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Show Mounting Battle Tempo Calls for More Material Big Problem Is to Route Manpower Into Critical Work; Labor Needs Vary Throughout Different Areas. By BAUKHAGE Netvi Analyst and Comnwntator raw material and will have the manufacturing facilities in time. Undersecretary of War Patterson told the house military affairs committee com-mittee that in the 3rst six months of 1945, 700,000 men would be needed for war production and industry necessary to the war effort. I have talked with the War Manpower Man-power commission experts and they break down those figures something like this: One hundred and fifty thousand men needed immediately for critical war production. One hundred and fifty thousand more for other war production to take care of the normal turn-over, expected replacements, etc. The remaining 400,000 must be retained in civilian production and services which have to be continued in order to maintain the total war efTort. The situation is summed up in general terms this way: The manpower man-power mobilization problem is not as large as it was in 1942 and 1943 but it is more acute in certain lines. Two things contribute to making mak-ing it more acute. One is the fact that we haven't the pool of either civilian production or the unemployed unem-ployed from which to draw as we had at the start. Second, because the needs are "critical" (battle needs) they must be satisfied im- ; mediately nr the actual front-line WNU Service, Union Trust Building Washington, D. C. What is wrong with the American war efTort on the home front? Why all this excitement over a new draft of manpower? Didn't War Mobilizer Byrnes say that our war production almost equalled the production of the entire world? These questions are being asked In many minds. I have asked them of the men whose Job t Is to get things done in Washington, and I want to try to put their answers before you. Let me quote one sentence spoken by War Mobilizer Byrnes himself: "Critical production no longer feeds pipe-lines or goes into strategic strate-gic reserves it is going right into battle." If we compare "critical production" produc-tion" with fighting units, perhaps the recent German counter-otTensive will help us see the picture. When Von Rundsledt's drive started, men and tanks and guns and trucks, "critical production" in other words, all had to be poured into actual battle. The result was that there were just not enough of them in the right place at the right time and our line crumbled. There were no immediate reserves to throw in and bolster the defense. Later on, when the veterans from the Third army and the First army and the British troops arrived, the tide was turned. They represented the reserves of "critical production" produc-tion" which should have been there all the time. . For many months on that particular particu-lar front only the men in the front lines were needed. There were enough men there to take care of the normal enemy Opposing them. It was a minimum force without enough reserve to take care of maximum need and they were thrown back. That is the situation in war production pro-duction today. Certain critical supplies sup-plies (airplanes, tanks, other vehicles vehi-cles and their accessories, certain types of ordnance, certain types of ammunition) are being used so fast in battle that if an extra strain developed at a certain point there would not be any reserve to call upon. Changing Conditions Alter Planning Why are these things lacking? Why didn't we pile them up, as we do other things, until we had enough to take care of an emergency? Chiefly, because their greatest need developed after we started our war activities may be immediately affected. af-fected. One thing which must be considered consid-ered is the geographical shift of the American labor force, a point which affects the general situation for it Involves moving a worker from place to place And in the present pres-ent need, although the West coast (where labor is concentrated) is still the most critical area, the building of new factories to meet new needs and the change in the type of needs from one established factory in one place to one in another an-other place involves the question of suasion or force on the worker For instance, there is a great need in Utah and Wyoming for workers work-ers in coal mines. The scattered foundry sections from Michigan and Ohio, through Pennsylvania and New York to New England are critical areas. Even plane production, produc-tion, concentrated in the West, has its problems, for, although some airplane air-plane factories on the Pacific coast have closed down, many of the new factories for the flying fortresses and other new models are in areas other than the West coast. We have the man and woman-power woman-power in the nation to take care of the need. It is a question of getting programs. Reserves for the future can only be based on present information infor-mation or estimates based on previous previ-ous knowledge, or lucky guessing. When the war began nobody, not even the Japs who used amphibious warfare in the early stages to the best advantage, had any Idea of the type and number of landing-craft, landing-craft, to say nothing of the technique tech-nique of operating them, which are used in the latest Allied operations. The contrast between the Japanese landing in Lingayen bay and the American landing three years later in the same place is astounding. Byrnes used as examples of other "unpredictables," inventions and Improvements over old models, jet planes, new types of radar and the like. Today, 55 per cent of our war production does not need to rise. Some of it is properly declining. But there are other parts of the program which are lagging that should mount, because they are "critical production." Of course, some plants making such goods are temporarily closed while re-tooling for new models. Others are under construction But many plants lack nothing except manpower, those, for example, making certain types of planes and tanks and ships. Tires are being ground to pieces by sheil splinters in the mud of Luxembourg Luxem-bourg and Belgium. Tanks ere rolling roll-ing from New Guinea to the Philippines Philip-pines to the Rhine, and bigger and better ones are demanded There is a constant need for all kinds of ammunition, am-munition, but there is critical need for certain types of ammunition, both heavy and light. And so we come to the main problem prob-lem which is really the only problem prob-lem today manpower. We have the the right man In the right place. Overoptimism Causes Letdown There are several reasons why the right man (and woman) is net in the right place now. One is due to an error in judgment which may, or may not, be blameworthy. Germany's Ger-many's "come-back" power, for which I attempted to set forth certain cer-tain reasons in two preceding columns, col-umns, was underestimated. This caused a shortage in certain types of weapons. Superabundance in others. The latter put men out of work and caused them to seek non-war jobs. We had counted on a more mobile type of warfare. We did not think we needed the heavy artillery to blast Germany out of powerful defenses. We counted too heavily on enemy vulnerability to the bombing of German cities. That was both a psychological and strategical stra-tegical error. Underestimating the length of the European war also had a bad psychological psy-chological effect. It caused many workers to quit war work for what they thought would be more permanent per-manent employment. It caused great pressure on Washington to begin be-gin reconversion, as War Mobilizer Byrnes admits was wrong. He said: ". . we could not do two things at once . . . could not pursue an all-out war production effort while simultaneously releasing materials, facilities and manpower for civilian production." The man and his job were separated, sepa-rated, too. by the improvement oi models and creation of new equipment. equip-ment. No one can be blamed for this. But frequently, as I have shown, it tended to place the job and the man miles apart. |