Show S Sent nt Warning Unknown to Army Message to Relayed by Navy on Nov 26 1941 WASHINGTON Dee Dec 4 UP The UE-The The Pearl Harbor investigating investigating gating committee heard beard today that Great Britain and Gen Douglas MacArthur at Manila lanila had more knowledge of secret Japanese messages prior to Dec Dee 7 1941 than did Maj l Gen Walter C. C Short at Hawaii WASHINGTON Dec 4 INS The INS The Pearl Harbor committee commit commit- tee learned Tuesday that the late Pres Roosevelt sent a war warning to the Philippines on Nov 26 1941 which the army's inte intelligence chief knew nothing about The message was transmitted by Adm Harold R. R Stark then chief of naval operations to the high commissioner of the Philippines and stated that an advance against Thailand seems I the most probable I I consider it possible that this I next Japanese aggression might cause an outbreak of hostilities between be be- tween the United States and Japan Japan Japan Ja Ja- Ja- Ja pan the presidential message warned Maj Gen Sherman Miles army intelligence chief if it 1941 told the committee he ho had not seen the warning message Earlier Miles told the committee commit commit- tee that Adm Harold R. R Stark at first opposed Gen George C. C Marshalls Marshall's Marshalls Marshalls Marshall's Mar Mar- shall's hour eleventh-hour warning to Pearl Harbor on the morning of Dec 7 1941 Miles tiles also was asked why Marshall Marshall Mar Mal shall did not get to his desk to write the final message until 11 1125 25 o'clock o'clock- one o'clock-one one me hour and 35 minutes before the Japanese struck Horseback Riding He replied I 1 believe Gen Marhall Marshall Marshall Mar Mar- shall hall was out horseback riding This is' is also out out lathe in the I army armr boards board's report on on P Pearl arl Har Bar bor Miles MUes told the committee that he had never known that Gen Douglas Doug Doug- las MacArthur Philippine commander commander com corn mander was receiving information direct from interception of ot secret Jap diplomatic messages Miles testimony on the events of at Dec 6 and 7 1941 disclosed that army intelligence experts correctly anticipated a Jap attack but it was to be directed against Thailand Thai Thai- land rather land rather than Pearl Harbor Gen Miles gave the committee his version of ot what occurred in Marshalls Marshall's e the fateful Sunday Sunday Sunday Sun Sun- day morning as Washington officials officials of of- learned of ot the Japs' Japs 1 p. p m. m dead line for breaking relations with the United States His account contained In a memo written for the chief chiet of staff one week later on Dec 15 disclosed 1 Miles and others believed the probable Japanese move would be Into Thailand but that it might be any anyone one or more of a number of other areas 2 Gen pen Marshall telephoned Stark Stade chief of ot naval operations and suggested a warning to the Philippines Hawaii Panama and the west coast Marshall put down the telephone and said that the admiral did not think any further further further fur fur- ther warnings necessary since all the forces had already been several several sev sev- eral times alerted Again Called Stark 3 Marshall wrote out his now historic warning message again called Stark and the latter apparently apparently apparently ap concurred and asked that the naval forces be Informed Marshall added that to the mes mes- sage 4 4 Miles Gen Leonard onard T. T Gerow war plans chief Col Cot R. R S. S Bratton far eastern intelligence head and ands a Col Cot Bundy voiced be be- See Page 2 Column 1 Flashed W W nn o oTo 1 To 0 Philippine Islands Itt Continued from Page Pago One On Ono 1 i lief Ie the timing and the tlc Tap Jap reply Y probably meant munt Thailand meant Thailand I I 5 6 i. i Bratton contended that th the army's message center gave him I no Intimation that all four tour mes roes messages sages w would uld not go over over army radio direct to the four tour arm army headquarters The message to toW Pearl Harbor another memo revealed re revealed re- re W was sent by Western Union at 1217 p. p m m. was W re re- by RCA Honolulu at a A. A m nt Hawaiian time and was delivered to the army signal Bignal off of- of fleer f er at tt 11 1145 5 r am a. Orders Orden Priority t 6 s. Gen Gerow b br sent Instructions r r with Bratton for tor the message cepI cen- cen center 1 I 0 ter to to give first priority to th the Philippines s. s If there Is a question or of f priority 7 Col Bratton advised Marhall Mar Mar- hall that the me message age center said the warning would be encoded Inkt In 1 tt kt three ree minutes minute on the sir air alrIn In fn eight 4 end and d in the hands of the recipients In ln I think 20 zm Stiles Miles s told the the committee th that t tJ he ho saw nw no reason for alerting or waking Awaking the chief of staff itaf or or Secretary Secre- Secre J tary Hull Hun on the night of D Dec c 6 after he learned the contents of I the first 13 parts paita of the J Japanese i reply The witness said aad Id these portions t of the Intercepted message were just a si rehash of Japanese arguments menta ments which did not themselves In them Indicate Indicate a a break In relations although al alk k though he sai said Baht h he ha had expected p te they probably would woula l i rues Mlles a admitted tb that t It IE was a fair air assumption a Ion on n the night of of ri ec 6 that were goIng go- go i. i go- go going Ing to be broken cen of off by the Japanese Japanese Japa Japa- f nese nes First Gearheart and then Ferguson Fer Fer- gU guson questioned Miles on n whether I there was any discussion of flash flash- I Ing the Mar Marshall h warning to Hawaii Ha Ha- t. t wall wail by telephone telephone- orb or or by radio radi o rather than an transmitting i It through routine channels Miles Miles' replied that there had been no such discussion during the historic Dec 7 meeting In In Marshall's Marshalls Marshalls Marshall's Mar Mar- shall's office oIce We were in In such haste to get the message sent t so o that I It would be In the hands of ot th the various commanders commanders com com- manders that we did not discuss how It was to tobe to be transmitted Mlles Miles declared Speed Essential The main th thing A ng was to get the warning ot off w with th all possible speed and We handed It ft to the the signal corps to cx expedite as rapidly a 3 It coul could Gearhart asked Mites Miles If It he he did not know that the F FBI B I had a wave short connection with Hawaii Ha Ha- wall wail and that a r. similar hookup was was maintained b by th the navy nivy Mlles Miles l s said he had heard th that both the FBI and the navy had such communication At that time was wu there not onGen on Gen Marshall's Marshalls aU desk a a telephone by which he could have called Hawaii VaU Gearhart asked Yes sir sIr Miles said td there was was And was wa there not a 8 scrambler apparatus by the phone 1 Gearhart Gear- Gear hart lart continued I Yes es sir Miles answered anS slowly slow low slowly lowI I ly there was WM a a. scrambler appa apparatus ratus rates In a room near nea by I S No When Mien you de decided to send the warning warningS mes message age was WM there any discussion on n the tho method of transmission transmission trans trans- mission Gearhart demanded I 1 remember r. r n no no such J ch d discus discussion sion Miles MUes responded Gearhart then commented th that t although the need to exp expedite the warning had bad been desperately YU U Ur Urgent gent gen the army high command had selected e th the slowest way of getting getting get getting get get- ting It to Hawaii |