| Show general countr lc br th north american newspaper New paper alliance story ol 01 the ac ee F world erred including la whole reproduction rt the or in part prohibited service gem johm J CHAPTER it thus appeared quite clear that the french were so intent on their plan that premier clemenceau pre burned to cable washington as to how our units were to be handled upon the receipt of the cable from wash ington about the disagreement between petain and myself I 1 wrote at once to M clemenceau quoting the cable and adding may I 1 not suggest to you mr pres ident the inexpediency of tatang such matters to washington by cable these questions must all be settled here eventually on their merits through friendly conference between general petain and myself and cables of this sort are very likely I 1 fear to convey the impression of serious disagreement between us when buch is not the case Clemence aua reply M clemenceau s reply translated into english follows my dear general I 1 hasten with out losing a moment to reply to your letter dated january B 1018 I 1 found myself in the position of cabling to the ambassador of france at washing ton because the two contradictory re which I 1 had receded from general petain and from yourself when you did me the honor of calling on me obliged me in the interests of the common cause to seek an abbl between the two commanders in chief 1 need not conceal that I 1 placed full confidence in the american gov emment with regard to this however it was not to the american govern ment that I 1 addressed myself I 1 cabled to the ambassador of france I 1 which was my right and my duty in order to give him directions for the conversations which might take place either with the secretary of war or with the president of the united states it might very well have happened that later on I 1 should have addressed the american government but I 1 insist on this point that I 1 have done noth ing of the sort I 1 had not authorized the ambassador of france to read all or part of my dispatch to the secretary of war I 1 regret that he did so but I 1 do not disavow anything that I 1 wrote 1 I am giving you here the alon which I 1 owe you and I 1 am going to exercise all the patience of which I 1 am capable in awaiting the good news that the american commander and the french commander have finally agreed on a question which may be vital to the outcome of the war Clemence aus motive questioned As the french were dead set on getting our troops under their control it Is more than probable that the french premier feeling that their plans were not working out sought to create some distrust in the minds of our administration at washington against my management of things in order to pave the way tor insisting that we were entirely wrong in not consenting to amalgamation how ever at later meetings with clemen beau and retain the alleged differ encee were seemingly settled amicably as indicated in my cable of januari 14 which follows for chief of staff nave now alte understanding with french satis factory to them and to me that our divisions now in france shall corn their training as already begun in the future divisions arriving in zone of french armies are to have pe of training with french each regiment in a french division when sufficiently experienced by training in a quiet sector with french our alons are to be united under their own commander and will be placed in the line in our own sector CHAPTER the necessity for controlling the use of strong drink among our troops had been brought forcibly to my attention through the ease with which alco hollo beverages could be obtained the use of light wines as a part of the french ration was the continuance in the army of the versal custom of the people of having wine with their meals the wines and beer were not so objectionable but strong alcoholic spirits were regarded by the french themselves as dangerous and were prohibited for their troops but the prohibition was not well enforced outside the zone of the armies the problem of preventing our troops from drinking the stronger liquors was difficult especially at the ports of entry efforts to obtain enforcement through conferences with local authorities and through agreements with the port and district boffl clala were made from time to time but with little result I 1 finally appealed to prime minis clemenceau for support but be would only counsel local officials as he did not wish to declare a state of elege martial law in the end it was necessary to take the matter in our own hands and declare every bar and restaurant where the heavy liquor was sold as off limits for our troops our were directed to tire their personal attention to the enforcement of this order vice in army denied about athla time a cable was re calved from washington that some publication at home had made a sweeping charge of both immorality and drunkenness against our men no such statement could be based on fact nor could it serve any purpose except to cause unnecessary anxiety to par ants and relatives and perhaps fy on the part of some one an un worthy desire for sensation in reply I 1 cabled in part as follows there has never been a similar body of men to lead as clean lives as as our american soldiers in france they have entered this war with the highest devotion to duty and with no other idea than to perform these du ties in the most efficient manner possible engaged in healthy interesting ex in the open air with simple diet officers and men like trained lord northcliffe athletes are ready for their task for bidden the use of strong drink and protected by stringent regulations against other evils and supported by their own moral courage their good behavior Is the subject of most fa comment especially by our allies american mothers may rest assured that their sons are a credit to them and the nation seek more chaplains my diary notes the following paris thursday jan 10 1918 have appointed maj robert ba con to be colonel and A D C on my staff bishop gwynne deputy chaplain general british army and bishop brent were my guests at chaumont on monday on tuesday brent and I 1 als cussed increase in number of chaplains which we both favor bishop brent had been selected by me for appointment as chaplain with a view to his being the chief of the chaplain corps which it was planned to organize the bishop did not approve of this idea and in deference to his opinion and upon bis alon a permanent executive commit tee of chapla lm was appointed to study the problems involved and make recommendations direct to me from time to time bishop gwynne of the british forces explained their system the methods and the control and direction of chaplain a work from which we adopted such features as were applicable to our service