Show service Ss sem iv CHAPTER LX continued I 1 the third phase of the meuse ar onne began october 14 the previous phase important gains had been made along the whole front against increasing intensity of resistance the retirement of the en my in front of the allies to the west was being accelerated by our persistent gains in the east indicated clearly that he was trying to sae him I 1 belt from complete disaster which it was urgent that we should strive all the more vigorously to hasten the enemy s strong defenses in the bats de romagne and the bols de had to be reduced before further considerable progress could be baade to the west of romagne heights we faced the strongly fortified position which included cote de chat illon landres st georges st juvan abols des lobea and grandpre Gran opre our attacks on the and in conjunction with french fourth army met violent appo especially at the beginning and although ground was often taken and retaken re taken times our lines were steadily pushed forward east of the meuse in the french seventeenth corps the sixty fifth brig fide adward L king of the thirty third division bad made some ress and the twenty ninth division despite the difficult terrain and severe casualties had entered woods north of farm the fifth division in the face of intense fire on its front and flanks ton the reached the top of the bloies northeast of romagne and cleared the wood north of bunel cunel ele ments of the division pushed through to the northern edge of the bols des bappel but were withdrawn by dint of the superior alon of our troops the eremya lines were broken at a vital point by the fifth corps cote dame marle taken unstinted praise must be given the thirty second division which handing heavy losses october 14 arll bantly captured cote dame marle per haps the most important strong point of the hindenburg line on the western front the town of romagne and the eastern half of bols de romagne were fieo taken by this division on that day while on the following day its line was advanced about a mile to the edge of the bols de baethe talle the forty second division fought ag gressl vely against the most obstinate defense forcing its way through the western half of bols de romagne its eighty fourth brigade douglas mac arthur scaling the precipitous heights of the cote de chatillon and carrying its line on beyond that position the desperate resistance on the left of the division south of st george and lan breset st georges however could not be overcome the importance of these operations can hardly be overestimated the capture of the romagne heights especially its dominating feature cote dame marle was a decisive blow we now occupied the strongest position on that front and flanked his line on the aasne and the heights of the meuse unless he could recapture the positions we held our successes would compel the enemy to retreat from his lines to the north as we were within heavy artillery range cf his railroad lines CHAPTER the pressure of the american army in the great meuse argonne offensive had profoundly impressed the enemy october S marshal von hindenburg nin denburg tent the following letter to the german chancellor the high command insists on its demand of september 29 for the immediate forwarding of an offer of peace to our enemies there te now no longer any ible hope of forcing peace upon the enemy the situation crows more desperate every day and may force the high command to grave decisions the chancellor yielded and october 5 telegraphed through the swiss government ment to president allson the german government requests the president of the united states to take in band the alon of peace acquaint all belligerent states with abla request and invite them to bend diaries for opening negotiations it accepts the program set forth desperate in me argonne by the president in his message to congress january 8 and in his later addresses especially the speech of september 27 as a basis tor peace negotiations with a view to avoiding further bloodshed the german gov requests the immediate conclusion of an armistice oe land and water and in the air signed max prince von bedan imperial chancellor the president s reply was not satis factory to the german government and the exchange of notes continued until finally the germans accepted the very frank statement by the president con keyed in a state department message october 23 that the nations of the world do not and cannot trust the word of those who have hitherto been the masters of german policy and that the government of the united states cannot deal with any but veritable representatives of the german people who have been assured of a genuine constitutional standing as the real rulers of germany if it must deal with the military masters and the monarchial lal autocrats of germany now or if it Is likely to have to deal with them regard to the international of the german empire it must demand not peace negotiations but surrender meanwhile with these peace negotiations tiati ons in progress and with our own and allied offensive continuing to produce favorable results it became more and more evident that the time soon must come when we should have to consider terms and conditions under which hostilities might cease the discussion of armistice terms in a gen era way by the allies had in fact begun the most important deafen alve position on the romagne heights was in our firm possession and his final defeat was only a question of time lie had fought desperately to hold his ground but had been corn polled to give way steadily before our effective blows we could have gone forward without special preparation and succeeded in driving the enemy from the field but the situation led to the conclusion that his defeat could best be accomplished by one powerful stroke by a well organized offensive the difficult and continuous offensive from september 20 had been very trying on our troops and had resulted in a certain loss of cohesion it was therefore deemed advisable to take a few days for the replacement of tired troops the renewal of supplies and the improvement of alons french delay attack october 28 was tentatively descg bated for the beginning of the next general advance the fourth phase of the macuse argonne offensive but the french army which was to support our attack on the left could not get ready in time so the attack of both armies