercut our manumind. The first Is that the country, cerNo! He never facturers. will port lines, such as Iron goods, machin-do tain of whose forget that staple trades are undercut, ery, chemicals, dyss and glass, which the elections of 1911 he gave a pledge must. If It Is not to suffer, be the same ' In to not involve much Importation of raw country the and this pledge was that as that which receives the In- "We electors, materials. are not going to allow her to pay demnity. The second Is that this stats In aa such to a way wrack our Indusof affairs must be reasonably perma- tries. receiving: Nation Benefits. nent, so as to give time for a now equiIs so, then, most certainly If all thla to librium to a be set to Now up. pay large compel Germany tt will not be worth our while to disNow, in tho caaa of Great Britain, tha Indemnity Is tha asms thing as to com-p- el our export industries for s couple her to txpand some or all of tna first of thess two condition le not ful- order of much less to endsnger the peace exports to a greater ex- filled. Great Britain la to receive, not of years, simply out of a refuse) ta Europe, tent than she would do otherwise. The the whole of the indemnity, but about face a very 'obvious fact. can a In It. she effect of which fifth this only wey export staple Germany's Germany, without stimulating her exexpansion Is by offering tha goods at a Industries happen, as is well known, to to an Industries lower pries than that at which other coincide with those of Orest Britain to port activity In excess a remarkable extent, not equalled In the of that which they will enjoy anyhow, countries cars to offer thorn. pay an amount of reparation, wall This might come about, tb an extent case of any other pair of nations man- can worth the while of the allies to receive which would not be the caaa In the ab- ufacturing for export on a targe scale. The United States would suffer less and worth the while, also, of Germany sence of pressure to pay reparations, than Great Britain from the forced sub- to pay, as due amends and for the sake artly by ths German working classes sidisation of Tb of a quiet life.-- With this sum we shall owerlng their standard lnof life without the same de- other band sns Is to receive no pert of be Very-W- ls ghd prudent to be conreducing tbelr efficiency InGerman the export Indemnity. France, however, though tent. gree, and partly by dustries being subsidised, directly or In- some ofta her Industries, too, would bs Little to receive half the Indemnity Expansion Expected. directly, at tha expense of tha rest of upset, and would probably gain on balance. tha community. For my own part, however, I doubt If these conditions wars to persist over Here, then, there Is a divergence of In- the likelihood of a expansion of long period of years, tha result weuld terest between France and Great Brit- German trade In thegreat near future. If ain; beat adjusted, perhaps, by tha for- there la a general trade revival, obviously be Injurious to similar competdoubtless ing Industries in other countries, which giveness of existing debts and by some she will share In It. If world prices rise would be forced to reduce their scale priority to France in respect of repara- again, her exports will be worth mors. these of operations and to divert their labor tion receipts, especially aa both I tha fears of Germanys concessions , are desirable on other But believe thst Into other channels. world on a ' price undercutting targe lr grounds. scale are much exaggerated. These particular Industries would For many of tha factors which enable' her to Mo suffer. But wa shall fall Into tha Permanence Insecure. so at present are necessarily temporary. protectionist fallaey if we pass from thisthat the reto the further conclusion The second of ths conditions, namely, In the first pises, when trade le bad, in- -, the la of an Indemnity of necessarily eeipt to those reparation payments comparatively 'small lines of goods offered that receive it. In ex I on a permanence Jurious scale. Is. to aav the feast, not at very low prices have an Importance, targe n lndemnity a country Is com-- 1 safely secured. Who believes that tha In the'mlnda'of cUn Tr.V.TA traders, whlch whriiia- palling the Tnh.w7.nta of another coun- - allies will, over a period of one or two appear whan trade revives and prices are above-mention- Germsn-jxportxbul.o- eer-taln- n no longer capable of being dominated by small offerings. In the second place, export trade ta subsidised, not by a depreciated exchange, but by a depredating exchange. When the external purchasing power of the mark Is falling faster then the Internal power, German purchasing benefit at the expense of the restexporters of GerAnd a depreciating exchange even many. Is no help, when deterioration has gone beyond a certain point. This particular stimulus U, therefore, necessarily temporary. In the third place low costs of production are at prevent made possible In Oermany In certain trades by what are, in effect, government subsidies. Coal, housing, transport and food a re all obtainable at artificially low prices, which la a part of ths explanation of Germanys budgetary deficit. These subsidies are especially beneficial to tha Iron and ateel trades But If Germany in ta make any pretense of balancing her budget, these subsidies will bars to go. If ths subsidies continue. Inflation will have to proceed at such a rate as to undermine at a very early data tha whole financial structure. But If they are abolished, the artificial cheapness of many arpresentmust ticles go, too. Coal Price Is Low. The caaa of coal la particularly Im coal- - 'has partwnS; Tha averaga-prica-- of bean 274 marks a ton, that s to say, about 12.40; Insluded In thla Is a tax of 40-marks a 'ton. The most obvious source of revenue for the German government la a great Increase la this tax, which la Indeed proposed; for the price of coal, could be raised by 200 marks a ton without being unduly high In relation to world pricea. There ta an additional Incentive to the Ore man government to raise this tax, because under tha treaty of Versailles reparation coal delivered overland ta credited to Germany at tha German home price. Hence, by Increasing the home price Oermany will Increase what Is dredtted to her for reparation coal. Incidentally a point of Importance for Iron producers elsewhere this would ipodlfy tha present 44 cheapness of tbs reparation coal to the fi French and Belgian Recipients of it. If German coal remains at 274 marks a toe. ; the competition of German Iron and stew 1 may be very fOrmtdabta; but in thtoi event the budgetary position of Germany will be so bad aa to about, eoonei I or later, compensating bring disabilities of some t other kind. There is also another consideration. Tha mors Oermany exports, tha greater t wtlj be bar Debilities under tha sliding scale. Tha export la levied I at A flat rata on all percentage types of exports; ( even falls on tha deliveries In kind which are not commercial exports but art handed over to the reparation commission without payment (a. g., when Germany delivers coat to the reparation com mission, she has In addition to pay cash te tha extent of 24 per cant of the value of tho coal, beoause tha coal la sa export!). Where, therefore, exports contain a high pro port Ion of previously Imported raw material, Germany may to actually worse off by developing such trade, than by leaving It alone. In affect, there will be, so far aa tha netlot aa a whole Is concerned, a tax af 24 pet eant on exports which will hardly tend In the long run to stimulate exports. 1 Danger to Everyone The conclusion of this articla Is therefore, that tha purchasing power SI A' ttveT!permark Inside Carman y wm lemT ts fall, so that tha stimulus to export due to tha present excess of the Internal ever tha external purchasing power will tend ta diminish, and that, for this and othm reasons, the competition of German es porta may not be so severe In the kn run as some people think. If, however, the exchange value of th mark depreciates further, which the en forcemeat af tha present reparation da mends must bring about, Germany's ca parity to export at prices much below those with whtqb bar trade rivals ret compete may persist for soma time and an attempt on tha 011100 partyett persevere for another two years with policy which they ara certain to abandnr sooner or later, may do much Injury tithe normal equilibrium of Internationa trade, and thus Impoverish everyone. - |