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Show CREDIT GIVEN TO U. S. FOR SMASHING TEUTON SUBMARINE BLOCKADE British Provided 48 Per Cent of Troopships, but America Gave Almost 83 Per Cent of Neces-essary Neces-essary Escorting War Vessels. By COMMANDER CHARLES C. GILL, U. S. N. A oved ,y Itf-ur Admiral Albert (Jbavr;s, Commander of the 'ruber and Transport Force, United States Atlantic fleet.) PHK lM:s to IM.; he !d-a of a I lifted Si :t t ;S OVtirneaH expeditionary expedition-ary force numbered hy millions would have be-n t';nei ally rcpa.nl-ed rcpa.nl-ed ,-ih a rcniolfl if not Impossible '';, iiii, m.. ( :onMi-ri:ontlj' no extensive pen -f- tune, per p.-ira lions had been made for Mjrh j,n .undertiLkiritf. The task of pi-ovldint,' a transport fleet w;i s, therefore, ;i pioneer work. Ship had (o bo ob-lained. ob-lained. officers and nre.wa enrolled and i mined. Ii v.as necessary to provide docks, st.orJiouHtS, liichler and tups, ( o.ilinpr eriuipmenl, repair facilities and nil the varird machinery for operatine: and iiiu in I ii inlnfi- a l;ii'KO transportation service. An " fi'ifdent a dr..: nisi rat ivo organization Lad n bo developed. Such, in brief, was the problem confronting con-fronting Ucar Admiral Albert (Jb aves, (hen eommander of the destroyer force of ' lie At lit tc fleet, when, on May 21), 11-17, Ik; received orders dr-sinatln him com-nmidf-r of United f-tat eg convoy operations opera-tions in the Atlantic in addition to his nth- i- duties. Work Constitutes Special Naval Phase. Thu work of the navy in connection with I be transports tlon of troops to France ooiisllluten a distinct phase of the present war.. The. attending- political and .military .mili-tary f iron instances Incident to the col-hip.se col-hip.se of Kussia, the critical situation on the. western front, and the threat of the tJerman .submarine combined to make this phase of special significance. Throughout Through-out the year following the entry of -the United Slates into the war the military a nd naval developments were such that the safe transportation across the Atlantic Atlan-tic of troops and supplies became a problem prob-lem of more and more pressing impor-la impor-la nee. The United States oriny in France was n decisive factor in obtaining speedy victory. vic-tory. The tranai orla tlon of this army overseas under naval protection was, therefore, a major operation of first importance. im-portance. A lare share of this urgent mission devolved on the United States navy, and lis successful accomplishment in the face of reat difficulties is another paie to the record of the service in keeping keep-ing with its past history nnd traditions, according to the advance sheet of an ar- tlrlo nppari!i7 iu the Defomber number of t he Current Historv magazine, pub-lifh-'d bv the New York Timen compinv, and thks is the fjrst offbdal publication completely ref-itiM the claim that our tronpa v.;re transported to Furope almost al-most entirely In foreign bottoms. Explanation Given to Clear Confusion. Much confusion of thoupht has existed as to Just how the vast work of transporting trans-porting a r'nltfd States army numbering L,07fp K80 souls to JCuropo has been accomplished. accom-plished. It is unfortunate that misinformation misinfor-mation should be disseminated respe:tlnj? an operation in which the different organizations or-ganizations concerned performed their respective functions In utmost harmony and co-operation. Ad have done their allotted parts splendidly and efficiently. effi-ciently. All share in the satisfaction re-BultliiK re-BultliiK from ( he suceeasful accomplishment accomplish-ment of a difncult and urgent undertaking. undertak-ing. At the time the United States entered the war the enormous toll of shipping gathered by the L'-boat In the East Atlantic At-lantic and the boast of Von Hindt'nburg that the submarine blockade of Fhgland would starve her out and win the war. indicate the seriousness of the naval situation In those waters. Inasmuch as the principal field of British naval activities activi-ties was the North sea and English channel, chan-nel, the task of breaking the U-boat blockade in the Atlantic naturally became the immediate mission of the Fid ted States navy. Splendid Work Done in Sending Vessels. The prompt dispatching of destroyers, yachts, and all olher available craft of a tvpe useful against the submarine to the Fast Atlantic, and the splendid work I hese vessels and others later sent to augment their strength have done in cleaning up tficse waters of F-boat devastation is a matter of record, the importance; of which in winning the war is conceded from all quarters. This was the first step in preparation for sending-the sending-the United States army overseas. The next step was the development of the transport service and tiie convov and escort system. In this work the cruiser and transport force co-operated with the destroyers and other antisubmarine craft abroad. In addition, Great , Britain, , France and Italy supplied troop ships. : As would be expected from Great Brit- ! ain's enormous merchant marine, she was able to supply the greatest carrying capacity. ca-pacity. She had the ships ready for this use, and 48 per cent of the American army was transported In British steamers, steam-ers, 2',a Per cent were carried In French ships, and 3 per cent In Ttallan ships. The remaining 4BU per cent were carried car-ried in United States ships, and all but 2 '.2 Pr