was fixed for november I 1 in accordance with my instructions on october 18 two important prelim loary operations were carried out dur ing this period 1 operations against the bots des logos and bols de bour bogne to clear the woods east of the aasne and north of the atre and thus flank that part of the hostile line on the allne and 2 local operations to secure a mutable su table line of departure tor the general attack during the meuse argonne battle my personal quarters were on my train which lay partially hidden in the woods on a spur near while there I 1 spent a portion of each day at official headquarters giving dl lons regarding operation and deciding other important questions I 1 usually occupied the rest of the day at the front in close touch with corps and divisions although I 1 had now relinquished ed the immediate command of the first army its activities and those ot the second army carried out under my direction required cloe super vision farther west our second corps read with the british fourth army was engaged october 17 south of I 1 e cateau in the battle of the selle this corps with the thirtieth lewis and twenty seventh 0 ryan division in line from right to left crossed the selle river and advanced tour miles in the face of strong resistance capturing 1600 prisoners and 12 guns the main objective of our initial at tach september 20 had been reached falling to capture it in our first at tempt we had deliberately systematically and doggedly stuck to the task in the face of many difficulties and discouragements discourage ments CHAPTER the demands of incessant battle bail compelled our divisions to fight to the limit of their troops were held in line and pushed to the attack concern to both great britain and tranee t ranee than to the united states and lint aa armies bad been en faed longer and had suffered more than ours 1 thought it appropriate for bar douglas halg and general ie biln to express thear views first M irshal halg eadd in substance that the german army was far from being disintegrated and was still capable of withdrawing to a shorter front and making a st ind against equal or greater forces on the other hand the allies were pretty well the total shortage of men for the british and aren h armies he said was about WO each with none available to fill the gap the american army be further said was not yet complete and some lime must elapse before it would be larte enough to relieve the diminishing allied armies lie thought the terms should be such that the ger m ins would not hesitate to accept them he then proposed immediate and complete belgian and french territory occupation by the allies of alsace lorraane Lorr alne and the fortresses of metz and strasbourg restitution of all rolling stock seized by the germans in france and bel glum or its equivalent and repatriation of inhabitants of invaded terri tory marshal foch then asked my views I 1 replied tn effect the general view that an armistice should provide guarantees against a resumption of hostilities give the al lies a decided advantage and be nn favorable to germany in case hostilities should be resumed meets with my approval I 1 think that the damage done by the war to the interests of the powers with which the united states la associated against germany has been sa great that there should be no tendency toward leniency the present military situation Is very favorable to the allies the german forces since the beginning of the counter offensive july 18 have been constantly in retreat and have not been able to recover since that time the condition of the french and british armies can best be judged by the fact that they have been continuously on the offensive since then and that they are now attacking with much vigor As to the american army the part until deemed incapable of further ef tort because ot casualties or alou artillery once engaged was ael dom withdrawn many batteries until practically all the animals were casualties leaving the guns to be towed out of line by motor trucks or by hand our men as a whole showed uarl fortitude in this continuous fighting during inclement weather and under many disadvantages of position consider armistice terms my diary records paris monday october 28 1918 met marshal boch and al lied commanders at sculls friday to consider terms of armistice pe views were esthier than mar ahal and mine more stran gent than either have been laid up with grip since saturday at the opening of the conference marshal roch said in substance you are doubtless aware that the germans are negotiating for an armistice through the intermediary of the amer lean government and declare them selves ready to accept the fourteen points of president allson as a basis he went on to bay that he had called us together to obtain our views and that he thought the terms should be such as to render germany power less to recommence operations in case hostilities are resumed one of ahli officers then read aloud from a newspaper the fourteen points defers to british and french foch then asked my opinion as to conditions that should be imposed and I 1 replied that a it was a batter of it has taken in the operations since july 18 has not been inconsiderable it Is constantly increasing in strength and training its staffs its services and its higher commanders have am proved by experience so there 1 ev ery reason to suppose that the american army will be able to take the part expected of it ip the event of resumption of hostilities I 1 therefore propose 1 evacuation of france and belgium within 30 days and of all other foreign territory occupied by germany without delay 2 withdrawal of the german armies from alsace lorraine and occupation of those territories by the allied armies 3 withdrawal of german ar to the east of the rhine and and the possession of such bridgeheads on the eastern side in the rhine by the allies as may be nee essary to insure their control of that aher 4 unrestricted transportation of the american army and its roa terdal across the seas 5 immediate repatriation of all nationals of foreign territory now or heretofore occupied during the war by germany C surrender of all U boats and U boat bases to the control of a neutral howo until their disposition la otherwise determined 7 return to france and bel glum of all railroad rolling stock that has been seized by germany from those countries TO BB |