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Show WILL THE SPHINXES SPEAK? Y" Mr. Archibold's opinion that the Standard Oil Company's policy of silence was a mistake ought to carry much weight. It is based upon an extraordinary wealth and variety of experience, Wc hope, rather than i . belicvej that It will bo generally heeded. heed-ed. The Standard was by no means singular in that policy. It has been ' J and still is the rule rather than the exception among trusts to turn a blind side to the public, including even the general body of their own stockholders. The Steel Trust is the only big "industrial" that has made a practice of publishing, in any considerable con-siderable detail, a statement of its operations and conditions. A few, like the Sugar Trust, have contended themselves with a vague remark or two to the general effect that trade k. was quite good. Most of them have W the amount of net earnings and given out a collection of figures called a balance-sheet, which might be likened liken-ed to Talleyrand's definition of speech as a mode of concealing thot. See, for a fair example, the last report re-port of the Tobacco Trust. I These indefinite generalizations arc i supposed to meet the reasonable de sire of security-holders for information informa-tion concerning the enterprise in which their money is invested. The larger and equally reasonable public desire for knowledge touching the conduct and state of concerns that control important staple commodities, commodi-ties, is not even considered. We arc awaiting with deep interest the next annual report of the Standard Stand-ard Oil Company, hoping it may mark a departure in "industrial" statements, i THE GAG AND THE PHONOGRAPH. PHONO-GRAPH. It was, of course, an advance in representative government when the Imperial Chancellor intimated 'that his continuance in office was dependent depen-dent upon the support of a majority in the Reichstag. If this becomes a precedent it establishes the principle of Ministerial responsibility to the repr sentatives of the public which was definitely won in England over two hundred years ago. What is termed the closure in England Eng-land and gag-rule in Washington was introduced coincidently with this important im-portant reform. The Socialists and , Clericals who desired to vent their ' feelings concerning the Ministerial coalition found themselves (in the same annoying position as rcpresen-. rcpresen-. tatives of the people at Washington who desire to speak when Mr. Cannon Can-non doesn't desire them to. Much liberty to speak may be enjoyed en-joyed in representative assemblies that are mostly debating societies As responsibility for conduct of the government devolves upon them there is 1 ss speech and more action. Finally, Fin-ally, no doubt, as the representative i assembly actually runs the govern- '' ment, all speeches will be printed only, or at most delivered to a phonograph phono-graph in the cloakroom. M THE INDESTRUCTIBLE JEST. A simple statement that James Hamilton Lewis may be the next Democratic candidate for Governor of Illinois surprises us. Mr. Lewis is a man of ability and unimpcached integrity. His administration of the very important office of corporation counsel 'of Chicago was distinctly creditable. In close political sympathy sympa-thy with Mr. Bryan, his candidacy on the ticket headed by the Nebras-kan Nebras-kan would be entirely fitting. The surprising thing is in the form of the statement. It speaks simply of James Hamilton Lewis. Now, Mr. Lewis indulges a somewhat some-what odd but perfectly proper fancy in the matter of neckwear, and he cultivates whiskers of a sort not affected af-fected by the commonalty. Observing Observ-ing which, a careless reporter long ago invented a nickname for him, anil a bad pleasantry of that kind is almost al-most as indestructible as matter itself. it-self. Once given vogue it forms a stock-in-trade in humor. It becomes a fixed part of the circulating medium med-ium of jest. Through habit one accepts ac-cepts it as one docs a bank-bill, so the temptation to pass it is almost irresistible. It is always available to lighten the page of the writer and the conversation of the barber. To use it is to be funny. Anybody can live down a crime. To live down a once-current notion that one is a joke is no such commonplace com-monplace achievement. THE NEWEST THING IN TARIFFS. TAR-IFFS. In this country we have a high-tariff high-tariff system for the purpose of protecting pro-tecting labor; but it is shaped and operated exclusively by the manufacturer manu-facturer through his representatives in Senate and House. Labor's onlj part is to sit mum and gratefully receive re-ceive whatever benefits the manufacturer's manu-facturer's system may confer upon him. Australia has adopted a high-tariff system, but in that government the labor element is strongly represented, represent-ed, and labor's own views regarding projection are bound to receive respectful re-spectful attention. So we fnd tlio Premier proposing that every manufacturer manu-facturer shall pay an excise tax equal to half the protective duty on his goods unless