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Show TRUTH AliOUT THE WAR. Xoir tli at another season of war is about to close it is well to cast up the account, "'nothing to extenuate, nor set down aught in malice," iu prejudice preju-dice or in unwarranted pessimism. At the end of the fighting season the war seems still in deadlock, no nearer a decision that it was when the year began. Tho balance of power, on the surface, at least, has shifted little ono way or the other. Tn Europe the territorial terri-torial gains are largely iu favor of the Teutonic powers, as they have Vjeeu ever since the nations closed iu the world-convulsing st-Aiggle. f tho allies have growia stronger and they have iu certain ways Germany Ger-many has not grown appreciably weaker. weak-er. In fact, Germany is more powerful today, in somo respects, tb.au she was a year ago. In au effort to calculate the comparative strength of the two sides it is easy to go wroug, because we know only in an approximate fashion fash-ion the condition of our own side while being more or less in ignorance of the condition of the eucmy. Thero are t-omo salicut facts which can be stated briefly and which will appeal to tho studious observers of the war game. Wc have alluded to the territorial gains iu Europe, but should mention the conquest of practically all of Africa by the allies, the British successes in the Bagdad region and in the Holy Land, the slight. German retreats re-treats in 'Franco and the retirement of the Austrians before the Italians on a front of a few miles to a depth of still fewer miles. Xor must wc forget tho recovery of Gnlicia by Austria when wc. are noting the extensive acquisitions ac-quisitions of territory by the Germans in Russia. It will be contended with justice that occupation of territory is no true measure meas-ure of success in such a war as this, that a few military or naval victories of a decisive character would quickly change the map of Europe. We see I tho truth of this in Germany's naval asceudauev in the Baltic. If that ascendancy can be improved by . the destruction of the Russian fleet in the Gulf of .Finland au eventuality which is most probable the Gentians can make themsrlves makers of Finland and the Petrograd region, extending ; their occupation over scores of thou- ) sands of square miles. On the other 1 hand, a smashing victory by General ( Ila-ig iu Flanders which is improbable this year would clear the iermaus away from the Belgian coast and restore re-store another part of uorthern France to tho rightful owner. But the relative strength of the two sides must be calculated by a different standard. We must ask ourselves whether the military power of the allies tins increased anil will continue to in-crea.se in-crea.se by comparison with the Teutonic j power. The difficulty in working nut j the equation is trie unknown quantity j beyond the Rhine. We know in a general gen-eral way what the allies have done in supplying war materials: we know-wherein know-wherein they have been strengthened and wherein they have been weakened. We are ignorant as to many conditions in Germany the food supply, the supply sup-ply of raw materials for the war factories, fac-tories, the state of the railroads, the e power to produce airplajies. submarines ud to replace the wasted ranks of the army. The allies have been fond of telling one another that their duty was to keep on "killing Germans'' and that tiie war would end as soon as CDongh Germans Ger-mans had been killed. There was a flaw in the argument that they did not think it worth while to point out. but there is no advantage in hiding from the American people the real situation. If Americans are made to understand the war n.s it is they will not rest satisfied sat-isfied with what 'hey have done, but will make still more gigantic efforts. The flaw in the argument was simply this -Germany replaced its man pow-er in its industries with prisoners and with the popular inn s of occupied t'rri-torv. t'rri-torv. Millions of workmen have been recruited fiom Russia, Poland, Kuma-A, Kuma-A, Serbia, P-elgium. northern France, Albania and Montenegro, as well as from the neutral countries Swedeu, Denmark and Holland. Farms and factories fac-tories have sent out their workmen to the fighting fronts and have taken in the workmen from the foreign countries. The factories of Great Firitain are worked' by British: the factories of France by the French, and the factories of the United States by Americans. However, our own country need not figure fig-ure in the reckoning, for we have been in the war six months, and while we have lost less than 200 fighting men, we have raised an army of more than a million anil have several hundred thousand thou-sand men iti our navy. In Franco prisoners, pris-oners, Chinese coolies and workmen from Africa have assisted, but, comparatively com-paratively