cent of these sailed in Urn ted States naval transports. American Troops Escorted by U. S. All the troops carried in United States ships were escorted by United States men-of-war; that is, cruisers, destrovers, converted yachts and other antisubmarine antisubma-rine craft. Also, for the most part, the troops carried in British, French and Italian ships were given safe conduct through the danger stones hy United States destroyers. Roughly, S'2 per cent of the maximum strength of the naval escorts provided incident to the transportation trans-portation of United States troops across the Atlantic was supplied bv the United States navy, 14 1-3 per cent by the British Brit-ish navy, and 3Vb per cent by the French navy. The declaration of war with Germany found the United States without a transport trans-port fleet and without a merchant marine ma-rine capable of supplying1 ships for transporting trans-porting a large military expedition. It is a remarkable and noteworthy example of American ingenuity and zeal that, starting with almost nothing nt the beginning be-ginning of the war, a United States naval transport service has been built up which has carried almost a million soldiers to Europe. In spite of the determined efforts ef-forts of submarines to prevent it this has been accomplished without the loss of a single soldier by the hand of the enemy. Army Co-operation Facilitates Work. The splendid co-operation of the army has made this possible. The army organized or-ganized and developed an efficient svstem for loading and unloading- the ships at the terminal ports. The navv transported transport-ed the troops and safeguarded them en route. On homeward-bound voyages, however, we have not been so fortunate. In a i ineiii-uie uiif mis oeen uue to neeu of con-centrating con-centrating maximum naval ascort protection protec-tion on troop-laden convoys. Frequently this necessitated lighter escort for the ships returning, and It was on those homeward-bound vessels that the. subma- . rines scored their successes. The United States naval transports Antilles, President Lincoln and Covington were torpedoed and I sunk. The Finland and Mount Vernon ! were torepoed, hut were able to reach port for repairs. The United States armored cruiser San Diego struck a mine laid bv a German submarine and was sunk. Hun Secret Agents Caused Much Damage. The service was not without hazard, as is shown by the fact that more than half of the war casualties in the United States navy were suffered Inthe cruiser and transport force. Nor were enemy guns and torpedoes the only memue danger irom fire and internal damage was enhanced by the machinations of enemy secret asents, and the likelihood of collision was increased by the necessity neces-sity of maneuvering without -lights in convoy formation vessels manned for the most part by inexperienced crews. In connection with the operation of the ships special mention should he matle of the volunteer and reserve personnel, particularly par-ticularly the officers and men from the U-nlted States merchant marine service, who enrolled in the navy for the period of the war. These have rendered splendid splen-did service, and the interests of the United States for the future require that the cordial relations of co-operation es-ta'oliphed es-ta'oliphed between the merchant marine and the navy be maintained. Officers Detailed From Regular Navy. In the larsrer transports It was the policy of the department to have the captains, executive officers, chief engineers, gunnery gun-nery officers, senior medical officers and senior supply officers detailed from the rffular navy and the remainder of the officer complement filled from the various classes of reserve and volunteer ofiicers. Tins worked very well, and too much credit cannot he Riven the latter for the loyal, service rendered ;.nd tiie. aptitude , shown in adapting themselves to naval j war conditions. I In special oases it was rossible. after a ! cptiain amount of experience had been! pained, to relieve heads of departments, ' oricinaily assignments of regular naval ; officers, by reserve , officers. For ex- , ample, in the case of the Harrisburt?, Lou- isville. Plattshurff, Manchuria, Mongolia and Finland, after a few trips the reserve captains took over command of the ships, j 45,000 Employed in j Transport Service. j Credit is a!sr due the navy yards, pro- i visions and clnihint? depots, medical sup-pi sup-pi v depots, and the ship repair plains which supplemented the navy yards in performing per-forming the work incident to making ready and keeping- In service this lare United States nava cruiser and trans-jort force, commanded by Rear Admiral Gleaves and numbering, at the time of the armistice, twenty-four cruisers and forty-two transports, trans-ports, manned, exclusive of troops car-iled. car-iled. by about 3'XK' officers and -12.000 men. A an ir:s'.iii'.'"e of'noie or less prevalent mlsfv.torntation : lie-- e:ulv in t.:e pres reference ref-erence waf !nad-Ly high author! Ly to j "Seven great British liners which have i carried fia per cent of the American . soldiers sol-diers .abroad since March." The actual I figures are: Total United States soldiers carried since the end of March. 1SHS, l,50u,624. The seven largest ships of a foreign ally carried. In all 10.37 per cent of tiie above total. In the same period a single ship of the United States naval transport service serv-ice carried 5 per cent of tiie total. |