custom in our army arising from lack of appreciation of the usefulness of chaplains had relegated them as a class to the status of handy men who were detailed to write up boards of survey or run libraries aviation questions demanded attention for in no other ice was so evident and so difficult to overcome apparently there was earnest effort at borne but it was too often misdirected on the part of the allies especially the french lack of mechanics and delay in procuring motors and material such as spruce had given them a set back due to these conditions and their own increased programs the french and also the italians were un able to take more than a small proportion of our flying cabets cadets who were on the ground and who under agreement were to be instructed by them about this time the contract or planes we had made in august was formally abrogated the french gov eminent being unable to meet its con due to the delay in receipt of machine tools and raw materials from the united states a possibility which had been forecast in my cables to the war department in its stead we later made an agreement whereby WP should be dependent upon the allot ment that might be made us accord ing to the number of divisions we might have in france early in december I 1 signed an agreement with lord northcliffe of the british air board that we should send enlisted men to england and maintain that number in in their aircraft factories and air ice stations this plan proved to be beneficial to both sides as far as car aled out but especially to ourselves in providing us with trained meo and saving us the necessity of establish ing extra schools for teaching them ourselves due to the of air personnel from home we lacked 4 of reaching the number specified and later the need for line troops prevented our completing the number british wanted U S men when general robertson came tor the conference regarding the shipment of troops for training with the arit ish as mentioned in my diary we began to discuss the details of the als position to be made of our forces which might be brought over in british shipping it was found that gen eral proposal was cally the same as the one submitted co E M house through mr lloyd george he wanted to bring our in fantry and machine gun units by bat only and pointed out how much more this would meet the shortage of men in the brit ish army than to ship whole divisions with all their equipment and stores ue believed that the british gov eminent would take the task of releasing temporarily some shipping en in carrying food and raw materials if america could see her way to provide the men although he said U could not well undertake the transportation por tation of complete divisions as not enough men would be brought over in this manner to justify the great risks involved in other words the british had the shipping to transport amerl can battalions on condition that they would serve in the british armies however as general proposal would enable us to increase our strength more rapidly my prelim inary cable to washington reporting the conference recommended that it be given consideration and in view of our national attitude regarding ice with another army that if ap proved the plan should be regarded as a temporary measure to meet an emergency that as soon as possible the remaining troops of our divisions thus temporarily broken up should be brought over and the units reas sem bled that division brigade aart regimental commanders and their staff be sent with their infantry for training with the corresponding british units and that the infantry be taken from hose divisions that would not otherwise be transported until after june CHAPTER every one in authority realized that all resources the allies could muster would be required to meet successfully the great offensive of the central pow ers expected n the spring but to uso them effectively close co among commanders would be impera alve with this in mind I 1 proposed to premier clemenceau that the corn manders in chief and chiefs of staff get together to examine the altu atlon and it possible determine a general program of combined action M clemenceau at once approved the suggestion it was also favorably received by general foch who it will be recalled was chief of the french general staff I 1 proposed that the meeting be held at my headquarters but the french selected petain s G H Q at the meeting january 24 1918 robertson for the british spoke firby and suggested a general statement ac to 1 mutual support between allied armies 2 situation as to 3 question of troops in italy 0 situation as to the transportation tt the american army and facilities given it in france petain favored defensive general petain thought that for the present the allies would be forced to remain on the defensive because of lack of men he said the french army had ninety seven divisions with an in fantry strength of from to men each some thirty odd of these divisions being in reserve and the rest in the trenches besides eight cavalry divisions two of which were dismounted and six mounted all divisions he thought could be kept up until april if there should be no fighting but later on eren without a battle he would have to break up five divisions to maintain the others the six mounted cavalry divisions would have to be reduced to four and before the end of the year the total force would have to be reduced by twenty divisions foch waa cpr counteroffensive general foch declared that the best means of baiting a strong and persistent offensive was a powerful counteroffensive the german offensive at verdun was stopped not by our resistance there but by our offensive on the som me in said general foch such an operation Is possible only when foreseen and prepared beforehand in planning the counteroffensive I 1 think that the entire front must be conald ered as a whole and not the french as one part and the british as another the plan must envisage them together preparing for offensive action on a common battlefield with alt the forces at their disposal general robertson expressed accord with foch but he did not see where or with what means such an offensive could be executed and stated that the war could not be won by remaining on the defensive give us back the troops from sa donika and we will commence offensives said general halg we were not speaking of offensives but of gen eral foch replied general robertson remarked that of course the french and british could reinforce each other and make coun attacks ter and then asked could they do more than that not without the americans gen eral petain answered him dependent upon U S general robertson then said 1 I think our only hope lies in american reserves 1 and he wanted to hear from me TO BB CONTINUED 1 |