speaking, the French have not. hail foreign aid in the industries to tho extent that Germany has had such aid. It is clear, on tho whole, that "killing Germans" has not beeu enough. Killing German industry has been quite as essential and in that respect re-spect the allies have failed. What of the U-boats? The proposition proposi-tion has been stated frequently. The U-boats can defeat the allies by attaining at-taining a certain effectiveness. Has that state of effectiveness been reached? Von Tirpitz says it has and adds that it is ouly a matter" of time until tho allies must capitulate. What is the truth? The U-boat, together with mines and raiding cruisers, and reckoning reckon-ing accidental wrecks, is making it impossible im-possible for the allies to build as many ships as are being sunk. That docs not mean tho defeat of the allies within with-in a year, but it certainly does not point to victory. The task mapped out by the allies for next year is a greater task than was attempted this year. There will be more soldiers to supply and fewer ships with which to supply them. It is at least apparent that the submarines sub-marines are limiting the powers of the allies to strike decisive blows. With the submarine out of the way the allies could swiftly increase their military mili-tary power so that Germauy would be distanced. But the submarines are not out of the way and are not likely to be. We have not the space to discuss all the influences of the U-boat upon the war but let us consider one element ele-ment for a moment. It will not have escaped the notice of the observing that the allies are forever hitting at the strongest points, while the Germans strike at the softest spots. Why is tlis? Because the U-boats hold- the ailies within certain limitations. If tho U-boats were not sinking ships every ev-ery day the allies would not be compelled com-pelled to eonfino their military operations opera-tions chiefly to the French and Italian fronts.. They could strike for Constantinople Constan-tinople again. They could move forward for-ward several million men from Macedonia Mace-donia into Bulgaria, Serbia and Austria. They lack, not the men, but the shipping. ship-ping. And we must not lose sight of the fact that a cargo goes to the bottom with practically every ship wheat, beef, sugar, bacon, canned goods, potatoes, po-tatoes, ammunition, guns, automobiles, airplaues, machinery of all kinds. Millions Mil-lions of tons of food and machinery have been sent to the bottom of the sea since August, 1914. If tho allies could destroy six or seven freight trains of the enemy every day, and the goods in them, they would be able to play even. - That would sap the strength of the enemy more than mighty battles. And this can be done. A vast preponderance in aircraft can accomplish this result. But can the allies attain this preponderance? preponder-ance? Only time can disclose that to us. The chances are that we shall be able to assert the necessary preponderance prepon-derance next year or the year after, granting that the U-boats do not essentially es-sentially decrease ocean transportation. transporta-tion. The allies have been employing their aircraft in the most gainful ways. They have not bombarded German towns at random. They have dropped their bombs on railway stations and tracks, on trains, on submarine bases, on aerodromes, aero-dromes, factories and various military establishments. They have accomplished accom-plished something, but their preponderance prepon-derance has not been sufficient, apparently, appar-ently, to cripple the enemy. The two great successes of the war are the submarine and the airplane. It seems now as if victory might be determined de-termined by a race between them. We have touched upon a few of the discouraging aspects of the war. There are some encouraging aspects. Many Will remember General Grant's story of his first clash with the enemy as commander of a force. He was in a state of nervous collapse witli worry about his chances of success, suc-cess, but finally he ordered an advance and the enemy ran away. He learned by that experience that the other fellow fel-low was very apt to be as scared as himself. It is quite likely that the Teutons, in spite of their bold front, may have suffered as heavily as have the allies. If we could use the eyes of au all-seeing angel and look into Germany Ger-many we might discern a condition of disastr that we could hardly have ini- agined. Wc might see railroads falling to pieces for want of new rails and j equipment, factories patching up old ; machinery, farms useless for want of fertilizer and eveu the seemingly inexhaustible inex-haustible man power at the breaking point. We might see all of these things and we might, see none of them. We must reckon only with the kuown in our preparations and leave the unknown to work for us if it will. |