his goods arc produced under fair conditions with respect to the labor employed that is, the home made goods arc duly protected against foreign competition; but if the manufacturer is "unfair from the labor point of view the difference between be-tween the home and the foreign price, instead of going into his own pocket, is turned over to the state. Such is labor's own idea of a labor protecting tariff system. We wonder what would happen and how .many fall dead if somebody should propose it to the protectors of American labor lab-or in the United States Senate. THE COUNTRY BANK RE-SERVE. RE-SERVE. i i The I.nv requires national banks to hold, at all times, a reserve equal to twenty-five per cent of their deposits in the larger cities and fifteen per c nt elsewhere. But the actual, available cash reservethe re-servethe fund that the banks as a whole can really use in a crisis amounts to about six per cent of their deposits. In 1873, 1893 and 1907 this proved insufficient, and more or less extensive suspension of cash payments followed. The country bank is permitted to keep three-fifths of its reserve on deposit de-posit in a city bank. At the date of the August, 1907, statement, the national na-tional banks outside of the reserve ci'ics had about seven per cent of their deposits in cash on hand. In a crisis, such as occurred in October, this seven per cent was all the country coun-try banker could absolutely count upon. Banks in the lesser reserve cities may keep half of their reserve on deposit de-posit in the central cities (New York, Chicago and St. Louis). These lesser les-ser reserve-city banks held in August Aug-ust over a billion and a half of deposits, de-posits, but had less than two hundred hund-red millions of actual cash on hand. To take a:i example at random, Kansas Kan-sas Cicy showed twenty-four per cent reserve, or substantially the legal leg-al requirement; but actual cash on hand amounted to less than ten per cnt of gross deposit liability. In a crisis, of course, the country bank looks to the lesser reserve city, while the city, having less than fifteen fif-teen per cent of its deposits actually actual-ly in cash on hand, must at once look to the central reserve city, and especially New York, which holds about one-third of all the actual cash in all the reserve cities combined. THE NEW YORK BANK RESERVE. RE-SERVE. The banking position in New York is complicated by the trust compan-puc compan-puc spunj 1sn.11 joj ojcd oj XnEittSuo papuDju; oja.tt siuoouoa asDijj, 'sa; other deposits not subject to sudden call. Thirst for profits has led many of them into the regular banking field. Ai the date of the last report the larger ones doing an extensive demand-deposit business held five hundred hun-dred and sixty-three millions of deposits depos-its subject to check (to say nothing of some other liabilities)' and only thirty-eight millions of actual cash, or about six per cent. At the first sign of actual trouble in October the necessity of providing for the trust companies devolved upon the banks. At the date of 'he August statement state-ment the national oam s of New York City held (in addition to one hundred and twenty-seven millions due trust companies and savings banks) three hundred and thirty-eight millions of deposits of other banks, constituting, in considerable part, the reserves of those other banks and, therefore, peculiarly pe-culiarly liable to demand in a crisis. October 19, the New York banks were theoretically in good condition. They held cash reserve equal to twenty-six per cent of their deposits. Just one week later, with a net loss of about six per cent in reserve, they resorted to Clcatiing-IIousc certificates, certifi-cates, restricting cash payments and throwing the bank system of the whole country into disorder. In short, the position of the New York banks is such that they dare not let their reserve drop much below twenty-five per cent. To prevent that they will lock it up and suspend cash payments. pay-ments. Thus the twenty-five per cent of cash held by the New York banks is not at all a fund which is available avail-able to the banking system of the country with which to meet a crisis. On the contrary, the first effect of a crisis is to lock it up, or, at least, to place heavy restrictions about it. And the banks will never in normal times permit the reserve materially to exceed twenty-five per cent, because be-cause that means loss of profit. In one week last October the Bank of England's reserve dropped over seven per cent. Interest rates advanced, ad-vanced, but there was no derangement derange-ment of the banking system. Any suggestion of restriction of cash pay-postcrous. pay-postcrous. It is often said that our banking reserve re-serve is too small. It is not so much, it seems to us, the size or the character char-acter of the reserve that needs improvement. im-provement. No other big commercial commer-cial country fixes a hard and fasi statutory reserve. The trouble is that our reserve is not reserve in the true sense of being a cash fund which is instantly and completely available to meet an emergency em-ergency with. |